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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN THE SOVIET UNION I

AS early as 1906, Lenin, fully recognizing in the agrarian events of 1904-5 the harbingers of a social revolution, nevertheless saw fit to admonish his followers in these words: "We are supporting the peasant movement to the last, but we must remember that this is not the class which is capable of bringing about or will bring about a socialist revolution." [1] This attitude toward the peasantry flows directly from what Lenin called a "truism" known to every Marxian, that the "leading social forces in every capitalistic society are the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, while all the other social groups who occupy an intermediate position . . . inevitably gravitate in the direction of the first or second major group." [2] In the light of the position of the peasantry during the French Revolution, in the revolutionary movement of the nineteenth century in Western Europe, and in the first decade of the twentieth in Russia, Lenin held that "all the attempts of the petite-bourgeoisie in general, and the peasantry in particular, to assert their power and direct economic and political policies along their own lines, ended in defeat." [3] Soon after the outbreak of the February Revolution of 1917 he warned his followers that a union of the peasantry with the bourgeoisie might take place. Hence, "the proletarian party at present must not

[1] Lenin, N., *Peresmotr Agrarnoi Programmy Rabochei Partii* (*A Reëxamination of the Agrarian Program of the Workers Party*) (St. Petersburg, 1906), p. 27.

[2] Lenin, N., *Sobranie Sochinenii* (*Collected Works*) (Moscow, 2d ed.), vol. XXIII, p. 290.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. XXVI, p. 290.

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place any hopes on the community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry. We are striving to win the peasantry over to our side; the peasantry, however, is more or less consciously on the side of the capitalists." [4]

Despite this critical attitude, Lenin was aware of the fact that the October Revolution would not have triumphed but for the support of the poor and middle peasants. He realized the importance of an alliance between the workers and the majority of the peasants, since the rôle of the latter group in a still overwhelmingly agrarian Russia was not less significant than that of the proletariat. If we may consider the October Revolution of 1917 as the resultant of several compounded forces, of which the peasantry is a leading one, then, to a large extent as the peasantry shifts, so does the direction of the Revolution. In the crucial year of the Soviet Republic, in 1921, he insisted that "only an agreement with the peasantry can save the social revolution in Russia until the revolution takes place in other countries".[5] As the prospects of an early communist outbreak abroad faded away, an understanding with the peasants became the central point of Lenin's policies. When Lenin, through the promulgation of the New Economic Policy, spoke of establishing a closer link (*smychka*) between the workers and the peasants, it was more than the expression of a temporary policy, it was the premise upon which rested the possible solution of the peasant problem, and, by the same token, the development and preservation of the Soviet State.

The practical expression of this all-important link is the socialization of agriculture. This proceeds along two lines: the organization of peasant collective farms and the organization of State farms. The present inquiry is concerned with the former, which the Communists view at this moment as the most important way of solving the peasant problem.

The overthrow of Tsarism and the nationalization of the land and industry did away with the superstructure of capitalism in Russia. The application of the slogan, "All Land to the Peasants", increased the number of farms from 15 mil-

[4] *Ibid.*, vol. XX, p. 245.

[5] *Ibid.*, vol. XXII, p. 238.

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lion before the February Revolution to nearly 22 million in 1923,[6] 24 million in 1925 and over 25 million in 1928.[7] Lenin believed that the domination of the bourgeoisie rested not only upon its international solidarity but also "upon the strength of the small producers who give birth to capitalism and bourgeoisie—daily, hourly and all the time."[8] Therefore he interpreted the great increase in the number of small village producers as an indication that the foundation of capitalism in the village still remained. A classless society signified the absence of not only the landed nobility and the bourgeoisie but also the elimination of millions of small individual farmers and producers. The only way to eradicate them was through "the transfer of the economy of the country [including that of agriculture] . . . to a technical base of large-scale production."[9]

Lenin consented only grudgingly to the land decree of October 26, 1917 (November 7, 1917) with its provision for an equal distribution of the land among the peasants. He interpreted the decree as an approval of the division of the land of the rich landowners which had actually taken place in many parts of the country. Failure to approve it would have jeopardized the very existence of the Revolution. But Lenin felt that the solution of the agrarian problem was not in the egalitarian division and in the individual farming of the land. "A system of division of land", he maintained, "was opportune at the outset . . . in order to show that the land had been taken away from the rich landowners and turned over to the peasants."[10] But this could not solve the problem. When the peasantry, through its own experience, realized "that egalitarian division [of land] was nonsense" it would come to appreciate the fact that only "in communes, 'artels', and other

[6] *Selskoe Khoziaistvo S.S.S.R. v 1923-24* (*Agricultural Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1923-24*) (People's Commissariat of Finance, Moscow, 1924), p. vi.

[7] *Statisticheskii Spravochnik S.S.S.R. za 1928* (*Statistical Handbook of the U.S.S.R. for 1928*) (Central Statistical Administration, Moscow, 1929), p. 82.

[8] Lenin, N., *op. cit.*, vol. XXV, p. 173.

[9] *Ibid.*, vol. XXVI, p. 46.

[10] *Ibid.*, vol. XXIII, p. 282.

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coöperative organizations for the collective cultivation of the land lies salvation from the disadvantages of small-scale economy." [11]

The proletariat must realize, Lenin maintained, that the peasant is both a petit-bourgeois and a toiler, and that "as a toiler the peasant gravitates toward socialism, preferring the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The peasant as a grain seller gravitates toward the bourgeoisie, toward free trade, i. e., back in the direction . . . of capitalism." [12] It accordingly becomes imperative for the proletariat to advance the interests of the peasant-toiler over those of the peasant-petit-bourgeois. The surest way of achieving this is through a system of collective working of the land. He warned his followers time and again that the change in the system of agriculture should not come through coercion or by mere edict from above—"Let it be so!" The proletarian leadership should crystallize itself, he said, not into a power to force the peasant against his will into a collectivized system, but rather into a means of creating the necessary conditions for a voluntary shift. In an agricultural country like Russia, Lenin maintained, "we rest our case on the truism that through methods of coercion we shall achieve nothing. . . . To apply violence here means to ruin the entire cause. A continuous process of educating [the peasant] is essential here." [13] He insisted that "the attempt to introduce a collectivized system of agriculture through decrees and regulations would constitute one of the greatest of absurdities," [14] because "only those collectives are of value which are organized by the peasants themselves, through their own initiative, and the superiority of which has already been tested, in practice, by the peasants." [15]

Lenin's proposed method of bringing about a collective system of agriculture points clearly to the pace to be followed. Considering the general make-up of the Russian peasant, par-

[11] *Ibid.*, vol. XXXII, p. 282.
[12] *Ibid.*, vol. XXIV, p. 314.
[13] *Ibid.*, vol. XXIV, p. 168.
[14] *Ibid.*, vol. XXIII, p. 252.
[15] *Ibid.*, vol. XXIV, p. 174.

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ticularly his adherence to old forms and his distrust of large-scale economy, Lenin pointed out that "it is self-evident that such a transition . . . a transition from individual peasant farming to collective working of the land, requires a long time, and under no circumstances can it be accomplished at once." [16] Tsarism, in his opinion, could be overthrown in a few days, the landlords and capitalists expropriated in a few weeks, but the solution of the agrarian problem "which we are now approaching . . . can be achieved only through extremely persistent and continuous effort. . . . For the collective working of the land we shall have to fight step by step, inch by inch." [17]

A long time before Lenin formulated his views, the Russian peasant, through sheer force of necessity, properly gauged the importance of collective action. For instance, the land commune system, which, before the promulgation of the Stolypin land reform, covered almost eighty per cent of the total peasant land allotments,[18] had taught them lessons in effective coöperative action long before the modern coöperative movement came into existence. Under this system the land was owned by the entire village commune, or *mir*. In order that each member of the commune might use the land on an equal basis, the *mir* would periodically redivide the land among the members, allowing each one to utilize the allotted land for his own purposes. But even "where there was no repartition, even when there existed the hereditary tenure which would not permit it, the roots of the peasant households still interlocked," [19] because the peasants held their land allotments in numerous widely scattered strips. This prevailing system greatly entangled their land relations. Physical consolidation of the land as a means of obliterating the boundary strips, and disentangling the peasants' land relations, was practically unknown. Under

[16] *Ibid.*, vol. XXIII, p. 423.

[17] *Ibid.*, vol. XXIII, p. 423.

[18] Maslov, S., *Krestianskoe Khoziaistvo* (*Peasant Economy*) (Moscow, 1920), p. 88.

[19] Robinson, G. T., *Rural Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1932), p. 122.

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the circumstances "it was inevitable that the households should follow a common routine in the seeding, harvesting, pasturing and fallowing of the intermingled strips in each great field." [20] This close connection led to collective activities which were not limited to the "holding, renting, purchasing and distributing of the land." [21] They also found their expression, "though much less commonly, in the actual labor of production." [22] Thus "in 'artels' or cooperative groups, the peasants plow the land, and sow, harvest and thresh the grain . . . mow hay, cut down forests and brushwood . . . construct enclosures, common threshing floors, grist mills, pasture fences, dams, roads, ponds and ditches." [23] In general, in the Russian commune, collective labor assumed such proportions that "history cannot measure even approximately the variety and extent of these activities." [24]

Despite the variety of collective activity in which the peasant participated, he still retained a considerable degree of economic autonomy within the village commune, while large-scale collective farming, as the Communists view it, is predicated on the disappearance of this autonomy. But viewing the land commune system in connection with the spread of collectivization in Soviet Russia, one cannot but notice that within the old prevailing system of agriculture there evolved one fundamental element of the present movement—the element of collective action.

The collective movement in the Soviet Union falls into two phases: the period from the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution to 1929, and the period inaugurated in the spring of 1929 under what is known as the Five-Year Plan in Agriculture.

The beginning of the first period, the period of intensive preparatory work, dated from the Land Decree of October 26, 1917 (November 7, 1917). The first article of this decree states that "the landowners' right of property in land is herewith abolished without compensation." The provision that "the lands of the rank-and-file peasants and the rank-and-file

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 123. [21] *Ibid.*, p. 125. [22] *Ibid.*, p. 125.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 125 (quoting Sergei Witte). [24] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

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Cossacks are not subject to confiscation" (Article 5) merely insures these two groups the right of cultivating the land they formerly owned. The Peasant Land Instruction which was incorporated in the same decree shows that private property in land, whether of the rich landowner or the rank-and-file peasant, was done away with:

> The right of private property in land is to be abolished for all time. The land shall not be bought, sold, leased or otherwise alienated. All lands, whether belonging to the State, the former imperial family, the ex-Tsar, the monasteries, or the church, whether copyhold, entailed, private, public or peasant, shall be taken over without compensation, turned into the property of the entire people, and placed at the disposal of all who till them for use (Article 1).

Thus, this land decree did away with what the Bolsheviks always considered the greatest obstacle to the solution of the agricultural problem in Russia—private ownership of land.

In the Decree on Land Socialization issued on February 19, 1918 we find the first attempt to give legal form to Lenin's policies. It states specifically that the land policy of the Soviet Union "is to encourage a collective system of farming . . . at the expense of individual farming, with a view toward the transition to the socialist system of agriculture" (Article 11-e). The Decree also provides that "the State is to offer every encouragement, material and moral, to the collective system of working the land" (Article 11-e). But the legal foundation upon which the collective system of agriculture in Soviet Russia rests is to be found in the "Decree Concerning the Socialist Plan of Land Organization and Measures Pertaining Thereto", promulgated on February 14, 1919. This decree states that "all the land within the borders of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, no matter who may be cultivating it now, is considered a single state fund." We also find here a definite statement as to what the State intends to do with the land. The decree provides for the "building up of a unified agricultural economy . . . through large state agricultural undertakings, communes . . . and other forms of coöperative

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land utilization" (Article 3, section 1). It views "all forms of individual land farming . . . as transitory and passing." The decree touches upon the reasons for creating State farms (*sovkhozy*), defines the nature of an agricultural commune (Article 60), and specifically directs the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and all its branches "to give all possible assistance to agricultural communes . . . *artels* and other agricultural coöperative societies—supplying them with seed, implements, cattle and other forms of agricultural and technical aid" (Article 135).

These decrees were to be supplemented by a series of measures and policies systematically and gradually—measures of a nature easily grasped by the peasants whose mode of living and thinking stem from old methods of tilling the land. And it was out of consideration for this factor that there arose at the very outset the problem of deciding upon a means of uniting private and social interests in a way which would make the transition easy for the small land cultivator. This was to be effected through the collective farm or the *kholkhoz*.[24a] The latter is characterized by a physical consolidation of a number of individual peasant farms into a single block of land; by a complete or partial socialization of all or only the basic means of production, and by the substitution of a single, general planned process for the individual labor processes. The various forms of agricultural collectives fall into three categories: agricultural communes, societies for the joint cultivation of the land (*toz*) and agricultural *artels* (Sec. 3, Art. 1 Land Decree of Feb. 14, 1919). All these forms took root during the first period of collectivization, and with a varied degree of success have continued throughout the last sixteen years.

The three forms differ in the degree to which the land and the other means of production of the members are socialized, and in the manner of distributing the income among the members. Measured in these terms, the highest form of an agricultural collective is a commune. Here all members pledge themselves to a complete collectivization of their individual

[24a] Literal translation—collective economy.

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properties.[24b] Work and consumption are carried out on the basis of complete equality. The income is divided among the members of the commune equally, without regard to the size of the property contributed by each to the common fund.

A *toz* is an organization in which some of the means of production and the labor force of its members are temporarily socialized for the purpose of carrying out certain kinds of field work. Such collectives are not necessarily characterized by the physical consolidation of the land of their members. The division of income depends upon the amount of labor and equipment contributed by each member to the joint enterprise. Here is found a very slight variation from the individual system of farming. Private property concepts predominate, and the economic inequality among the members of such an agricultural organization remains intact.

The *artel* occupies an intermediary position between the commune and the *toz*. In it the basic means of production are collectivized. With some exceptions, there is complete physical consolidation of the fields held by the members of the *artel*. In the latter group there is preserved a certain degree of economic inequality; first, because a small part of the income is distributed among the members in accordance with the extent of the property contributed by them, and, secondly, because of the divergence existing in the amount of remaining property individually owned by the members, such as gardens, orchards and some cattle. The income is divided according to the quantity and quality of work performed by the members.

Due to the government's assistance and widespread application of the principle of voluntary organization, the total number of collectives in the Soviet Union was 33,258 by the

[24b] There seems to be, however, an exception to this general rule as indicated by the following excerpt from a recent decree promulgated by the Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. on June 15, 1933: "Each member of an agricultural commune has a right to acquire for his individual economy a cow, small productive live stock and fowl." (*Agricultural Bulletin of the Commissariat of Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R.*, No. 14.)

This is additional evidence of the recent tendency toward creating an incentive to work by providing the collectivized peasants with a restricted form of individual economy. Other manifestations of this tendency are discussed in the course of this paper.

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TABLE I: AVERAGE [25]

Republics	Peasant Farms				Cultivated Area (in hectares)			
	1925	1926	1927	1928	1925	1926	1927	1928
R.S.F.S.R.	12.3	15.1	19.1	14.0	52.2	73.3	63.8	50.0
Ukraine	12.0	12.2	11.0	12.0	52.0	55.0	51.5	43.0
White Russia....	12.4	13.0	10.0	13.0	51.5	50.0	45.0	38.0
U.S.S.R.....	12.1	14.0	15.5	13.7	51.2	64.1	59.0	44.5

middle of 1928. They included some 416,700 individual peasant farms, embracing a population of 1,982,000 and a cultivated area of 1,388,900 hectares (a hectare is approximately two and a half acres). The percentage of farms collectivized was 1.7, representing 1.6 per cent of the total population and 1.2 per cent of the total cultivated area.[26]

Considering the average cultivated area of a collective, and the number of farms, horses and large-horned cattle per collective, the smallness of its size becomes apparent. Table I shows but very slight year-to-year increases, and in the case of the year 1928 there are actual decreases in size.

The average figures for the year 1928 (Table II) include all the collectives organized before and during 1928. Comparing the peasant collective farms organized before January 1, 1928 with these organized after that date, we notice a still greater diminution in size.

It is this composition of a collective farm, particularly the size of the cultivated area, that led Iakovlev to the following conclusion: "The amount of land per collective does not permit a successful . . . utilization of modern agricultural machinery . . . even the old collectives [organized before 1928] are made up of land areas not sufficient for the organization of a rational, large-scale economy." [27]

[25] Kulikov, P., "Kontrolnye Tsifry po Kolkhozam na 1928-29" (Control Figures of the Collectives for 1928-29), *Na Agrarnom Fronte* (*On the Agrarian Front*), No. 12, 1928, p. 25.

[26] *Statisticheskii Spravochnik* (*Statistical Handbook of U.S.S.R.*) 1932, p. 130.

[27] Iakovlev, I. A., *Za Kolkhozy* (*For the Organization of Collectives*) (Moscow, 1929), p. 23.

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PER COLLECTIVE

Horses				Horned Cattle			
1925	1926	1927	1928	1925	1926	1927	1928
6.0	9.3	9.0	6.0	9.0	11.0	16.7	8.0
5.3	5.3	7.3	6.0	5.3	5.2	6.9	6.1
8.3	8.0	6.0	5.1	16.0	15.3	12.0	14.0
5.8	8.0	8.0	5.6	8.0	9.0	8.9	7.0

TABLE II: AVERAGES FOR 1928 [28]

Regions	Toz		Artel		Commune	
	Population	Cultivated Hectares	Population	Cultivated Hectares	Population	Cultivated Hectares
North Western						
org. before Jan. 1, 1928..	45.5	21.4	35.5	29.2	47.6	60.0
org. after Jan. 1, 1928 ...	38.4	8.1	31.9	168.0	24.1	251.0
Central Black Soil						
org. before Jan. 1, 1928..	79.3	44.1	61.8	58.4	94.0	126.0
org. after Jan. 1, 1928 ...	77.2	11.9	71.5	21.8	71.0	49.8
Lower Volga						
org. before Jan. 1, 1928..	69.9	66.6	38.8	64.8	48.0	138.6
org. after Jan. 1, 1928 ...	63.7	18.8	40.9	32.0	33.0	40.0
North Caucasus						
org. before Jan. 1, 1928..	61.2	61.3	52.4	84.1	78.9	203.9
org. after Jan. 1, 1928 ...	53.7	26.1	51.3	46.0	46.0	610.0
Siberia						
org. before Jan. 1, 1928..	65.6	68.1	59.8	86.2	89.6	168.9
org. after Jan. 1, 1928 ...	54.9	40.3	54.6	81.9	76.4	104.0
White Russia						
org. before Jan. 1, 1928..	51.8	41.8	42.2	45.2	55.9	70.2
org. after Jan. 1, 1928 ...	36.8	5.8	32.8	15.9	39.2	34.8
R.S.F.S.R.						
org. before Jan. 1, 1928..	65.8	56.6	51.5	57.7	72.3	138.3
org. after Jan. 1, 1928 ...	57.6	25.3	50.7	40.0	53.9	63.3

Of great importance also is the extent to which the collectives were supplied with means of production, the latter including agricultural implements and work animals. Measuring in rubles per cultivated hectare, we notice the degree in which they were underequipped and the extent to which the individual peasant outranked them in this respect (Table III).

[28] Kulikov, P., *loc. cit.*, p. 25.

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TABLE III: MEANS OF PRODUCTION PER CULTIVATED HECTARE MEASURED IN RUBLES [29]

	1925-26	*1926-27*	*1927-28*
Peasant Farm	227	223	226
Collective Farm	126	132	120

The probable explanation for the low level of the technical base of the collectives is found in the fact that 25 per cent of all the *tozy,* which at that time comprised 59 per cent of the total number of collectives, possessed no means of production of their own. Only half of them had equipment valued at more than a thousand rubles. The same held true for the *artels,* and "only half of the communes [the total number of which comprised but 5 per cent of all the collectives] and a small number of the *artels* and the *tozy* exceeded the limits of a large peasant farm . . . and with the implements at their disposal . . . have begun to carry on a more or less large farm economy." [30]

The movement was predicated on the rapid development of a new technical base. Lenin believed that "only a material base, technique, the utilization of tractors and machines in agriculture on a large scale" [31] could change the mentality of the peasant. The tractor was regarded as one of the most important implements in the transition to a new system of agriculture. But on October 1, 1928 the total number of tractors in the country was 26,733, of which about 17,500 were concentrated on the collective farms.[32] Due to this small number of tractors, "only one tenth of the newly organized collectives [in 1928] had a sound technical base as measured in terms of tractors." [33] The failure to utilize economically the full capacity of a tractor on the generally small collective, the high

[29] Kulikov, P., *loc. cit.,* p. 26.

[30] Gaister, A., "Dostizheniia i Trudnosti Kolkhoznogo Stroitelstva" (Achievements and Difficulties in the Formation of Collectives), *Na Agrarnom Fronte,* No. 10, 1928, p. 15.

[31] Lenin, N., *op. cit.,* vol. XXVI, p. 239.

[32] *Statisticheskii Spravochnik* (*Statistical Handbook of U.S.R.R.*) 1932, p. 145.

[33] Gaister, A., *loc. cit.,* p. 19.

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TABLE IV: ECONOMIC STATUS OF COLLECTIVES MEASURED BY LIVESTOCK EQUIPMENT [34]

Groups of Farms	Organized in 1928	Organized before 1928	Individual Peasant Farms
	Per Cent	*Per Cent*	*Per Cent*
Without horses	45	45.2	30.4
With 1 horse	47	38.3	50.2
With 2 horses	7.0	10.6	13.8
With 3 horses	0.5	2.7	3.5
With 4 horses	0.5	2.6	2.1
	100	100	100
Without cows	27.9	34.8	17.9
With 1 cow	59	40.9	54.1
With 2 cows	1.2	15.2	20.0
With 3 cows	1.5	3.4	5.0
With 4 cows	0.5	1.7	3.0
	100	100	100

percentage of tractors out of repair, and the lack of spare parts, created such a situation that, in the Ural Region, for instance, the cost of plowing one *desiatina* (2.7 acres) by tractor was 17 per cent greater than by the use of animal power.[35] In the fall of 1927 a considerable number of the tractors available in the Tersk and Stavropolsk regions of the North Caucasus, as well as in the district of Samara, could not be utilized at all. Under such conditions the tractor could not serve as a leading organizational element in the new system of agriculture.

Not all of the peasants who joined the collective movement did so because they were eager to realize the ideals of communism in a practical way. It is true that the city workers and the "working intelligentsia" who joined the movement were largely motivated by such an aim. But the majority of the peasants did so primarily because of the smallness of their land holdings and their lack of implements to work their small patches of land. By joining the collectives they were reason-

[34] Kulikov, P., *loc. cit.*, p. 30.

[35] Kindeiev, K., "Dostizheniia i Nedostatki Stroitelstva Kolkhozov v RSFSR" (Achievements and Shortcomings in the Formation of Collectives in the RSFSR), *Na Agrarnom Fronte*, No. 5, 1928, p. 104.

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ably sure of getting additional land, implements and credits from the state. Judged on the basis of the horses and cows they owned (see Table IV, page 13), the majority of the members of the collectives organized before and during 1928 belonged to the poorest group of the village.

The indicated characteristic features of the greatest number of the peasant collective farms organized within the decade 1918-1928 warrant the conclusion that "the social stratum which feeds the collective movement is composed of the poorest and small-household groups of the village . . . the peasantry for whom there was no possibility to rise to a higher economic level within the frame of their insignificant individual economy." [36]

The shift in the relative importance of the various types of collectives during the decade under consideration is significant. Between 1919 and 1927 the number of communes in the R.S.F.S.R. had decreased by one-half, the number of *artels* had increased by 74 per cent, and the number of *tozy* had increased by 563 per cent.[37] This trend, which was in evidence throughout the Soviet Union during the first period of collectivization, indicates an unmistakable shift from the type of a collective where the independent peasant autonomy disappears, to the simplest type, where, to a large extent, it remains intact.

Notwithstanding the numerous shortcomings which characterized the work of the collective farms, these have shown an increase of yield per unit of land, as compared with that of the individual farms[37a] (see Tables V and VI).

The production results of the collectives in the Ural Region are of greater significance.

[36] Naumov, K., "Voprosy Kolkhoznogo Stroitelstva" (Problems Concerning the Organization of Collectives), *Na Agrarnom Fronte*, No. 5, 1928, p. 6.

[37] Kindeiev, K., *loc. cit.*, p. 98.

[37a] The yield figures cited in the course of this paper are, with but few exceptions, general averages for the entire U.S.S.R. Detailed figures on yield, particularly for the years 1930-1932, which would permit a regional study of the productivity of a collective farm vs. an individual farm, did not appear in the sources consulted by the author.

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TABLE V: AVERAGE YIELD PER HECTARE ON INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE FARMS OF UKRAINE IN 1927 [38]

(in quintals; one quintal or centner = 3.7 bushels of 60 pounds)

	Individual Farm	Tozy	Artels	Communes
Winter wheat	6.91	8.47	8.76	9.79
Spring wheat	9.90	11.35	13.96	15.80
Rye	9.75	10.19	12.03	13.71
Barley	6.23	7.51	7.13	7.73

TABLE VI: AVERAGE YIELD PER HECTARE ON INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE FARMS OF THE URAL REGION IN 1927 [39]

(in quintals)

	Communes	Artels	Tozy	Average for Collectives	Average for Common Individual Farm	Average for Best Peasant Farm
Spring wheat...	10.77	10.98	13.31	10.89	7.73	10.97
Percentage	*139.70*	*142.46*	*172.61*	*141.18*	*100.00*	*142.25*
Rye	13.58	6.73	9.50	9.37	7.90	13.79
Percentage	*171.64*	*68.74*	*120.08*	*118.42*	*100.00*	*174.30*
Barley	10.25	16.02	16.88	12.95	10.97	16.38
Percentage	*93.4*	*146.00*	*153.9*	*119.2*	*100.00*	*149.25*

Table VI presents figures for a number of collectives and individual farms picked at random. They show that while the yield per hectare in a collective was still considerably below the yield of the best individual peasant farm, it was much higher than that of the average individual peasant farm.

In general it may be stated that numerically, after a decade of development, the collective farms were only mere specks in the vast horizon of the Russian countryside, that their grain production amounted to only 1.7 per cent of the total grain output, and that the movement had not succeeded in making

[38] Iakovlev, I. A., *loc. cit.*, p. 51.

[39] Tsylko, F., "Ocherednye Zadachi v Oblasti Kolkhoznogo Stroitelstva" (Current Problems in the Field of Collectivization), *Na Agrarnom Fronte*, Sept. 1928, p. 9.

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any appreciable dent in the thick layers of the peasantry. The collective farms still lacked many fundamental prerequisites for an efficient large-scale agricultural economy, but the state's assistance in the form of better land, better seed, greater amount of fertilizer and larger supply of machines, coupled with the pooling of the peasant's means of production, were fruitful of results. They succeeded in yielding larger crops than the average peasant farm. From the Communist point of view this argued well for a policy of a more extensive collectivization.

With the development of the New Economic Policy, the social differentiation in the village reappeared. The Communists believed that this process would lead to results inimical to both the political and the economic development of the Soviet Union. Under the new policies the peasants were being transformed, once more, into producers for a free market. Thus the basis was laid for the appearance of capitalism and class differentiation within the village. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the nationalization of industry, control of credit, monopoly of foreign trade, and the specific measures instituted by the government to limit the process of differentiation failed of their purpose, for capitalism was developing once more in the village. In the light of these developments, Lenin's dictum to the effect that "if there exist small economy and freedom . . . of exchange, capitalism appears,"[40] withstood the test of time. On the eleventh anniversary of the October Revolution the growth of capitalistic forces in the village was pronounced, if the reëmergence of the "kulak"[41]

[40] Lenin, N., *op. cit.*, vol. XXVI, p. 306.

[41] *Note:* A committee set up by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Statistical Office defined a "kulak" as a peasant farmer having one or more of the following characteristics: (1) employment of two agricultural laborers, one of them hired for not less than one half of the year; (2) possession of not less than three head of draft cattle, in some regions not less than four, and the cultivation of more than 10, 12, 14 or 16 desiatins, depending on the region; (3) ownership of a small processing plant with at least one hired laborer, or even without one in case there is a hired laborer in some other branch of the farm; (4) ownership of some commercial enterprise, even without the assistance of a hired man; (5) individual ownership or large

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group provides any criterion. Virtually expropriated during the years of War Communism, this group of well-to-do peasants comprised about 10 per cent of the total peasant population by the end of 1927.[42] This social stratification, particularly as the ranks of the well-to-do groups kept on swelling, was bound to change the entire socio-political orientation in the village. The economic power of the kulak group was considerably greater than their numbers would seem to indicate. They controlled more than one-third of the total means of production in the village, cultivated 23.5 per cent of the entire sown area, and produced 40 per cent of the total amount of grain sold on the market.[43]

The Soviet Government viewed the situation in the village with great misgivings. It realized that it could not "eliminate the kulaks as a class through taxation and other restrictive measures, while leaving in their hands the means of production and the right of making free use of the land."[44] The Soviet Government was compelled to acquiesce in a state of affairs where the kulaks played an important rôle in the village, for any other policy was bound to court "sure failure, strengthen the position of kulakism and leave . . . [the State] without grain."[45] The rich peasants of the Russian village had taken advantage of their strategic position as producers, and by the end of the decade they were a force sufficiently large to warrant serious attention.

The middle-class peasants, the *seredniaki,* who, in 1926, composed 56.4 per cent of the total peasant population,[46] be-

share ownership of modern agricultural machinery. Larin, I., "Sotsialnaia Struktura S.S.S.R., k Desiatiletiiu Oktiabria" (Social Structure of the U.S.S.R. on the 10th Anniversary of the October Revolution), *Pravda* (*The Truth*), Nov. 6-7, 1927.

[42] *Piatiletnii Plan Narodno-Khoziaistvennogo Stroitelstva Strany* (*The Five-Year Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Country*) (Moscow, 1930), vol. II, part 1, p. 264.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 265.

[44] Stalin, J., *Voprosy Leninizma* (*Problems of Leninism*) (Moscow, 1931), p. 463.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 458.

[46] Iakovlev, I. A., *K Voprosu o Sotsialisticheskoi Rekonstruktsii Selskogo*

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came the central figures in the village. The old agricultural system revolved about them. The aim of the Communists was to cultivate in them the element of the toiler at the expense of the seller, and to draw them gradually into the ranks of the builders of socialism. But at this very time the sellers' proclivities asserted themselves with greater force than ever before, due largely to the government's policy of maintaining a high price level for manufactured goods and a corresponding low price for agricultural products. The so-called "scissors" problem, which has characterized Soviet economics for many years now, found its expression in this inequitable price disparity between manufactured goods and the products of the village. It is true that the "scissors" contributed much toward the rehabilitation of Soviet industry, but in view of the fact that this industrial growth was achieved largely at the expense of the village, it accentuated the already existing schism between the interests of the city and those of the village. All efforts on the part of the Soviet Government to effect a close working union with the great mass of the middle peasantry were, for the time being, unavailing. In the quiet but grim economic struggle with the city, this most important section of the village identified its economic and political interests with the kulaks rather than with the proletarian state. Under these circumstances, eleven years after the October Revolution, there was ample justification for Lenin's statement made in 1921 to the effect that the village, after the Revolution, became more petit-bourgeois and as such represented "an independent class which after the crushing defeat and expulsion of the landed nobility and the capitalists, remains as the only class capable of challenging the political supremacy of the proletariat." [47]

The industrial progress attained by 1928 had fundamentally changed the relative position of industry and the prevailing system of agriculture. Although agriculture in the Soviet

Khoziaistva (*On the Problem of Socialist Reconstruction of Agriculture*) (Leningrad, 1928), p. 1. Iakovlev defines a middle peasant as one who cultivates from two to eight "desiatins" of land and owns from one to two head of work animals.

[47] Lenin, N., *op. cit.*, vol. XXII, p. 289.

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Union during its best years, 1925-1927, showed a year-to-year increase in its aggregate commodity production, its rate of progress was slower than that of industry. Whereas in 1926-1927 Soviet industry exceeded the prewar production level, the total agricultural production for the same year was only 88.1 per cent of that of 1913.[48] The agricultural production in 1926-1927 was 30 per cent greater than that of 1923-1924, but the percentage of marketable grain was even slightly less than in the earlier year.[49] This seemingly paradoxical situation is probably traceable to the refusal of the peasants to part with their produce at low prices. The generally slow progress in agriculture was traced by the Soviet Government not so much to the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the government's price policy as to the general break-up of the large estates and some of the large peasant farms into smaller and smaller units, where economic farming was impossible. Even if the price relationship had not adversely affected the development of agriculture, the existing system of small peasant farms producing 11 bushels of wheat and 4.5 bushels of barley as compared with 17 bushels of wheat and 9 bushels of barley per acre formerly produced on the large estates, was bound to slow up the development of agriculture and to curtail the amount of marketable grain.[50]

The existing situation cannot be properly evaluated apart from its relationship to the vast scheme of industrialization of the country. If the existing tendencies in agriculture were allowed to proceed unchecked, the program of industrialization would be jeopardized. The fulfillment of the program depended upon importation of machinery and of a great variety of raw materials from abroad. Soviet Russia, however, had not sufficient gold and was unable to procure long-term credits abroad to finance her purchases. The only way out was to finance imports with the proceeds from exports, primarily the export of agricultural products which had always played an

[48] Iakovlev, I., *loc. cit.*, p. 357. [49] *Ibid.*, p. 352.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 353. ("Poods" and "desiatins" converted into bushels and acres on the basis of: 1 pood = .6 bushels of 60 pounds, and 1 desiatina = 2.7 acres).

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important rôle in Russia's foreign trade, accounting for 73.7 per cent of the gross Russian export in 1913.[51] In 1924 Soviet industry was started on the road toward rehabilitation because the Soviet Union was thus able to pay for the imported machines.[52]

Three years later, confronted with a vastly greater and more significant industrial plan, the Fifteenth Party Congress expressed its dissatisfaction with the agricultural situation in the following resolution: "The backwardness [of the old system of agriculture] hampers . . . the export of agricultural products which is the basis of import operations necessary for a more rapid industrialization of the country, and the further development of agriculture itself."[53] In other words, agriculture was still looked upon as the main item upon which the import plan had to be based. But in 1927 the relative importance of agricultural products in the total mass of exports declined from 73.7 per cent to 57 per cent, and to 46 per cent in 1928.[54] The year 1928, when the Five-Year-Plan had assumed concrete form, ended with a 20 per cent decrease in agricultural exports.[55] This decline of Soviet Russia's main item of export, along with the growing grain shortage in the cities and industrial centers, threatened to undermine the main pillars upon which the Plan rested.

Immediately prior to the inauguration of the vast program of industrialization it became obvious that the prevailing system of small-scale agriculture failed to meet the demands made upon it. With the system left intact, the situation was bound to become worse with the application of the Five-Year-Plan. From the point of view of the existing economic rela-

[51] *Statisticheskii Spravochnik* (*Statistical Handbook of the U.S.S.R.*) 1932, p. 392.

[52] Popov, L. L., "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana Razvitiia Selskogoi Lesnogo Khoziaistva" (The Basis of the Tentative Plan for the Development of Agricultural and Forest Economy), *Planovoe Khoziaistvo* (*Planned Economy*) (Moscow, Aug. 1925), p. 19.

[53] *Pravda*, December 21, 1927.

[54] *Statisticheskii Spravochnik S.S.S.R. za 1928* (*Statistical Handbook of the U.S.S.R. for 1928*) (Moscow, 1929), p. 719.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 719.

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tionship between the city and the village at the end of the decade 1918-1928, the former was moving toward a socialist form of industrial organization; the latter, toward a capitalistic form. Industry and agriculture did not constitute a single national economic whole. Notwithstanding the fact that the land was owned by the state, the city with its large centralized and partly socialized industry had its antithesis in the small and extremely backward individualistic system of peasant farming. From the Communist point of view this was an economic anachronism which "would some day end in a complete breakdown of the entire national economy," [56] if it were not corrected. Only a system of large-scale mechanized agriculture could avert such an outcome. But this was to be realized not through the introduction into the village of capitalistic large-scale enterprise, but, on the contrary, by the eradication of all its vestiges. And the Communist Party decided that the surest way of achieving this end was the further consolidation of the small farms into large ones equipped with modern machinery. Therein lay the guarantee that the problem of "either back to capitalism or forward to socialism" [57] would be solved in favor of the latter alternative.

It was during the deliberations of the Fifteenth Party Congress, held in Moscow in December 1927, that the general principles underlying the Five-Year-Plan were outlined. The direction of the future development of agriculture was one of the major considerations in the preliminary outline of the Plan. In his report to the Congress, "On the Work in the Village", V. N. Molotov, then member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, subjected the rural question to a searching analysis. He pointed out, among other things, that the very important land-organization problem in the village was yet to be solved, that five million wooden plows were still in use, and that the economic status of eight million farms was such that not even one horse per farm could be utilized economically.[58] Molotov contended that notwithstanding the numerous deficiencies of the existing collectives they had shown themselves

[56] Stalin, J., *op. cit.*, p. 444.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 445.

[58] *Pravda*, Dec. 27, 1927.

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to be of real value, and should the collective movement overcome the difficulties with which it was beset during the past years, the progressive development of the peasant collective farms would be assured. To achieve this, the collective movement must follow the specifications of the Five-Year-Plan in Agriculture, as coördinated with the general plan for industrialization.

The "Maximum" Plan for Agriculture[59] which was finally adopted by the Sixteenth All-Union Conference of the Communist Party on April 29, 1929,[60] had as its objective the partial reorganization of the village along socialistic lines. In the words of the authors, "The Plan aims to create during the five-year period a socialized producing area to counter-balance the upper [village] stratum of the individual farmers."[61] It was indicated that even at the end of this period the individual peasant farms and not the collectives would still play the chief rôle in the raising of agricultural products.[62] It is around this general premise that the agricultural Plan was built.

Recognizing that the machine was to serve as the means with which to achieve economic and social transformation in the village, the Plan provided that 120,000 tractors should be at the disposal of the collectives by the end of the period.[63] This number of tractors was considered sufficient to mechanize seventy-five per cent of the twenty million hectares which were to be collectivized by 1932-33.[64] The remainder of the collectivized area was to be worked with animal power.

The demands of large-scale mechanized agriculture could

[59] The general Five-Year-Plan was proposed in two drafts: The "Maximum" and the "Directive", or minimum. The first was based on the assumption that during the five-year period the harvests would be generally good, with production both in industry and agriculture showing a general increase. The "directive" draft, on the other hand, allowed for at least one poor harvest and a slower rise in physical output in general and in agriculture in particular.

[60] *Pravda*, April 30, 1929.

[61] *Piatiletnii Plan Narodno-Khoziaistvennogo Stroitelstva Strany* (*The Five-Year-Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Country*), vol. II, part 1, pp. 265-6.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 322.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 287.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 274.

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not be met by the introduction of machinery alone when the labor supply available was accustomed to a centuries-old economy of hand-plow and sickle. To do away with these old methods, and to insure the success of industrialization of agriculture, the collectives had to be supplied with well-trained specialists. The total number of persons with special agricultural training by the middle of 1929 was 44,198.[65] Out of this number only 11.4 per cent were specialists in the field of mechanized agriculture; 11.2 per cent, livestock specialists; and 77.4 per cent, general all-round agronomists.[66] The available number of specialists was too small to satisfy the ever-growing need of agriculture. Moreover, from a qualitative point of view, many of these old-type agronomists, who were accustomed to serve the needs of small peasant farms, were in need of reëducation in harmony with the newly created large collectives. There was a demand for a "new type of specialist, an agronomist-engineer who must have a minimum knowledge in technology and mechanics" and, in addition to this, "knowledge of agricultural processes."[67] The Plan therefore aimed to treble the number of such specialists as well as to acquaint five million peasants with the basic principles of agricultural science.[68]

Cognizant of the fact that it would be enormously difficult to collectivize a large area through the organization of small collectives, and that to attempt to do so would further complicate the already intricate problem of land organization, the Plan called for the organization of large collectives. The figures on the following page (Table VII) show the change in the size of the collectives as the Plan neared its completion.

The plan also provided that by the end of the five-year period the average rise in yield per hectare throughout the Soviet Union should not be less than thirty-five per cent.[69]

[65] Iezhev, N., "Selskokhoziaistvennye Kadry" (Agricultural Experts), *Na Agrarnom Fronte*, No. 2, 1930, p. 22.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[67] *Piatiletnii Plan Narodno-Khoziaistvennogo Stroitelstva Strany* (*The Five-Year-Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Country*), vol. II, part 1, p. 308.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 310.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 291.

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TABLE VII: INCREASED SIZE OF COLLECTIVES [70]

Size of Collectives	Percentage of Total	
	1928	1933
Not more than 100 hectares	44	7
Not more than 101–400 hectares	28	23
Not more than 401–800 hectares	14	26
Not more than 801–1200 hectares	12	23
1201 hectares and more	2	21

It should be noted that the authors did not consider the problem of increases in yield as primarily a technical one, but felt rather that "a thirty-five percent rise in yield is first of all an organizational problem . . . because from a purely technical point of view there are no obstacles in the way of doubling the yield." [71] The average grain yield per collectivized hectare in 1927-1928 was 8.37 quintals.[72] Hence, the average grain yield per hectare of 11.28 quintals,[73] expected during the last year of the Plan, must be looked upon as a modest one indeed.

With the rise in yield the total grain production of the collectives would be 119.5 million quintals in 1932-1933, and fully 49 per cent of this would be available for the market.[74] It was estimated that by 1932-1933 the collectives and the State farms together would supply about 39 per cent of the grain available for the market. This constituted approximately the amount of grain sold by the upper stratum of the village in 1927-1928. Such a result, the authors of the Plan believed, would be of considerable social and economic significance, since the amount of marketable grain offered by the socialized sector would diminish the possibility of grain speculation by the kulaks, besides weakening their power to challenge the state system of regulation of grain prices and grain supply.

As to the extent of socialization of the fields and agricultural implements of those peasants who joined the collectives, it was expected that by the end of the five-year period 80 per

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 275.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 308.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 328.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 329.
[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 328-29.

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cent of all their fields and 75 per cent of all their agricultural implements would be socialized. The socialization of animal power was to proceed at a slower pace. Any accomplishment in this field depended upon a considerable capital outlay for the construction and equipment of special barnyards. The necessary funds were to be furnished largely from the capital accumulations accruing from the socialized fields of the collectives. Since it was planned that the greater number of collectives would be organized during the second half of the five-year period, large capital accumulations were not expected. It was with these considerations in mind that the authors of the Plan decided that only 50 per cent of the animal power belonging to the peasants who entered the collectives would be socialized by the year 1932-33.[75]

Such, in brief, were the main provisions of the Plan for the collectivization of agriculture.

In the beginning of June 1929 four per cent of the total number of farms were collectivized, covering an area of 4,185,000 hectares, with a population of 4,666,000.[76] Within the next four months these figures were practically doubled. But it was only after October 1929 that the collective movement began to grow at a very rapid pace and soon assumed such forms and displayed such tendencies that the period now stands out as a most significant one in the history of the movement. Stalin saw in the rapid growth of the collectives the solution of the chief economic and political problems of the Soviet Union: "Should the collective movement proceed at the same rate, the scissors problem would be solved in the nearest future . . . the relationship between the city and the village would be set upon a new basis and the contradiction between the city and the village would be washed away at an accelerated pace." [77] Collectivization of small groups of farms

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 276.

[76] *Statisticheskii Spravochnik* (*Statistical Handbook of the U.S.S.R.*) 1932, p. 131.

[77] Stalin, J., *Voprosy Leninizma* (*Problems of Leninism*) (Moscow, 1931), p. 453. The statement was originally made in the course of a speech on Soviet agricultural policies delivered December 2, 1929.

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was essentially a matter of the past. This was the period when organizing collectives which embraced entire villages and covered vast stretches of land became the order of the day.

The growth of the collective movement was much faster than the Plan had anticipated. Nine months after its inauguration, on January 5, 1930, the Communist Party announced that "the tempo of the development of the collective movement as indicated by the Plan, has been exceeded . . . The Five-Year-Plan . . . which provided for the collectivization of 22-24 million hectares by the year 1932-33, would be considerably overfulfilled this year."[78] As to the future development of the movement, this decree issued by the Communist Party provided for a complete collectivization of all the peasant farms before the expiration of the five-year limit. Such important grain-growing regions as North Caucasus, Ukraine, and the Middle and Lower Volga were to be completely collectivized by the fall of 1930, or not later than the spring of 1931. In the case of the other grain-growing regions, the task was to be accomplished by the fall of 1931, or spring of 1932.

The acceleration in collectivization which developed during the following six weeks proved that the decree had underestimated the driving force behind the movement. With a grim determination which brooked no opposition and recognized no obstacles, those who directed the work proceeded to shift a great body of the peasantry into the collectives. The city workers and the members of the Communist Party sent to the village received instructions to the effect that they need not devote their efforts to convincing the peasants that collective farming was more advantageous than individual farming, for it was felt that the peasants were already convinced of that.[79] These instructions were vigorously followed.

How the main grain-growing regions were affected may be

[78] "O Tempe Kollektivizatsii i Merakh Pomoshchi Gosudarstva Kolkhoznomu Stroitelstvu" (Concerning the Tempo of Collectivization and Measures of State Assistance to the Collective Movement), *Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1930.

[79] Iakovlev, I., "Doklad—Moskovskim Rabochim Uezhaiushchim na Rabotu v Kolkhozy" (Report made by Iakovlev to a group of Moscow workers leaving for work in the collectives), *Pravda*, Jan. 24, 1930.

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gleaned from the fact that by March 1, 1930, in the Ukraine, North Caucasus, Lower and Middle Volga, Central Black-Soil Region and Crimea, the number of collectivized farms as a percentage of total number of farms reached 55, 77, 68, 56, 82 and 76, respectively.[80] The pace at which collectivization proceeded throughout the U.S.S.R. is shown by Table VIII.

TABLE VIII: THE TEMPO OF COLLECTIVIZATION IN 1930 [81]

1930	Collectives Organized	Peasant Farms	Collective Farms as % of Total Number of Peasant Farms as of Spring, 1929
Jan. 20, 1930.....	59,400	4,393,100	21.6 %
Feb. 1, 1930.....	87,500	8,015,100	32.5 %
Feb. 10, 1930.....	103,700	10,935,300	42.4 %
Feb. 20, 1930.....	108,800	13,675,900	52.7 %
March 1, 1930.....	110,200	14,264,300	55.0 %

It is to be noted that for ten days, January 20—February 1, the number of peasant farms which were drawn into the collectives almost doubled, and by March 1 of the same year, more than half of all the peasant farms were consolidated into collective farms. In a word, this was the period when collectivization in some regions "jumped from 10 to 90 per cent in a few days." [82]

The rapid growth of collectivization was followed by an increase in the size of the collective farms. The figures given in Table IX (page 28) show the change in this direction.

During this period there took place a considerable socialization of the animal power of the peasants who joined the collectives. On January 20, 1930, 17 per cent of all the draft cattle in the collectives were socialized; on February 1, the figure had risen to 52 per cent; ten days later the percentage

[80] From the Bulletin of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, *Izvestiia* (*The News*), March 9, 1930.

[81] *Ibid.*

[82] "O Borbe s Iskrivleniiami Partii v Kolkhoznom Dvizhenii" (Concerning the Struggle against Party Distortions in the Collective Movement), *Pravda*, March 15, 1930.

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TABLE IX: AVERAGE SIZE OF COLLECTIVE FARM FOR THE ENTIRE U.S.S.R. [83]

Date	Average Number of Farms per Collective	Average Number of Hectares per Collective
June 1, 1929	17.6	105.6
October 1, 1929	23.3	139.8
January 20, 1930	73.9	525.9
February 1, 1930	91.5	602.3
February 10, 1930	105.4	672.8
February 20, 1930	125.6	759.6
March 1, 1930	129.2	797.4

had risen to 81, and by March 1 the figure was 77.[84] This upward surge was characteristic not only of the highest form of collective organization, the agricultural commune, but of the *artel* and the simplest form of collective, the *toz,* as well.

Mass collectivization was the new form of the collective movement, and its success, measured from the Communist point of view, was expressed not only in the large percentages, but also in the new social "face" of a collective of this period. The collective no longer represented only the poor section of the village but also a number of middle-peasants. The increased importance of this group was regarded as a significant factor in the development of the movement, for the Communists believed that socialism could not be built in the village without the support of this group.

Some of the middle-peasants who entered the collectives were mindful of the state privileges enjoyed by the members. The nature of these special rights was stated in the Land Code of December 15, 1928.[85] According to this code the segre-

[83] The figures for the dates, June 1, 1929 and October 1, 1929, are taken from Tsylko, F., "Osnovnye Vekhi Kolkhoznogo Dvizheniia" (Milestones in the Development of the Collective Movement), *Na Agrarnom Fronte,* No. 5, 1930, p. 21. The other figures are taken from the Bulletin of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, *Izvestiia,* March 9, 1930.

[84] Bulletin of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, *Izvestiia,* March 9, 1930.

[85] *Obshchie Nachala Zemlepolzovaniia i Zemleustroistva* (*General Principles Concerning the Use of Land and of Land Organization*), Collection of Statutes of the U.S.S.R. for 1928, Part I, Statute No. 642.

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gation of land into separate individual farms was made very difficult, but the segregation of land for collectives was facilitated and encouraged (Paragraphs 15 and 19). The collectives were given preferential rights in securing available land (Par. 8), as well as special privileges in the matter of payment of the Single Agricultural Tax and in securing long-term credits (Par. 30, *a* and *b*). They were the first to be supplied by the State, and on more favorable terms than the individual farmers, with modern agricultural machines and implements, fertilizers, seeds and livestock (Par. 30, *e*).

A large number of peasants of the middle group were not tempted into the collectives by these privileges. They joined them, however, under the pressure of adverse economic forces, and, as was later fully admitted,[86] under the pressure of purely administrative measures. The middle-peasants were primarily producers for the market, and once the widespread, if unofficial, attack was launched against the still lingering vestiges of the New Economic Policy, i. e., against the continued existence of a free market, the economic foundation of those peasants was undermined. Faced with a situation which left this system of agriculture economically insecure, many peasants thought the best way out was to exchange what was no longer a profitable or secure system, for a system of agriculture which was backed by the full authority of the Soviet Government. Furthermore, in the absence of a rigorous distinction between the middle-peasant and the kulak, and in view of the general persecution leveled against the latter group, many of the middle peasants, to escape persecution, deemed it expedient to join the collective movement.

The keynote of this period of collectivization was the relentless war waged by the Communists against the well-to-do section of the village. Stalin's speech dealing with the agrarian policy of Soviet Russia sounded the battle-cry. "Now", he said, "we have a sufficiently strong material base for an attack against 'kulakism', to break down its opposition and to liquidate the kulaks as a class."[87] In his opinion, mass collectivization is based on the complete annihilation of the class enemy,

[86] *Cf. infra*, p. 36.

[87] Stalin, J., *op. cit.*, p. 458.

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"de-kulakization in regions of mass collectivization . . . having now become a component part of the organization and development of the collectives." [88] Shortly afterward, the government, in a brief but momentous decree, pronounced the doom of the prosperous section of the village when it granted the right to the regional governments and the autonomous republics, "to use . . . all the necessary measures in the struggle against the kulaks, including complete confiscation of their property and deportations from certain regions and provinces." [89] Some of the Bolshevik leaders, especially those who knew the village intimately, realized the harshness of the measure, but there was nothing which could change that, since "this follows from mass collectivization with relentless precision." [90]

This course did not stem from political considerations alone. The considerable economic power concentrated in the hands of the well-to-do peasants counted heavily in the course of action decided upon by the Bolshevik leaders. The confiscation of kulak property became a means of strengthening the material base of the collectives. From 25 to 40 per cent of all the indivisible capital funds of the collective farms organized by May 1, 1930, consisted of such property.[91] The means of production of some of the kulaks, their farm buildings, and in general all the property that could be utilized in a collec-

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 459.

[89] *O Meropriiatiiakh po Ukrepleniiu Sotsialisticheskogo Pereustroistva Selskogo Khoziaistva v Raionokh Sploshnoi Kollectivizatsii i po Borbe s Kulachestvom* (*Concerning the Measures of Strengthening the Socialist Reconstruction of Agriculture in the Regions of Mass Collectivization, and the Measures Undertaken in the Struggle against Kulakism*). Issued Feb. 1, 1930, by the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

[90] Kalinin, M. I., "Doklad na Obedinennom Zasedanii Zentralnogo Chernozemnogo Oblastnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta i Voronezhskogo Gorodskogo Soveta Rabochikh i Krasnoarmeiskikh Deputatov" (Report made to the Joint Session of the Central Black Soil Regional Executive Committee and the Voronezh City Council of Workers and Red Army Deputies), *Pravda*, March 3, 1930.

[91] *Kolkhozy Nakanune Shestnadzatogo Sezda Partii* (*On the Eve of the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party*) (published by Plankhozgiz, Moscow, 1930), p. 29.

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tive, was socialized. The confiscated funds were distributed among the poor peasants for the purpose of enabling them to make their share payments upon joining a collective.[92] The figures that would indicate just how many kulaks were "liquidated" in that comparatively short period are not available, but between the inception of this process and the middle of 1931, the kulak population decreased from 5,400,000 to 1,600,000.[93]

However desirable, from the Communist viewpoint, were the social changes in village life which resulted from the rapid collectivization of agriculture, this very pace, nevertheless, brought in its wake features which affected most adversely the collective movement of the years that followed.

By March 1930 it was almost impossible to point out a region not affected by mass collectivization. Stalin's dictum that "before determining the tempo and method of organizing collectives one must carefully consider the variety of factors peculiar to the regions of the U.S.S.R." was announced after the numerical growth of the collectives had reached unprecedented heights.[94] The fact that a particular section of the country did not lend itself to this form of collectivization was of no significance to the local authorities eagerly competing for larger percentages. Many of the collectives were being organized in a purely mechanical fashion and later came to be known as "paper collectives." Such regions as Moscow, White Russia and the Tartar Republic, where conditions conducive to a rapid tempo of collectivization were totally lacking, managed, nevertheless, to be in the forefront of the movement. But the collectives of these very regions could not register any achievement in organizational work. Qualitative

[92] "Kak Proizvoditsa na Mestakh Raskulachivanie" (How De-kulakization Takes Place in the Village), *Pravda*, January 31, 1930. See also Averiev, V., "O Dvukh Etapakh Raskulachivaniia" (Concerning Two Stages of De-kulakization), *Na Agrarnom Fronte*, No. 6, 1930.

[93] *Social Economic Planning in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics*, p. 121. Report of the Delegation from the U.S.S.R. to the World Social Economic Congress, Amsterdam, August 23-29, 1931.

[94] Stalin, J., "Golovokruzhenie ot Uspekhov" (Dizziness from Success), *Pravda*, March 2, 1930.

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factors were sacrificed for the sake of quantitative results. This explains why shortly afterward the decline of such collectives was as rapid as their rise.

Just as the organizers of the new collectives assumed that the various provinces of the Soviet Union were equally well suited for mass collectivization, so did they ignore the basic difference among the various types of collectives—the degree of socialization carried on within each type. The organizers insisted on socializing everything in sight. Reduced to its essentials, this policy meant turning the newly organized collectives into agricultural communes overnight, or "jumping" into the highest form of collectivization. It also meant that there was demanded of the politically and economically backward peasant a communistic way of life which was ideologically too advanced even for the most class-conscious and trusted workers of the industrial centers.

The reactions of the peasants to these methods were not slow in coming. They voiced their protest in a manner which did not fail to impress the central government with the seriousness of the situation. The peasants launched a campaign of wholesale slaughter of their cattle. The official decrees dealing with this situation reveal the significant fact that not only the kulaks but the middle-peasants, too, distinguished themselves in this campaign.[95] The well-to-do peasants realized that economically they could not survive the fierce attack leveled against them by the Soviet Government. With little or no property on their hands there was a greater likelihood of avoiding all the privations which went with the application of the process of de-kulakization, and of even joining, per-

[95] *O Merakh Borby s Khishchnicheskim Uboem Skota* (*Concerning the Measures in the Struggle against the Criminal Slaughter of Cattle*), issued by the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., February 16, 1930.

Mery Borby s Rasprodazhei Selskokhoziaistvennogo Inventaria, Rabochego i Polzovatelnogo Skota Krestianskimi Khoziaistvami, Vstupaiushchimi v Kolkhozy i Drugie Selskokhoziaistvennye Proizvodstvennye Obedineniia (*Measures against Selling by the Peasants of Their Agricultural Implements, Draft Cattle and Barnyard Livestock before Joining the Collectives or Any Other Agricultural Producing Coöperatives*), issued by the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. on Jan. 16, 1930.

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chance, a collective farm. Hence, in order to escape the fate of those whose property had already been confiscated, they preferred to slaughter their livestock and sell their agricultural implements.

There were a number of reasons why many peasants of the middle group decided to emulate, in this respect, the upper stratum of the village. First, at the time when the collective movement was marching forward in "seven-league-boots", an attempt was being made to socialize all the livestock of the collectivized peasants, despite the absence of proper facilities, insufficient supplies of fodder, and almost complete lack of practical knowledge concerning livestock socialization on a large scale. It was quite obvious to the peasants that their livestock could not thrive under such precarious conditions. Second, the price paid for the livestock to be socialized was too small in comparison with the price on the open market. For instance, a horse which could be sold for 100 rubles on the open market, was priced by the collective at 25-30 rubles.[96] Third, as a means of attracting a great number of peasants into the collectives, they were told, in many regions, that "mass collectivization is based upon the supply to the peasant of, if not 100 per cent, then at least a considerable amount of mechanical power, agricultural machinery and other implements."[97] Finally, during the period under consideration the share of income of a member of a collective did not depend upon the total amount of livestock he would contribute to the socialized fund. In view of the enumerated circumstances many peasants preferred to slaughter their cattle rather than deliver them to the collective. The figures in Table X (page 34) indicate the extent of this form of sabotage.

This huge loss, which can be restored only after years of patient work, helps to explain the difficulties experienced by the state to this date in supplying the population with meat products, and some branches of the light industries with raw materials. But the slaughter of livestock assumes special sig-

[96] Solomon, M., "V Raionakh Sploshnoi Kollektivizatsii" (In the Regions of Mass Collectivization), *Planovoe Khoziaistvo* (*Planned Economy*), No. 2, 1930, p. 235.

[97] *Ibid.*

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TABLE X: TOTAL LIVE STOCK IN THE U.S.S.R. 1928-1930 [98]

(*in thousands*)

Year	Horses	Horned Cattle (including cows)	Cows	Hogs	Sheep and Goats
1928	33,534	70,540	30,741	25,989	146,699
1929	34,638	67,112	30,360	20,384	146,776
1930	30,768	53,962	26,749	13,332	113,171
		(*in percentages of the preceding year*)			
1929	103.3	95.1	98.8	78.4	100.1
1930	88.4	80.3	87.9	64.9	77.2

nificance when one considers the technical base upon which the collectives of that period were built.

From the Communist point of view one of the main economic advantages of a collective system over small individual farming lies in extensive and intensive utilization of modern agricultural machinery. Only on this basis could the economic and social revolution in the village be accomplished. The authors of the Plan seem to have proceeded on this assumption. They stated that while it was possible to increase agricultural production by the mere pooling of the peasants' simple implements, "significant social shifts in agriculture cannot be accomplished without tractorization." [99] In this connection it may be recalled that the Plan provided for 120,000 tractors to work 15 million hectares of land, one tractor per 125 collectivized hectares. The supply of tractors, both through purchases abroad and home production, did not keep pace with the growth of collectivization in the spring of 1930. At this time the peasant collective farms covered an area of 33 million hectares, whereas the total number of tractors on the collectives amounted to about 39 thousand.[100] Considering that only 11.6

[98] *Statisticheskii Spravochnik* (*Statistical Handbook of the U.S.S.R.*) 1932, p. 191.

[99] *Piatiletnii Plan Narodno-Khoziaistvennogo Stroitelstva Strany* (*The Five-Year Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Country*) (Moscow, 1930), vol. II, part 1, p. 267.

[100] Nikulikhiu, Ia. and Karavaev, A., editors, *Teknicheskoe Peresvoruzhenie Kolkhozov* (*Technical Reëquipment of the Collectives*) (Selkolkhozgiz, Moscow, 1931), p. 33.

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per cent of all the collective farms were equipped with tractors,[101] the technical base of the huge collectivized area consisted primarily of the peasants' simple means of production, including their considerably depleted livestock.

Successful large-scale farming was conditioned also upon an efficient system of the organization of labor. Was this possible under the circumstances prevailing in the collectives in the spring of 1930? The answer may be gleaned from the following statement of the Commissar of Agriculture, Iakovlev: "On the basis of our investigations we insist categorically that the idea of achieving any kind of success in peasant farming outside of mass mechanization is a sheer phantasmagoria because only mechanization will supply the basis for a rational system of organization of labor."[102] The extent to which they had fallen short of achieving the latter goal may be inferred from a study of the effectiveness of the newly organized collectives in terms of yield per hectare. A comparison of per-hectare yields on private and collective farms reveals that while in 1928 a collectivized hectare produced 10 per cent more grain than one hectare on a private farm, in 1930 the difference was reduced to 6 per cent.[103] In the light of these results, Iakovlev's comment to the effect that the peasants had learned how to utilize the advantages of a collective for the purpose of extending the cultivated area, but "had not yet learned how to utilize these advantages for an increase in yield,"[104] is very much in point.

The Communists did not seem then to regard the inadequate

[101] *Kolkhozy Nakannune, XVI Siezda Partii* (*Collectives on the Eve of the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party* (Plankhozgiz, Moscow, 1930), p. 62.

[102] Iakovlev, I. S., editor, *K Voprosu o Sozialisticheskom Pereustroistve Selskogo Khoziaistva* (*Concerning the Problem of Socialist Reconstruction of Agriculture*) (Leningrad, 1928); the quotation is from the preface written by Iakovlev, p. xxxvii.

[103] *Economic Handbook of the Soviet Union* (American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, New York, 1931), p. 66.

[104] Odinets, P., "Rukovodstvo Kolkhozami" (Managing the Collective Farms), *Sovetskoe Stroitelstvo* (*Soviet Construction*), January 1932, p. 17. The author quotes from Iakovlev's address before the meeting of the Collegium of the Commissariat for Agriculture held in October 1930.

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technical base of the collectives as a possible handicap in the development of the collective movement. In fact, the Central Committee of the Party felt it necessary to emphasize "the need of a determined struggle against all attempts to slow down the collective movement because of lack of tractors and of modern agricultural machinery."[105] The Party therefore rejected and branded as counter-revolutionary Trotsky's dictum that, "From peasants' nags and wooden plows, however, combined, you cannot create large-scale farming any more than a combination of fishermen's rowboats can make a steamer."[106]

The insistence on collectivization at top speed on any base led, from the Communist point of view, to a very incongruous situation in the collectives: the existence of a new form of ownership within virtually the old frame of production methods. From a practical point of view this relationship hampered the normal development of the collectives. It is one thing to cultivate vast tracts of land with standardized modern machines, but it was an entirely different and more difficult matter to work the same land with a variety of simple implements. The pace at which collectivization was proceeding, coupled with a lack of managerial experience, led to the instability even of a number of those collectives which were provided with machines. But it was still more difficult to organize, manage, maintain discipline in, and by this token, to stabilize a collective the technical base of which was for the most part a conglomeration of inadequate peasant equipment.

The methods of collectivization prevalent at the end of 1929 and in the beginning of 1930 were expressed

> in measures of force and compulsion applied to the middle and poor peasants during the formation of the collective farms; in the socialization of the barnyard stock and cows belonging to the members of the artels . . . sufficient only for their own

[105] "O Tempe Kollektivizatsii i Merakh Pomoshchii Gosudarstva Kolkhoznomu Stroitelstvu" (On the Tempo of Collectivization and Measures of State Assistance to the Collective Movement); *Pravda,* Jan. 6, 1930.

[106] Iakovlev, I. A., *Red Villages* (New York, 1931), p. 38. Quotation from an editorial by Trotsky in the February-March 1930 issue of *Bulletin of the Opposition.*

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> household requirements . . . in the premature creation of the communes, without the requisite material and organizational preparation . . . in gross and ultra-administrative methods exercised in relation to the collective farms and their members . . . in ignoring the middle peasant and failing to use his agricultural experience and in applying to him the methods of struggle used against the kulaks (de-kulakization, disfranchisement, etc.).[107]

This was a violation of the concepts upon which the Communists originally intended to build the collectives and weld into a harmonious whole the interests of the peasants and the workers. Those concepts had more than a merely academic or theoretical significance; they bore directly upon the final outcome of the collective movement and the general socialist reconstruction of the country. Therefore, when the government, under the pressure of the peasants' protests, finally realized that to disregard Lenin's policies "would lead . . . directly to the destruction of the collective movement, to a disagreement with the middle peasantry, . . . to a disorganization of our ranks, to the weakening of our entire socialist reconstruction,"[108] the methods of collectivization underwent a considerable change. The government realized also the necessity of stating clearly what should and what should not be done in the name of mass collectivization; it realized the necessity of slowing down the pace of collectivization by curbing the zeal of the local authorities, and the need of impressing upon them the idea that Lenin's agrarian policy must be adhered to.[109]

The change in policy, however, was late in coming, for already groups of peasants had deserted the collectives before the decree referred to had been promulgated. The government attempted to stave off this movement by granting to the

[107] Iakovlev, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

[108] Stalin, J., "Otvet Tovarishcham Kolkhoznikam" (Reply to the Comrades of the Collectives), *Pravda*, April 3, 1930.

[109] *O Borbe s Iskrivleniiami Partii v Kolkhoznom Dvizhenii* (*Concerning the Struggle against the Party Line Distortions in the Collective Movement*), decree issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on March 15, 1930.

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collectives and their members a series of privileges through the enactment of a special decree.[110] The latter provided for the freeing from tax liability for two years of all the socialized draft cattle (horses and oxen) in the collective farms; also cows, pigs, chickens and sheep, both those collectively owned and those in the individual possession of the members (Par. 1); during the current year (1930) the collectives were to be supplied with loans amounting to 500 million rubles (Par. 4); all the farm payments on loans extended to them by the state before they had entered the collectives—which obligations were taken over by the latter—were deferred until November 1, 1930 (Par. 5); the indebtedness of the farms to the state in connection with land-organization work carried on there before they had given up their individual farming for collectivistic farming, was canceled (Par. 6). The confiscated kulak property was turned over by the state to the collectives on the condition that the latter repay to the state the value of the property. According to this decree the collective farms were freed from such payments (Par. 8). Finally, the decree released the peasants from criminal or civil liability for infractions of tax laws and for other misdemeanors committed before they had joined the collectives (Par. 7).

This last-minute concession would compensate neither for a period of mass collectivization which weakened the material base of the collectives, nor for the condition traceable to the frenzied pace with which collectivization proceeded. The collectives, ostensibly single, large, cohesive blocks of land, were actually "blocks of peasant patches of land pasted together."[111] It became comparatively easy for the members to leave the loosely integrated collectives, once they decided to do so as a protest against agricultural policies of which they did not approve. The desertions assumed a mass character. On March 1, 1930, the collective farms comprised 55 per cent of

[110] *O Novykh Lgotakh dlia Kolkhozov i Ikh Chlenov* (*Concerning New Privileges granted to the Collectives and Their Members*), decree issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., April 2, 1930, *Izvestia*, Apr. 5, 1930.

[111] Odinets, P., *op. cit.*, p. 17.

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the total number of farms as of the spring of 1929, but two months later they comprised only 24 per cent.[112] The Communists viewed the partial disintegration of the movement as a gain. Such was the case because "by allowing those who had been forced to join the collective farms to withdraw, and by exposing the pressure put upon the middle peasants as a direct violation of the Party instructions . . . the Central Committee of the Communist Party saved the collective farms."[113]

As already pointed out, the collective movement embraces three types of collective farms: *tozy, artels* and communes. Within the year June 1929-June 1930 and particularly during the few months of mass collectivization, a definite change took place in the numerical relationship among these types. Just as before and during the first half of 1929 the *tozy* type prevailed, so the *artel* became the most common type during the period under consideration. The figures given in Table XI support this observation:

TABLE XI: TYPES OF COLLECTIVES[114]

	Tozy	*Artels*	*Communes*	*Total*
June 1, 1929	34,032	19,535	3,178	57,045
June 1, 1930	14,522	62,006	7,342	85,950

Since the local authorities insisted during these months on socializing in the *artel* not only the basic means of production but also the peasant's entire property, the *artel* was such only in name. In reality it meant that those who joined an *artel* were actually joining a commune. The middle-peasant, upon whose good-will the future growth of the movement depended, could not become at one stroke a class-conscious member of a commune with all that this implies. The government therefore decided to put an end to the misinterpretation of the

[112] *Kolkhozy Nakanune XVI Sezda Partii* (*Collectives on the Eve of the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party*) (Plankhozgiz, Moscow, 1930), p. 7.

[113] Iakovlev, I. A., *Red Villages*, p. 91.

[114] *Statisticheskii Spravochnik* (*Statistical Handbook of the U.S.S.R.*) 1932, p. 130.

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meaning of an *artel* by publishing model rules wherein the status of this type of collective farm was clearly defined.[115]

According to this constitution of the new system of agriculture an *artel* is a type of collective where "the agricultural workers, poor and middle-peasants . . . voluntarily unite to build large collective farms by pooling their means of production and labor . . . in order to achieve a high productivity . . . and a large marketable surplus" (Sec. 1). Any member of the working population over sixteen years of age may become a member of an *artel*. This regulation does not apply to the kulaks unless members of their families are devoted supporters of the Soviet State and are willing to guarantee the proper behavior of the kulak while in the collective (Sec. 5). Upon joining an *artel* the member has to make a cash payment ranging from 2 to 10 per cent of the total value of his property (Sec. 6).

All the individual land holdings are combined in one field and "under no condition may the combined land area [of a collective] be decreased . . . those leaving can receive land only from the land reserves in the possession of the state" (Sec. 11). In view of the fact that the land reserves of the state are limited, and the state itself is not interested in promoting individual farming, withdrawal of individual members becomes very difficult. This situation is aggravated by yet another provision to the effect that "from 25 to 50 per cent of the value of the collectivized property . . . contributed to the indivisible capital fund, cannot be returned to the peasant upon his leaving the *artel*" (Sec. 6). It is maintained, however, that this provision does not infringe on the principle of voluntarism because "voluntary entry does not in the least way imply dividing up at will. *The collective farm is not a passageway. Every peasant must understand this before he joins.*"[116] Whatever the merit of the argument, it is clear that the provisions were intended to bring about a stricter discipline and to prevent the breaking-up of the *artels*.

One of the most important provisions of the constitution

[115] *Pravda*, March 2, 1930.

[116] Iakovlev, I. A., *Red Villages*, p. 93 (italics Iakovlev's).

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deals with the socialization of the means of production: "All work animals, agricultural implements, commercially productive livestock, all seed reserves, all cattle fodder, are socialized" (Sec. 3). Each member has a right to keep one milch cow for his personal use. Socialization of hogs and of sheep is permitted only in the regions where commercial livestock raising is developed. In connection with this provision it is to be noted that gardens, orchards, etc.—i. e., land within the confines of the peasant yard—are also retained by the holders for individual use (Sec. 2). Thus it was hoped that by socializing the basic means of production the private property notions in the village would be eradicated before long, but in permitting certain practices of an individual economy there is recognition of the fact that "having entered a collective the peasant does not cease to be one overnight."[117] Therefore, "to demand that the peasant on joining an *artel* should immediately lose all individualistic habits and interests; should surrender the possibility of carrying on individual farming . . . in addition to the socialized farming . . . is to forget the A, B, C of Marxism and Leninism."[118]

All the work in the *artel* must be carried on by its members, the exception being the employment of agricultural specialists or the temporary employment of laborers, in time of urgent need. For the work done the members are paid by the *artel* according to the quantity, quality and kind of labor performed (Sec. 7). At a later date a new provision was added to the model rules of an *artel* in an attempt to impose greater responsibility upon the members of a collective farm. Accordingly, should a member of an *artel* refuse, without proper cause, to carry out a task assigned to him, it is the duty of the management of the collective farm to impose upon him a fine amounting to the remuneration of five workdays; upon repeating the same offense, he is to be expelled from the collective farm.[119]

One of the most important provisions of the model rules

[117] *Ibid.*, p. 93. [118] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[119] "Ob Ukreplenii Kolkhozov" (On Strengthening of the Collective Farms), Sec. 3 of the decree passed by the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. on Jan. 30, 1933, *Pravda*, Jan. 31, 1933.

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directly affecting the welfare of the collectivized peasantry is the "obligation of the *artel* . . . to turn over its entire marketable output to the state and the coöperatives" (Sec. 10, art. 22) at prices fixed by the state. The somewhat vague term, "entire marketable output", was given a more concrete meaning shortly afterward. According to the provisions of the new decree, the collectives of the main grain-growing regions were under an obligation to sell to the state from one-fourth to one-third, and in all other regions, one-eighth, of their gross output.[120]

The business of an *artel* is conducted by the general meeting of the members or their elected delegates and by a managing committee elected by the members or the delegates. The general meeting by an open vote decides upon the most important affairs of the *artel,* while the business of the managing committee is to carry out those decisions (Sec. 9).

The *artel* as a member of a regional collective association carries on its work under the direct supervision of the latter. The regional collective associations are united into an All-Russian *Kolkhoz* (Collective) Center whose business it is to direct the work of the entire collective movement in accordance with the policies formulated by the Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.[121]

From a Communist point of view such an organization does not adequately represent the fundamental socialistic tenets. The constitution of an *artel* is an attempt at a workable coördination of two apparently mutually exclusive elements: the socialistic and the private individualistic practices. The latter element is cultivated by the economic inequality between the poor and middle peasants. Inequalities in the *artel* still persist for the two following reasons: first, because the property retained uncollectivized by the middle-peasant member is larger than the property retained individually by the poor peasant;

[120] "O Normakh Sdachi (prodazhi) Zagotovitelnym Organam Zernovoi Produktsii" [Concerning the Quotas of Grain to Be Delivered (Sold) to the (State) Supply Agencies], printed in F. Beloutski's (editor) *Kolkhozno-Kooperativnoe Zakondodatelstvo* (*Collective-Coöperative Legislation*) (Moscow, 1931), p. 83.

[121] *Ibid.*, pp. 60-63.

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and, second, since the middle-peasant contributes a larger share to the total collectivized property than the poor peasant, the former receives a larger share of the net output.[122] Furthermore, with the exception of the land, the socialized means of production do not belong to the state, but to a group of people forming a particular collective farm. While the net product is socialized it is not the property of the state as a whole but that of the members of the given collective farm.

Notwithstanding the absence of a strictly socialistic form, the Communists saw in the *artel* a type of collective farm where one does not encounter two opposing classes; where the economic dependence of one group of peasants upon the other is absent; and where no individual member of a collective may own the basic means of production. These elements, coupled with the fact that the real basis of a collective, the land, is state-owned, show that the proper application of the *artel* constitution results in a hybrid species of socialized agricultural system.*

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(later 2%)

[122] Five per cent of the gross crop is divided among the members of the artel according to the amount of property they have contributed to it. *Ibid.*, Sec. 3.

* To be continued.—ED.

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APPROACHES TO HISTORY V

VII

THE last study of this series[1] treated the history of German Romanticism and showed how many different learned tales can be told about apparently the same intellectual movement. The conclusion suggests itself that these histories varied so greatly not because of difference in the material but because of difference in the approach. It is true that in the case of German Romanticism the different approaches necessitated at times a shift in the material, a circumstance, however, which is irrelevant to our main proposition. One can easily select a historical subject where there is no possibility of shifting the material, and yet the "history" and the evaluation of the material will be constantly changing as one's general attitude and specific approach may change. Consider, for instance, how history has dealt with the famous monuments of Greek art. Here is a case where the material of necessity remains identically the same, but not so its history.

We have tried to impress upon the reader that the different histories are due to different approaches. Every approach, however, is an approach to something. What is it that historians approached in the case of German Romanticism? Obviously it could be nothing else than an outlook on life, a way of looking at things—in other words, an attitude of mind. The attitude of mind that is called German Romanticism has been approached in different ways and hence has produced different patterns, different histories. But has it been approached *without any attitude of mind?* Such an assumption would be tantamount to saying that it has been approached without a mind. Obviously when historians were writing on the Romantic outlook, they had an outlook of their own—and

[1] See POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. XLIV (1929), p. 481; vol. XLV (1930), p. 481; vol. XLVII (1932), p. 410; vol. XLVIII (1933), p. 23.

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they could look upon that outlook only with the outlook that was theirs.

It is quite true that scholars, who dedicate their lives to the service of truth, who search for it and give it honest expression, are loath to acknowledge that their efforts are dependent on so relative and changing an affair as an outlook on life or an attitude of mind. It would indeed be more satisfactory to all of us to work with that feeling of certainty and confidence in the permanence of our contributions that workers in the field of exact sciences seem to have. Yet the idea of history as an "exact science" has practically never been in vogue among professional historians. Of course, we are not forgetting the aspirations and noble efforts of Henry Thomas Buckle, nor the significant stimulus that Marx's economic interpretation has given to history. We will try to do them justice later on. But as a rule distinguished historians whose contributions have counted, and men who have given thought to history, viewed the writing of history as an art. What they meant by "art" is a more difficult question. Macaulay, for instance, depicts the historian as akin to the dramatist—nay, he wanders perhaps even farther afield from the postulates of "science" when he expects history to be a compound of philosophy and poetry.[1] It sounds rather like an English version of Wilhelm von Humboldt's views, after they were definitely influenced by the Romanticists and most especially by Schelling. Humboldt quite frankly looks upon history as a freely creative art, whose purpose is to give to the intellect and to the emotions of contemporaries a picture and appreciation of the

[1] "The talent which is required to write history thus bears a considerable affinity to the talent of a great dramatist. There is one obvious distinction. The dramatist creates; the historian only disposes. The difference is not in the mode of execution, but in the mode of conception. Shakespeare is guided by a model which exists in his imagination; Tacitus, by a model furnished from without." T. B. Macaulay, "Essay on History", *Edinburgh Review*, May 1828, printed in *Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays and Poems* (New York, 1880), vol. 1, p. 292.

"History, at least in its state of ideal perfection, is a compound of poetry and philosophy. It impresses general truths on the mind by a vivid representation of particular characters and incidents." *Ibid.*, p. 310.

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historical fate of mankind.[1] Curiously enough, even Ranke, who was trying to inform us what really happened and how things really were, is credited by Spengler with regarding Scott's *Quentin Durward* as a specimen of true history writing.[2] Mommsen was altogether too wise to bother with history as a "science", for he considered the historian more of an artist than a scholar.[3] He could not exactly make claim to

[1] "Ausserdem dass die Geschichte, wie jede wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung, vielen untergeordneten Zwecken dient, ist ihre Bearbeitung nicht weniger, als Philosophie und Dichtung, eine freie, in sich vollendete Kunst. Das ungeheure Gewühl, der sich drängenden Weltbegebenheiten, zum Theil hervorgehend aus der Beschaffenheit des Erdbodens, der Natur der Menschheit, dem Charakter der Nationen und Individuen, zum Theil wie aus dem Nichts entsprungen, und wie durch ein Wunder gepflanzt, abhängig von dunkel geahnten Kräften, und sichtbar durchwaltet von ewigen, tief in der Brust des Menschen gewurzelten Ideen, ist ein Unendliches, das der Geist niemals in eine Form zu bringen vermag, das ihn aber immer reizt, es zu versuchen, und ihm Stärke gibt, es theilweise zu vollenden. Wie die Philosophie nach dem ersten Grunde der Dinge, die Kunst nach dem Ideale der Schönheit, so strebt die Geschichte nach dem Bilde des Menschenschicksals in treuer Wahrheit, lebendiger Fülle, und reiner Klarheit, von einem dergestalt auf den Gegenstand gerichteten Gemüth empfunden, dass sich die Ansichten, Gefühle, und Ansprüche der Persönlichkeit darin verlieren und auflösen. Diese Stimmung hervorzubringen und zu nähren, ist der letzte Zweck des Geschichtschreibers, den er aber nur dann erreicht, wenn er seinen nächsten, die einfache Darstellung des Geschehenen, mit gewissenhafter Treue verfolgt." Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Über die Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers", printed in *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin, 1905), vol. IV, pp. 38-39.

[2] "Nevertheless, we must not lose sight of the fact that at bottom the wish to write history *scientifically* involves a contradiction. True science reaches just as far as the notions of truth and falsity have validity; this applies to mathematics and it also applies to the science of historical spadework, viz., the collection, ordering and sifting of material. But real historical vision (which only *begins* at this point) belongs to the domain of significance, in which the crucial words are not "correct" and "erroneous", but "deep" and "shallow". The true physicist is not deep, but *keen:* it is only when he leaves the domain of working hypotheses and brushes against the final things that he can be deep, but at this stage he is already a metaphysician. Nature is to be handled scientifically, History poetically. Old Leopold von Ranke is credited with the remark that, after all, Scott's *Quentin Durward* was the true history writing." Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, English translation by Charles Francis Atkinson (2d ed., New York, 1926), vol. I, p. 96.

[3] "Die richtige Schätzung der vorliegenden Zeugnisse, die rechte Verknüpfung des scheinbar Unzusammenhängenden oder Sichwidersprechenden zur tatsächlichen Folge treten überall in so unendlicher Einfachheit der Prinzipien

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so-called objective scholarship since he realized that history is neither made nor written without hate or love.[1] Eduard Meyer, alas, no longer among the living, but who still stands alone and without peer as a colossus in the entire vast field of ancient history, viewed history definitely as an artistic creation. He tells us that one can no more teach how to create an historical work, than one can teach the discovery of a philosophical idea, of a law of nature, of a plastic work of art, or of a musical creation.[2] A. J. Balfour perhaps sums up what

und so unendlicher Mannigfaltigkeit der Anwendung auf, dass jede Theorie entweder trivial ausfallen müsste oder transcendental. Dass Zeugen vom Hörensagen nur so viel gelten, wie der Gewährsmann des Hörenden gilt, ist so ziemlich der einzige Lehrsatz, den die Quellenforschung aufzuweisen hat; und die divinatorische Sicherheit des Urteils, die den eminenten Historiker bezeichnet, ist in neun Fällen unter zehn nichts als eine unbewusste Anwendung dieses Lehrsatzes auf komplizierte Probleme. Der Schlag aber, der tausend Verbindungen schlägt, der Blick in die Individualität, der Menschen und der Völker spotten in ihrer hohen Genialität alles Lehrens und Lernens. Der Geschichtschreiber gehört vielleicht mehr zu den Künstlern als zu den Gelehrten.

". . . es ist eine gefährliche und schädliche Illusion, wenn der Professor der Geschichte meint in der Weise Historiker bilden zu können, wie Philologen oder Mathematiker allerdings auf der Universität ausgebildet werden können. Mit mehr Recht als von diesen kann man es von dem Historiker sagen, dass er nicht gebildet wird, sondern geboren, nicht erzogen wird, sondern sich erzieht." Theodor Mommsen, *Rektoratsrede* (1874), in *Reden und Aufsätze* (Berlin, 1905), p. 11.

[1] "Those who have lived through historical events, as I have, begin to see that history is neither written nor made without love or hate." Theodor Mommsen, quoted in G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1913), p. 458.

[2] "Das Äusserliche der Technik kann methodisch eingeübt werden; dagegen die Hauptsache, die innere Erfassung des Stoffs, die Erkenntnis des historischen Problems, die Entdeckung seiner Lösung kann nur aus dem Innern des Forschers heraus geboren werden. Der Lehrer kann dazu anleiten, indem er zeigt, wie er es selbst macht, indem er das Problem und den Weg seiner Lösung in der Seele des Lernenden zu erwecken versucht; aber wie man ein Geschichtswerk macht, das lässt sich ebensowenig zeigen, wie die Entdeckung einer philosophischen Idee oder eines Naturgesetzes oder wie die Verwandlung eines Marmorblocks in ein Kunstwerk oder die Verbindung einer Anzahl Töne zu einer Melodie—oder etwa die Anfertigung eines brauchbaren Geräts oder selbst eines schmackhaften Gerichts. Mit der Technik muss sich in jedem Falle die Selbsttätigkeit des schaffenden Individuums verbinden, die zwar von aussen angeregt werden kann, deren inneres Wesen aber jeder Erkenntnis sich entzieht; sie bildet eine der gegebenen und nicht weiter analysierbaren

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many historians said or tried to say and many a thinker expressed in a less felicitous way:

> . . . there is always an artist to be reckoned with. It may be Thucydides and it may be Mr. Dryasdust. . . . But there is always somebody; and though that somebody might repudiate the notion that his narrative was a work of art, yet he cannot evade responsibility for selection, for emphasis, and for color. We may think him a bad artist, but, even in his own despite, an artist he is;—and artist whose material is not marble or stone, but brute fact.[1]

That historians have thought of the "art" of the historian in the sense of the artistic compositions of great painters, dramatists, musicians or sculptors is obvious, but we can perhaps clarify the subject by translating it into our own, possibly more consistent terms. Whether we take music or whether we take sculpture, *art* is organized expression, organized by definite attitudes. These attitudes as a rule present complicated fusions of currently prevalent general attitudes with the more particular style or manner of a given school and with the definitely personal aptitudes of the indi-

Grundtatsachen des menschlichen Daseins. . . ." Eduard Meyer, *Zur Theorie und Methodik der Geschichte*, printed in *Kleine Schriften* [Zweite Auflage, Halle (Saale) 1924], vol. I, pp. 3-4.

[1] A. J. Balfour, *Theism and Humanism* (London, 1915), pp. 85-86; quoted in F. J. Teggart, *The Theory of History* (New Haven, 1925), p. 28.

"History is not the mere statement of 'what has actually happened'. The historian, whether he sets out to explain a given present in the light of its antecedents or to construct a synthesis of what has happened from the materials provided by documents, is engaged in making a construction which is conditioned by the records which have been preserved, by the ideas and interests of the present in which the historian lives, by the exigencies and requirements of a form of art. With whatever care the facts are sifted, with whatever sincerity they are subsequently presented, narrative statement remains art, and, as such, is not science. The ambition and desire of historians, in the last half-century, to achieve scientific results is only an additional evidence of the influence of the demand for scientific knowledge in regard to the affairs of men to which attention was called at the outset. This hope or desire of historians can, however, be realized only when they have come to appreciate that, in adopting the mode of presentation for their results which is characteristic of traditional historiography, they have cut themselves off from any possibility of the attainment of scientific results." Teggart, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

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vidual, a combination which, even within the framework of the same prevailing attitudes, gives one's technique as well as one's spiritual personality an indelible personal touch. Yet what creation meant to the artist, how he himself looked upon his own works, we do not know and we cannot know. We see his work, but his own eyes no longer exist, and we can see his work only with our own eyes and view it in the light of our own feelings, our own outlook, our own attitude. And that remains true, no matter how conscientiously we endeavor to see things and to evaluate their significance in their own particular historical setting. On the other hand it is quite true that we may have a convincing insight into the complexity of the historical life in which the artist was placed and in which he functioned. We may see the driving force of conditions, of which the artist was quite unconscious. Such an insight, however, is in itself an artistic creation. And the process is not much different from the work of the painter or the sculptor, except that the scholar is not organizing and relating masses and planes, but relating factors, conditions and circumstances to the aims, visions and limitations of the artist he is studying. The historical scholar is as little conscious of what has conditioned his particular insight, his particular organization of the material, as the artist was conscious of the elements that conditioned his creative achievement.

But even granting that the creative processes of an artist and of a scientist are closely related, it serves no purpose to introduce the criterion of "truth" into art, or that of "beauty" into science. One might think that point of view to be a heritage of the German Romanticists who enjoyed dwelling in that mystic twilight of the absolute—where all cats are grey and truth and beauty cannot be told apart. Yet it is strange how early and also how late the word "truth" was used as a criterion and aim of art. So we find Quintilian reporting the general opinion that what Praxiteles and Lysippus successfully aimed at was the *truth*—"*Ad veritatem Lysippum ac Praxitelen accessisse optime adfirmant.*"[1] Rodin

[1] Quintilian, XII. 10, 7.

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says something similar about himself. When it was pointed out to him that in that case plaster casts would be "truer" than his sculptures, he answered, "*C'est juste! mais c'est que le moulage est moins vrai que ma sculpture. . . . Je vois toute la vérité et non pas seulement celle de la surface.*" [1]

What Quintilian and Rodin express in their statements, however, has nothing to do with romanticism; rather do they express an attitude which is known to us in art as "naturalism". Aristotle was not a fool when he defined art as "imitation of nature"; he was taking toward art a "naturalistic" attitude which was indeed quite in keeping with the tendency of his contemporaries, such as Lysippus. If to us such an idea of art is absurd, it simply means that we are no longer under the spell of naturalism but are viewing art with a different attitude of mind.

It may help us in many ways and illustrate an involved situation if we take as an example our historical as well as cultural attitude toward such seemingly unchanging historical documents as the famous monuments of classical antiquity with which at least in our school days we had to become familiar.

Already the Romans of the late republican and early imperial periods were collectors of Greek art. In our school years we learned this from Cicero who accused Verres of looting Greek temples. What kind and type of art the Romans looted or imported is a question. Presumably they chose the kind they could appreciate, just as America and Europe first appreciated in Chinese art pots and jars. When finally paintings began to be collected our Western civilization seems to have had an unerring instinct for what was of little or no significance in the history of Chinese art, but could be easily appreciated by a Western eye.[2] It could not have been other-

[1] Paul Gsell, *Auguste Rodin* (Paris, 1912), pp. 30-31.

[2] It could not be otherwise because of the difference in approach and attitude between Western and Far Eastern art. A report of a Chinese artist, who traveled in Europe in the eighteenth century, throws some light on the subject. It deals with style in the sense of stylization. Dr. Ferguson thought style meant brush-strokes!! Tsou-I-Kuei wrote in his *Remarks on Painting:* "Mural paintings of palaces and residences are often so real that one wants

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wise, unless rich collectors had had the brilliant inspiration of collecting solely and exclusively just what they did not like, did not appreciate and did not understand.

Before we censure the taste of the Romans in looting and collecting, we must bear in mind just what the taste and attitudes of their Greek contemporaries were. It was the period of so-called Greco-Roman art! There is no doubt however that some earlier pieces found their way to Rome, where they remained, if underground, until the Renaissance found them.

The Renaissance was indeed a rebirth, not of Greek but of Roman art and the new enthusiasm for the classical tradition amounted to an apotheosis of the art of Greece and of the art of Rome of the last century or so before the Christian Era. The more common the collecting and excavating of classical statuary became, the more " distinguished " it was considered. As a matter of record, already at the end of the thirteenth and in the early fourteenth century Italian artists like Niccola Pisano and Giovanni Pisano were attracted by Roman and Greco-Roman reliefs and as Italian art-expression was consciously aspiring to simulate the spirit of Greco-Roman art, the digging, restoring, preserving and collecting of classical art became the commonplace recreation of those who felt themselves called to be patrons of art. Thus the Apollo of Belvedere was dug up in Antium at the end of the fifteenth century, and the Laokoön in Rome in 1506. The famous Belvedere Torso was found early in the sixteenth century, for it was placed by Pope Clement VII (1523 to 1534) in the Belvedere Gardens. The Farnese Bull Group was found in 1546 and by that time appreciation of that particular level of classical art was so established and widespread that it transcended the borders of Italy. In rapid succession France, Spain, Germany and England joined in the treasure hunt. Acres of carefully restored classical statuary now found in the Vatican

to walk straight into them. Students may make use of a small percentage of the methods of westerners, and especially of their suggestiveness, but they are entirely devoid of style. [" Style of the brush ", adds Ferguson.] Although their work shows skill in drawing and workmanship yet it cannot be classed as true painting." John C. Ferguson, *Outlines of Chinese Art* (Chicago, 1919), p. 197.

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collections, the Louvre, and other museums testify to the untiring efforts of the generations of art lovers who followed in the wake of the Italian Renaissance.

What is of interest to us is the changing attitude toward these unchanging historical monuments of art. Dickins begins his book on Hellenistic sculpture with a statement to which the academic learning of our generation will hardly take exception. He tells us that "most of the writers on Greek art agree in calling the Hellenistic period an age of decadence. The period is a long one, lasting from the death of Alexander to the Roman absorption of the Hellenistic kingdoms, i. e. from about 320 to later than 100 B. C."[1] As a matter of fact or as a matter of bibliography this view is an old traditional and established academic one, as old, I believe, as Winckelmann. Johann Joachim Winckelmann, the so-called father of scientific archaeology, writes in his *History of Ancient Art among the Greeks:*

> If we review and condense the substance of this book, we shall see in the art of the Greeks, especially in sculpture, four stages of style, namely, the straight and hard, the grand and square, the beautiful and flowing, and the imitative. The first probably lasted, for the most part, until the age of Phidias; the second, until Praxiteles, Lysippus, and Apelles; the third probably ceased with the school of the three latter artists; and the fourth continued until the downfall of art. The period during which art was in its highest bloom was not of long duration, for from the Age of Pericles until the death of Alexander, at which time the glory of art began to diminish, there are about one hundred and twenty years.[2]

This observation with trifling variations became the cornerstone of academic art history and archaeology. One may well ask how so hard and fast a code of taste and appreciation, so obviously representing a very definite attitude toward art, could be reconciled with the palpable fact that since the days of Winckelmann our attitude toward art has undergone drastic

[1] G. Dickins, *Hellenistic Sculpture* (Oxford, 1920), p. 1.

[2] J. Winckelmann, *The History of Ancient Art among the Greeks*, translated by G. H. Lodge (Boston, 1872-1873), vol. III, p. 234.

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changes. It is precisely this striking incongruity that makes this problem so interesting to any study of the rôle and behavior of an attitude. For the problem is not confined to the history of art. The history of art is an example of it, but it applies also to the history of law, religion and all social life. Our changing attitude does not have to be formulated differently so long as it can change the content with which the formula deals. Here we have the formulation of Winckelmann—great was the Greek art of the fifth and fourth centuries only—but note what he puts into this particular period and see what generations of subsequent scholars have done to his idols. His actual attitude and appreciation is as incomprehensible and as distasteful to a modern artist as archaic art was to Winckelmann. For he actually wondered why Romans carried away from Greece examples of early art and he decided that the reason "can have been no other than that which leads me to mention them here, namely, to set up works of the most ancient art of the Greeks in order to have the series complete." [1]

Some chance remarks of Winckelmann give us a glimpse into his criterion of art, which of necessity excludes severe structural, impassive lithic art, for he was looking for, and obviously could not find, in archaic art "the degree in which passions were expressed".[2] We should not under the circumstances then be greatly surprised if he puts among the *chefs d'oeuvre* of the fourth century, and among the glories that Greek art produced during the reign of Alexander the Great, the relief of the Satyr of Villa Albani (Fig. 1), which expresses the emotions that Winckelmann so values—now generally regarded as significant only as a specimen of Roman vulgarity.[3]

[1] Winckelmann, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 185.

[2] "We should be able to give more precise characteristics of this older style if a greater number of works in marble, and especially in reliefs, had been preserved; as from them we could discover the method employed by the most ancient artists in grouping their figures, and hereby discern the degree in which the passions were expressed." *Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 187-88.

[3] "He is crowned with ivy, and is drinking . . . with so much eagerness and delight that the eyeballs are turned entirely upwards, and only a small portion of the hollowed-out pupils are visible." Winckelmann, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 216.

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And it is in the same period of Greek art at its highest, and as contemporary with Alexander, that the Laokoön group (Fig. 2) is placed. This group therefore belongs to the period, which, in the words of Winckelmann, reached a conception of beauty that could be carried no further.[1] We can see now with what sort of content Winckelmann filled his formulation of the development of Greek art. Though he is supported by the Renaissance tradition, it could not very well be said that at the time of Winckelmann every work of antiquity was apt to be considered a Greek original of the fourth century. Winckelmann's distinguished predecessor in the field of archaeology, Bernard de Montfaucon, considered practically all so-called Greek statues found in Italy as Roman copies[2] and Winckelmann took issue with this attitude of Father Montfaucon. The weight of tradition was however all in Winckelmann's favor, for in reality his views are but tradition classified, organized and systematized—with much learning and little taste.

It is perhaps obvious that if the attitudes expressed in Greco-Roman and Roman art are viewed as the highest artistic achievements of ancient Greece, and placed in the fifth and fourth centuries, then there is no room in this period for the genuine masterpieces of the Phidian period. That is precisely what happened when Lord Elgin brought the real Parthenon marbles to London. The Society of the Dilettanti—which was the society of the great English collectors of classical antiquity and represented the heights of aesthetic judgment—looked upon these marbles frankly with the uttermost disdain, and considered them the work of mediocre artists.[3] It could not very well be otherwise, for what were the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century English Dilettanti collecting as the chief masterpieces of Greece? Michaelis in his famous work on the private collections writes: "For all the marbles contained in private galleries belong, with unimportant excep-

[1] Winckelmann, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 218.

[2] B. Montfaucon, *L'Antiquité expliquée et représentée en figures* (Paris, 1719), Supplément (Paris, 1724).

[3] Society of the Dilettanti, *Specimens of Ancient Sculpture* (London, 1809), vol. I, p. xxxix.

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tions, to this class of Graeco-Roman sculpture."[1] As a matter of fact, the Society, and Payne Knight its spokesman, followed in the traditional attitude, as old as the Renaissance, toward Greek sculpture. The English traveler who first saw the Parthenon marbles *in situ,* George Wheler, considered the figures of the pediments to be additions of the time of Hadrian.[2] Let us now briefly review what happened in the course of a century or so to the unchanging marbles that were considered the greatest masterpieces of the fifth and fourth centuries in Greece and in the world as well.

The Laokoön Group now in the Vatican Museum was found in 1506. The Renaissance had a pedestal ready made for this statue, for did not Pliny refer to it as the most beautiful sculpture ever seen?[3] And that was exactly how Giuliano da San Gallo greeted the find: "That is the Laokoön of which Pliny speaks."[4] It was hailed by contemporaries in prose and in verse.[5] This admiration for the Laokoön, especially Pliny's opinion, finds expression in Winckelmann, who, as we have seen, puts the group in the fourth century as the most precious monument of that period "which must be preferred to all others, whether of painting or of sculpture."[6] It of course never occurred to Winckelmann to question the particular level of artistic appreciation and taste of Pliny who so glowingly described the statue nor of Titus, who put it in his "bath-room". Those who followed in Winckelmann's footsteps only elaborated on his thesis.[7] Lessing is sufficiently affected by

[1] A. Michaelis, *Ancient Marbles in Great Britain* (Cambridge, 1882), p. 184.

[2] G. Wheler, *A Journey into Greece* (London, 1682), pp. 361-62.

[3] Montfaucon, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 244-45.

[4] J. A. Symonds, *The Life of Michelangelo Buonarotti* (3d ed., London, 1899), p. 154.

[5] For instance, *De Laocoontis Statua Jacobi Sadoleti Carmen. Cf.* Lessing's *Laokoön, herausgegeben und erläutert von Hugo Blümner* (Berlin, 1876), p. 83, note.

[6] Winckelmann, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 84.

[7] The publication of the Society of Dilettanti makes the following criticism: ". . . Agesander of Rhodes, who with the assistance of Atenodorus and Polydorus, seemingly his sons, made the celebrated group of Laocoön, a work preferable to all that either sculpture or painting ever have, or probably ever

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the glamor of the statue to use it as a title for his famous work of comparison of poetry and sculpture. Lessing, indeed, trying to correlate the plastic arts with poetry, and fascinated by the Augustan Age, asks the very interesting question: why could not the Laokoön be the work of a contemporary of Vergil, or belong to the early period of the Roman Empire?[1] But Lessing remains bound by the aesthetic attitudes of his time and generation and fully appreciates the incomparable beauty of the group. There is no need to trace here the gradual change in that attitude. Bruns compares the Laokoön with the Pergamon Gigantomachie and considers both as "outer limits of emotional expression in Greek art, which puts them far away from the great masters of the fifth and fourth centuries."[2] Overbeck follows Bruns in his scheme of historical development of emotional representation, but adds very interesting observations of his own, showing the degeneration of the moral idea that the Laokoön myth implied, and places it with Rhodian art.[3] From now on the position of the Laokoön declines. Mrs. Mitchell characterizes the Laokoön as revolting[4] and Friedrichs and Walters place it at *ca.* 100 B. C. and consider the Laokoön even further from the spirit of classical Greek art than they do the Farnese Bull. Indeed, in their opinion there is no other work extant that could compare with it in sensuous expression of the horrible; it belongs to a time when the people could not understand inner pain and

will produce. . . . The style, however, of this masterpiece of art affords a better reason for supposing it a work of this time; it having too much freedom and laxity, both in the composition and execution, to be anterior to Lysippus; and too much vigour and spirit to be much later. The execution is, indeed, of that peculiar kind, which seems to have begun with the preceding period, and indeed with this; the surface of the marble remaining as it was left by the chisel; the masterly and scientific touches of which express, when seen at the proper distance, the trembling elasticity and palpitation of the flesh, and even the grain and texture of the skin." *Specimens of Ancient Sculpture* (London, 1809), p. L.

[1] Lessing, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-95.

[2] Quoted by Overbeck, J., *Geschichte der Griechischen Plastik* (Leipzig, 1881), vol. II, p. 301.

[3] Overbeck, *op. cit.*, pp. 288-89.

[4] L. Mitchell, *A History of Greek Sculpture* (New York, 1883), p. 605.

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could be moved only by such horrible expression as Laokoön represents.[1] The latest important work on Greek sculpture, that of Miss Richter, places it at *ca.* 50 B. C.[2] The usual conception of the periods of good and of inferior Greek art has not been challenged, but the accepted date of the Laokoön has been changed from the reign of Alexander to the Rhodian School of about 200 B. C., from there to *ca.* 100 B. C., and finally to *ca.* 50 B. C. Hence it becomes meaningless as a document of Greek art.

Similar was the fate of the Apollo of Belvedere (Fig. 3), now in the Vatican. It was found at the end of the fifteenth century and repaired by Montorsoli, a pupil of Michelangelo. The artists of the Renaissance considered it a Greek masterpiece of transcendent importance and Winckelmann esteemed it even above the Laokoön. He could speak of it only in superlatives—"the highest conception of ideal male beauty is especially expressed in the Apollo." He not only makes it a *chef d'oeuvre* of the fourth century but he waxes poetical about his own learned stature when contemplating the Apollo.[3] So long as the general attitude toward art did not change the Apollo remained safely on the pedestal where Winckelmann had put him. Indeed Feuerbach wrote in 1855 that all accepted Winckelmann's conception of the Apollo as the most beautiful monument of Greek art, the most precious jewel, the like of which no former artist had created and no future

[1] C. Friedrichs, Neubearbeitet von P. Wolters, *Die Gipsabdrücke antiker Bildwerke in historischer Folge erklärt* (Berlin, 1885), pp. 534-38.

[2] G. M. A. Richter, *The Sculpture and Sculptors of the Greeks.* (New Haven, 1929), p. 38.

[3] Winckelmann, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 214. "In the presence of this miracle of art I forget all else, and I myself take a lofty position for the purpose of looking upon it in a worthy manner. My breast seems to enlarge and swell with reverence, like the breasts of those who were filled with the spirit of prophecy, and I feel myself transported to Delos and into the Lycaean groves, —places which Apollo honored by his presence,—for my image seems to receive life and motion, like the beautiful creation of Pygmalion. How is it possible to paint and describe it! Art itself must counsel me, and guide my hand in filling up hereafter the first outlines which I here have sketched. As they who were unable to reach the heads of the divinities which they wished to crown deposited the garlands at the feet of them, so I place at the feet of this image the conception which I have presented of it."

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artist could ever achieve.[1] But attitudes changed: Overbeck sees in the Apollo a Roman work, a Roman copy in Italian marble of a Greek bronze statue of the post-Lysippian period.[2] Mrs. Mitchell put it in the Hellenistic period.[3] Friedrichs and Wolters consider it a Roman variation of an earlier work, but are nevertheless impressed by its beauty.[4] Von Mach denies that the Apollo is in fourth-century style, deprecates the popular overvaluation of the Apollo as a work of art and calls attention to its lack of dignity by comparison with earlier Greek statues.[5] Murray is of the opinion that the Apollo may be a Roman copy, and that, if it is, the original copied is of the Greco-Roman period, about the year 100 B. C., late second or early first century.[6] Finally in the distinguished work of Guy Dickins, our own generation makes its début by dealing with the statue in terms quite different from those of Winckelmann. To Dickins the Apollo

> attempts to outdo the elegance of its original by an ultra-refinement of surface in every direction, and by an affected stagepose and gesture. In both cases we see the effect of commercialism in art, for the artist no longer works on his own high standard of achievement. He is bound by the tastes of the patrons to whom he caters, and the uneducated Roman buyer liked to see strength shown by mighty muscles and refinement by daintiness of gesture. Both the Heracles of Glycon and the Apollo of Belvedere are fine pieces of sculpture, but as works of art they are little short of abominable.[7]

Forgotten is the hymn of Winckelmann. The Apollo as the highest expression of Greek art is in total eclipse.

[1] "Welches kein früherer Künstler erreicht hatte und spätere nie erreichen werden." A. Feuerbach, *Der Vaticanische Apollo* (Stuttgart, 1855), p. 5.

[2] Overbeck, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 322-23.

[3] Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 626.

[4] Friedrichs und Wolters, *op. cit.*, pp. 600-601.

[5] Von Mach, *A Handbook of Greek and Roman Sculpture* (Boston, 1905), pp. 299-300.

[6] Murray, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 373 (revised edition of 1890).

[7] G. Dickins, *Hellenistic Sculpture* (Oxford, 1920), p. 70.

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The Belvedere Torso (Fig. 4) was another of the great finds of the Renaissance and, in the eyes of Winckelmann and his immediate successors, one of the noble masterpieces of Greek art of the great period. The rock beneath the Torso bears the inscription, "Apollonios, the son of Nestor, an Athenian, made it." It shared the fate of Winckelmann's other masterpieces: von Mach finally dated and rated it at about the first-century level [1] and Miss Richter, basing her conclusions upon the lettering of the inscription, dates it *ca.* 50 B. C.[2] Similar has been the fate of the other masterpieces that were favorites of Winckelmann, his contemporaries and his immediate successors. It would be tedious to go on with their curious Odyssey, for as they migrated from period to period, as they traveled through generations from book to book, their dating implied their rating. Such was the fate of the Farnese Bull group found in 1546,[3] the Farnese Heracles,[4] the Borghese warrior, etc.[5] It has been pointed out on more than one occasion by learned archaeologists that after all Winckelmann and his school, as well as the great collectors of ancient sculpture, could not be blamed for their limited "knowledge" of Greek art, for all the material they dealt with was found in Italy and belonged to the Greco-Roman period, which they could evaluate neither historically nor aesthetically in the absence of genuine Greek material. It sounds like a fair enough statement, but those who so argued forgot much of the evidence to the contrary.

As a matter of fact, when the English began to form collec-

[1] Von Mach, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

[2] Richter, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[3] Winckelmann, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 107; Friedrichs und Wolters, *op. cit.*, pp. 517-18; M. Colignon, *Histoire de la sculpture grècque* (Paris, 1897), vol. II, p. 534.

[4] Montfaucon, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 200; Winckelmann, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 138-39; von Mach, *op. cit.*, p. 247; Gardner, *op. cit.*, p. 548; Richter, *op. cit.*, p. 45; Dickins, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[5] Winckelmann, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 215; Society of the Dilettanti, *Publications*, vol. I (1809), p. xliv; Laurent, H., *Le Musée Royal* (Paris, 1816-1819), vol. II; Friedrichs und Wolters, *op. cit.*, p. 543; von Mach, *op. cit.*, p. 316; A. W. Lawrence, *Later Greek Sculpture* (New York, 1927), p. 35; Gardner, *op. cit.*, pp. 514-15; Richter, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

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tions in the seventeenth century, they did so very thoroughly and tried to get ahead of Italy by ransacking Greece, Asia Minor, the Islands and even Egypt. Mr. Petty, a special representative of Lord Arundel, in conjunction with Sir Thomas Roe, the British ambassador to the Porte, collected marbles not only for the famous Earl, but also for the Duchess of Bedford and the Duke of Buckingham. Sir Thomas Roe's and Mr. Petty's agents did not neglect a single likely hunting-ground.[1] We know that among the places that did not escape their attention were Athens, Corinth, Argos, Sparta, Thasos, Kavalla, Delos, Angora, Ephesus, Pergamon, Alexandria and even Sinope. "But", writes Stanley Casson, "the canons of taste already fixed were immutable and the type of *objet d'art* collected by the Earl differed no whit from those known in Italy. This is the stranger, for the places now being explored must have contained works of the earlier periods as well as the later."[2] Casson's statement is very important. Winckel-

[1] Here is a specimen page from Sir Thomas Roe's letters to Lord Arundel: "*Copy to my Lord of* ARUNDEL, *Earl Marshal. My Lord,* I received your lordships letter in the Downes; and though my imployment bee the other end of the circle, to attend new things; yet myne owne inclynation is curious enough, to my meanes, to look back upon antiquity, and some learnings lost and decayed, rather, as I think, *ex industria,* then by the moth of tyme; in which opinion the little examination I have made in these parts, confirms me . . . hereby I find no difficulty in procuring such reliques, if I could discouer them. . . . But now I desire only to giue your lordship an accompt of the care I haue of your lordships commands. I moued our consul, Richard Milward at Scio, whom I found prepared and ready. Wee conferred about the maid of Smirna, which he cannott yet obteyne, without an especiall command. I brought with mee from Messina, the bishop of Andre, one of the islands of the Arches, a man of good learning, and great experience in these parts. Hee assured mee, That the search after old and good authors was vtterly vaine. . . . Concerning antiquities in marbles, there are many in diuers parts, but especially at Delphos (Delos), vnesteemed here; and, I doubt not, easy to be procured for the charge of digging and fetching, which must be purposely vndertaken. It is supposed, that many statues are buried, to secure them from the enuy of the Turks; and that, if leaue obteyned, would come to light, which I will endeauour as soone as I am warme here. Coynes wilbe had from Jewes. . . ." Adolf Michaelis, *Ancient Marbles in Great Britain* (Cambridge, 1882), Appendix: Letters of Sir Thomas Roe. Extracts from *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe, in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the year 1621 to 1628 Inclusive,* London, 1740, fol. 1 (p. 16).

[2] Stanley Casson, in *Greece and Rome,* vol. II, no. 4 (October 1932), p. 9.

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mann only expressed a well-developed aesthetic attitude of the Renaissance accompanied by a historical-developmental schedule based on testimony and literary quotations from Roman and Greek writers. It was obviously the aesthetic attitude that was sifting and fitting the material into the historical schedule.

That was exactly what was done with the celebrated Venus of Milo which was found in 1820 and purchased by Louis XVIII in 1821. It is interesting that Laurent in his desire to make the Venus rank with the best in Greek art compares it with the Apollo of Belvedere and informs us that the Venus was attributed to Phidias. Millingen in 1822 tells us that "the present statue may be ranked in the first class, and of the best time of Grecian art."[1] Collignon puts her in the early Hellenistic period soon after the death of Alexander.[2] Furtwängler ascribes her to the end of the second or the beginning of the first century B. C.,[3] and Friedrichs and Wolters put her perhaps a little earlier in the late Hellenistic Roman period.[4] While attributing the Venus to about the same period 180-160 B. C., Dickins remarks that "the Aphrodite of Melos has attained a somewhat undeserved position as one of the world's masterpieces of sculpture",[5] and in one of the latest works devoted to "later Greek sculpture" A. W. Lawrence is of the opinion that "The Venus shares this complex rhythm of pose with a group of other statues from the Aegean Islands and Asiatic coast, one of them inscribed with a date that corresponds to 128-127 B. C. There is, accordingly, no stylistic obstacle to accepting an inscribed base found with the Venus as belonging to it, since 100 B. C. is the date roughly indicated by the lettering."[6] Of course, recent literature records dis-

[1] J. Millingen, *Ancient Unedited Monuments* (London, 1822), p. 8.

[2] Collignon, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 473-74.

[3] "So reiht sich die Venus von Milo den zum Teil ja vortrefflichen Werken an, welche uns aus der späteren Hälfte des zweiten und aus dem ersten Jahrhundert vor Christi noch erhalten sind." Furtwängler, *Meisterwerke*, p. 655.

[4] Friedrichs und Wolters, *op. cit.*, p. 500.

[5] Dickins, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[6] Lawrence, *Later Greek Sculpture* (New York, 1927), p. 37.

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senting opinions like that of Miss Richter, who dates the statue between 300-250 B. C.,[1] but we believe that it is fair to state that even conservative judgment of today will not put the Venus of Milo farther back than does Beazley, who places her in the mid-second century.[2]

In this connection it is perhaps worth while to mention the tempest in a teapot that broke loose in 1927. Carl Blümel and, following him, Rhys Carpenter in 1931 assailed the pure Greek character of the Hermes of Praxiteles in the Olympia Museum. The attack of Blümel, though very ably supported by Carpenter, can as yet hardly be regarded as representing a widespread general attitude and therefore does not come within the scope of our considerations. Important, however, is the statement of Carpenter, "Alas for the state of that knowledge at present, when we can still debate the impossible choice between a Praxitelian original of the fourth century before Christ and a Roman version of four or five hundred years later."[3] It would seem that this complaint might suggest a certain widening of the concept of so-called knowledge. Archaeology was studying the attitudes and styles of the classical sculptors—would it not be perhaps as well to enlarge its scope by adding to its curriculum the study of the attitude of the archaeologists who reflected upon the attitude of the sculptors? These attitudes of the archaeologists and art historians are however involved with cultural situations, which are themselves seen by us in terms of our own attitudes.

We have already intimated that an attitude of mind that accepts the Laokoön as one of the greatest monuments of Greek art would have difficulty in appreciating the Parthenon sculptures. This is already shown by the reaction of Wheler to the pediments, which he believed to be later than the temple and of the time of Hadrian.[4] When Lord Elgin brought these marbles to England they were received with little enthusiasm

[1] Richter, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[2] J. D. Beazley and B. Ashmole, *Greek Sculpture and Painting* (New York, 1932), p. 93.

[3] *American Journal of Archaeology* (1931), p. 261.

[4] Wheler, *op. cit.*, pp. 361-62.

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and, while English collectors were buying with avidity Greco-Roman statuary, Lord Elgin was looking in vain for a purchaser. The common attitude toward these fifth-century masterpieces was perhaps best expressed by Payne Knight in his introduction to the *Specimens of Ancient Sculpture,* "Merely architectural sculptures executed from his [Phidias'] designs and under his directions, probably by workmen scarcely ranked among artists, and meant to be seen at the height of more than forty feet from the eye, they throw but little light upon the more important details of his art. . . . They are so different in their degrees of merit as to be evidently the works of many different persons, some of whom would not have been entitled to the rank of artists in a much less cultivated and fastidious age."[1] The Parthenon Marbles were bought after many artists testified to their merits and after the King of Bavaria quietly purchased the early fifth-century Aegina marbles. It is interesting that artists spoke with great admiration of the Parthenon marbles, while a writer on art, even when he was carrying on propaganda in favor of these marbles, could at that time think of no higher praise than to claim they were as good as the Laokoön, the Belvedere Torso, etc. Hamilton, who was obviously trying to present the Elgin marbles in the most favorable light, writes:

> An amateur, accustomed to the examination of the masterpieces of antiquity, will easily recognise in the detached sculptures of the Parthenon, and particularly in the parts of those statues which have been least injured by time, the grand and learned style of the Laocoon, the Torso, and the Hero in combat, called the Gladiator: the same ability in the expression of the skin, the same life, inspired, if we may use the term, into the inanimate stone, the same harmony in the proportions, and the same perfection in the union of the whole work.[2]

Clearly not the writers on art, but the artists were the precursors of the new orientation that filled the old established

[1] The Society of the Dilettanti, *Specimens of Ancient Sculpture* (London, 1809), p. xxxix.

[2] W. R. Hamilton, *Memorandum on the Subject of the Earl of Elgin's Pursuits in Greece* (2d ed., corrected, London, 1815), p. 6.

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schedule of Winckelmann with a different content. The genuine fifth-century marbles came to the foreground while the Laokoön and others were relegated to the lowest ebb of Greco-Roman art.

This revolution affected the content without, in the beginning touching the formulation. The old formulation was destined to stand for a long time. It is only in relatively recent years that a movement has developed which has already reformed and may completely shatter the age-old formula of the rise and fall of Greek art. On the face of it, if we should glance at the literature of our Western civilization and go back to the Greek and Roman writers of distinction, we should find that archaic art had no spokesmen, no defenders. The earliest aesthetic judgments that we find in Greek literature favor naturalism in art, the same mental slant that we find in the great Roman writers and later on in the writers of the Renaissance. Emotional aesthetic reactions were presumably closely connected with general cultural life. Attitudes that determine particular emotional reactions are presumably somehow connected with other contemporaneous attitudes within the framework of which the emotional-intellectual life of a given period expresses itself and leaves behind the documents and monuments of its struggles and achievements. When we view them placidly as expressing culture, civilization, we inadvertently make that culture placid—we appreciate the expressions but do not appreciate the life they express, and that life was a life of struggle and of passion no matter how it expressed itself. The great philosophers whom we are constantly quoting were anything but traditionalists. They were outstanding figures in a great reform movement in which Myron, Phidias and Polycleitos were forerunners. Certainly you could not expect from them any preference for the hieratic traditional art against which a new naturalism was struggling.

There are reformers and reformers. Some try to reform our lives by prohibition, by single tax, or by government ownership; others try to reform our attitudes of mind. The really great reformers are those who attempt to change our attitudes, change our mind, change our sentiments and make them

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nobler. To such a spiritual reform movement fifth-century art belongs. If we should for instance take Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* and compare it with Hesiod's *Theogeny*, which also deals with the old Prometheus myth, we would find a striking attempt at a fundamental reform. In Hesiod Jove is a god angered by clever Prometheus who deceived him but who in spite of all his cleverness was punished for his deed. Aeschylus, on the other hand, presents Zeus in a way that invites indignation and revolt; he unnecessarily drags in Io, turned into a cow by Hera, as a perfectly innocent victim of wanton tyranny; and he constantly insinuates that the power of the gods is transitory and will come to an eventual doom. To be sure, Aeschylus safeguards himself by orthodox phrases here and there, but the general impression that the tragedy produces is unmistakable. To our way of thinking Prentice is right in observing:

> The conceptions of the gods presented in the Prometheus are those which the Greeks of Aeschylus' time had inherited from a cruder and less spiritual age, embodied in their myths and sacred literature, and developed by the imaginations of their poets and artists into characters as repulsive to the thoughtful Greeks of the fifth century before Christ as they are to us. Such gods as these are gods created by man in his own image and by him exalted until they enchain and torture the intelligence by which they were created, terrorize and disgust their creators. The intelligence by which they were created will survive them. But men alone can liberate the intelligence by which they may be reconstructed in accordance with man's own intellectual and spiritual development. For such gods have no objective reality; they exist in men's minds.[1]

[1] William K. Prentice, "Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus", in *The Classical Weekly*, October 24, 1921, vol. XV, no. 4, pp. 28-29. The view of Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* prevailing in academic scholarship is that the tragedy before us is one of three plays, probably: the *Firebringing Prometheus*, the *Prometheus Bound*, and the *Prometheus Unbound*. It is assumed that the three plays together would have given us a different picture of Zeus. Since the two other plays do not exist, it is somewhat hazardous to guess just what they are likely to have contained. Indeed the existence of the two other plays is an assumption built on slender evidence. So for instance the theory of the existence of a *Firebringing Prometheus* is based on the statement of Cicero that Prometheus got the fire from the Lemnian volcano; since there is no

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In the Renaissance, as the very name suggests, we have also a cultural struggle against an inherited past. The so-called Renaissance was obviously an opposition to the "crude" Byzantine style. Stanley Casson in an admirable and instructive essay on the subject[1] fails to do himself justice when he blames Vasari and the chance finds in Italy for the subsequent course of Europe's artistic development! How different historical approaches can be is exemplified by the fateful rôle Casson attributes to Vasari.

> From all of which is evident [he writes] that one important treatise on art can prejudice all subsequent appreciation for a large number of centuries, just as the chance discoveries of artistic material in Italy prejudiced not merely subsequent taste but indeed the whole development of Italian sculpture. It did not, naturally, so affect Italian sculpture as to debase it. For with such glowing genius no debasement was possible. But it did set fine sculptors copying the antique when they should have been creating anew. The fact that one treatise on art could also exclude a thousand years of Byzantine art from any appreciation at all is an achievement which even Vasari would have shuddered to contemplate. Yet the following quotations show how profoundly Vasari had affected even late nineteenth century critics.

And Casson quotes John Addington Symonds and others on the so-called Romanesque and Byzantine styles as calling them "the dotage of second childhood fumbling with the methods and materials of an irrevocable past."[2] The idea of Vasari

such reference in *Prometheus Bound* it is assumed that the Lemnian volcano of Mosychlos must be mentioned in another play, an interesting but rather thin assumption. But granting that there were three plays that together would have given us a different and more edifying picture of Zeus, may we not then ask why it is that the other two plays are lost while the one that is subversive to the old religion has been preserved to us? May we not assume that the *Prometheus Bound* was of such interest to the public that it was copied often and therefore preserved, while the other plays were of no such interest, and therefore lost? If we assume the existence of the other plays "selectively" lost, it would argue for so widespread a critical intelligence as to indicate a widespread effort at religious reform.

[1] Stanley Casson, "A Matter of Emphasis," in *Greece and Rome*, October, 1932, pp. 5-20.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

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determining and governing our tastes for centuries strikes us as anything but convincing. Is it not easier to assume that Vasari wrote as the painters of his time painted, as the sculptors sculptured, and as the people felt—in terms of naturalism, the growth of which meant to them progress and development? The fight for that new development had to express itself in the abandonment of the Byzantine style, in the lack of appreciation for archaic "Etruscan" finds, and in the enthusiastic appreciation of late Greco-Roman discoveries.

Do we expect art-critics and historians to paint or to write? Obviously, to write about what others have painted. Could we imagine, let us say, impressionism starting not with paintings but with literary approval, literary expression, literary evaluation of non-existent paintings? Literary expression not only does not lead, but lags far behind the work of the artist. What did contemporary art-criticism do to Beethoven's Ninth Symphony? This symphony was buried and forgotten until Wagner resurrected it decades later and made it a popular favorite. If we should examine the art criticism, let us say, of France for the last century, we should find that every important début, the first appearance and early expression of every movement that proved lasting and was afterward praised as of momentous significance, was met by hostile criticism that looked upon what is new as a worthless gesture. It therefore does not appeal to our conception of the development of art to hold Vasari responsible for it. It is, however, true that the attitude that Vasari—i. e., the Renaissance—represented lasted a very long time. Winckelmann held the same attitude toward archaic art, which he called "Etruscan" art, and into this category are placed the marbles from Aegina in the Parliamentary inquiry concerning the purchase of the Elgin marbles, though they preceded the Parthenon sculptures only by about forty years. So for instance we read in this report:

> "The Aegina Marbles I have always understood from persons much more competent to give an opinion than myself, as pieces of sculpture, were rather curious from the age of which they were specimens, than valuable from any particular beauty."
>
> "In your judgment, then, as specimens or models of the Fine

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> Arts the Aegina Marbles have very little value from their beauty?"
>
> "Very little from their beauty, but very great from their antiquity and their rarity."
>
> "Of what age were they?"
>
> "They were of the age commonly called that of Etruscan Art.". . . .[1]

The testimony was given by John N. Fazakerly, an eminent connoisseur, and it quite expressed the general attitude toward the Aegina sculptures and of course still more so toward Greek archaic art as a whole. This attitude toward archaic art lasted throughout the nineteenth century and slight was the appreciation of it even in the beginning of the twentieth century, for our aesthetic emotions reacted within a certain framework of definite attitudes and could not free themselves from it. It would seem however that even if archaic art could not evoke an emotional response, its efforts and objectives could at least be understood by our intelligence. But as we look at the literature we find not the remotest understanding—and so it must have been impossible because our understanding also moved within narrow lines established by corresponding attitudes. Within these emotional and rational attitudes art meant a more or less skillful representation of nature—so it was appreciated and so it was judged. Take for instance the statue, now generally considered one of the greatest treasures of the Louvre, which was dedicated to Hera at Samos by one Cherameyes (Fig. 5). It is interesting how it is described in probably the most popular handbook of Greek sculpture, that of Professor Ernest A. Gardner:

> It is of very primitive type, the lower part of the body being a mere circular column from which the feet project at the bottom. The head is wanting, but the upper part of the body shows more attempt at rendering the form of the human figure; this, however, is only in the main contours, there being no modelling at all in detail. The drapery has evidently occupied the artist's attention, but he has taken more pains about the extremely elaborate arrangement of a complicated system of

[1] Great Britain, Parliament, *Sessional Papers*, 1816, p. 161.

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garments than about the study of folds or the rendering of texture; he has, indeed, been content to indicate both of these by a conventional system of parallel lines which follow all the contours of the drapery, and give to the whole the appearance of having had a large tooth-comb drawn over the surface. With our present knowledge of the history of the Ionic alphabet there is no need to place the inscription on this statue later than the middle of the sixth century, and certainly the style of the statue does not suggest a later date.[1]

Professor Gardner has obviously not the remotest appreciation of the statue in its non-naturalistic, formal aspects, its structural and rhythmic relationships. About as appreciative are the laconic lines of Murray, "It is of that perpendicular style, which the Greeks called a plank. It may represent that image of Hera at Samos which preceded the statue by Smilis, the contemporary of Daedalos."[2] Similar is the attitude of Charles Waldstein, who compares it with rudely carved Nürnberg wooden toys.[3] Murray frankly states the criterion by which such judgments are reached: "Where Archaic Art had failed was in the masterly conception of the figure as a whole and as organically free."[4] It never occurred to the textbook writers to question their own understanding of the objectives pursued by stylicized art. They patronizingly complimented the great masters of the sixth century for their halting and faulty endeavors in pursuit of the "truth". So we read in Ridder and Deonna's textbook:

[1] E. A. Gardner, *Handbook of Greek Sculpture* (London, 1897), p. 114. We find the description of the statue reprinted in all the many editions, even in the so-called thoroughly revised edition of 1915, reprinted in 1920, p. 119.

[2] A. S. Murray, *Handbook of Greek Archaeology* (1892), p. 247.

[3] "The Samian Hera, on the other hand, is composed exactly within the compass of a round tree-stem, reminding us almost of some of the early wooden Nürenberg toys rudely carved out of wood, though, in comparison with the Delian Artemis, it shows considerable advance in the modelling of the female figure and greater roundness of form. It will be seen how the indication of texture in the folding of the thicker upper and the thinner under-garment is attained by the cutting of parallel grooves in the manner of wood-carving." C. Waldstein, *Greek Sculpture and Modern Art* (Cambridge, 1914), p. 4.

[4] Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

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> One of the characteristic features of Greek art is its desire for truth. Even in archaic times it bears witness to this, though still held back by conventions. Doubtless the statues are frontal, and uniformly advance the left leg, but the interior details of the muscles bear witness to this will to get closer and closer to reality, and by oft-repeated attempts, to eliminate errors of vision and handcraft. The archaic work of the 6th century shows a curious mixture of truth and illogical convention.
>
> This innate feeling for reality triumphed at the close of the 6th century. The artist, whose hand had become more skilled, now rebelled against the conventional vision of former days, and he substituted for it a correct view of reality. He gave up the old supports of his primitive inexperience which had served their purpose but which, as he persevered, only hindered him.[1]

Deonna even points out that instantaneous photography established the "truth" of certain positions which archaic art "faithfully copied."[2] Let us not forget however that only a great revolution in our own attitude made us realize that conventionalization cannot be subjected to a complete physical examination and judged by its "truth to nature". Better men than Deonna, Gardner, Murray and Waldstein expressed themselves as they did whenever realism was the watchword of the art that was contemporary to them. So did Cicero criticize Kanachos for being too rigid to be "true to nature."[3] The lack of knowledge and of skill that our archaeology attributes to archaic art reflected at times rather upon the knowledge of our archaeologists. For it would be difficult to look upon the great masterpieces of sixth-century vase-painting and commiserate upon their lack of knowledge; it would perhaps be just as difficult to look upon a bronze horse probably from Phigaleia dating back to the ninth or eighth century B. C. (Fig. 6) and leave it with the impression that the great artist of this small bronze tried to portray faithfully the

[1] Ridder and Deonna, *Art in Greece* (New York), 1927, p. 188.

[2] *Ibid.*, and Deonna, *L'Archéologie et la photographie* (R. A. 1922), vol. XVI, p. 85.

[3] "Quis enim eorum qui haec minora animadvertunt, non intellegit Canachi signa rigidiora esse quam ut imitentur veritatem." Cicero, *Brut.* 18, 70.

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anatomy of a horse—and failed! When the Acropolis maidens, dating from different periods of the sixth century, were discovered in 1886, our archaeologists acclaimed them as demonstrations of steady advance; that is, as being progressively truer to life. The modeling of the latest Kore is even classified by Gardner as realistic. "It is in a sense realistic, but after an unpleasant manner, and we are fully prepared for the reaction, which we shall find in the next century."[1]

But what archaeologists were certainly not prepared for was the advent of a new attitude, a reaction to archaic art and against their evaluation of it. The archaic Kores, as de Gruneisen puts it, kept their smile for "*les grands amoureux*" but the old professors of archaeology remained respectable.[2]

We have seen how the *cognoscenti* of the beginning of the nineteenth century, devotees of late Greco-Roman art, looked askance at the Parthenon marbles, ascribing them to later and impossible dates. That time passed. It was easy for the realistic Parthenon marbles to come into their own. The Rise and Fall schedule was even fortified by putting them in their rightful place. The same paeans of praise that Winckelmann lavished on the Satyr of Villa Albani, on the Laokoön, and on the Apollo of Belvedere were now addressed to the Parthenon marbles. The breast of the beholder was now to expand and swell in the presence not of the Belvedere Apollo but of the marbles from the pediments of the temple of Athena Parthenos. The substitution of the Parthenon marbles for the smooth Roman garden-statuary as the standard of perfection was not without influence in reforming the attitude of the

[1] Gardner, *op. cit.* (ed. 1920), p. 192.

[2] "Lorsqu'on trouva, dans les années qui suivent 1885, les premières Korés de l'ancienne Acropole, les archéologues sourirent devant ces chefs-d'oeuvre de l'art archaïque. Mais leur sourire indulgent de savants formés par l'art classique, ne ressemblait en rien au sourire charmant et inconscient de l'archaïsme grec. Les archéologues cataloguèrent et classèrent ces Korés parmi les curiosités transmises à la postérité par un art inférieur, très éloigné de l'art des grandes époques.

"Les charmantes Korés, groupées dans la salle d'honneur du Musée de l'Acropole, ont gardé leur sourire pour les 'grands amoureux' de l'avenir, pour tous ceux qui devaient un jour comprendre la beauté du Moscophore." W. de Gruneisen, *Sculpture grecque archaïque* (Paris, 1932), p. 12.

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artists themselves. Antique sculpture found in the Renaissance or even that acquired in the nineteenth century was for the most part carefully restored. So even the Aegineten Marbles in Munich were refinished and restored by Thorwaldsen. Hamilton informs us that Lord Elgin wanted Canova to restore his Parthenon marbles, but fortunately Canova thought that it would be sacrilege in him "or in any man to presume to touch them with a chisel."[1] Their injured and weathered surface and fragmentary condition indeed made restoration very difficult. So they were fortunately left as found—and the eye was now taught to appreciate unfinished and rough surfaces, an appreciation which was probably partially responsible for the new attitude toward the traditional meticulously finished surfacing of sculpture. It may have influenced the new technique, as a recent writer has pointed out.[2] But it is worth remembering that Rodin, for instance, was a great student and ardent collector of Greek marbles—and no one can study Attic reliefs of the fourth century without becoming conversant with the effectiveness of the impressionistic and sketchy technique of so many of them. It was, curiously enough, in impressionism, in spite of its realistic aims and professions, that the beginning of the great revolt against realism and the rise of the new structural and formal attitude toward art is found, that new attitude which was to make possible an appreciation and understanding of Greek archaic art. Though Cézanne looms as the outstanding figure, many others contributed to the new movement. Among them should be mentioned Seurat, who died in 1891, van Gogh, who died in 1890, Gauguin, who departed in 1891 for his final trip to Tahiti, each of them in his own way rebelling against the realism of the impressionistic school. In the beginning of the twentieth century the new attitude became recognized as a widespread movement, although Cézanne was refused at the Luxembourg as late as 1895.

It is hardly our province to discuss the attitudes of the different schools of post-impressionistic art. It is however fair

[1] Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[2] Wilenski, *The Meaning of Modern Sculpture* (1932), p. 26.

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to say that all of them are characterized by an interest in formal relationships and all abhorred realistic details. What Clive Bell said of Cézanne is probably true of all of them—theirs was "a continuous effort to capture and express the significance of form."[1] Emphasizing form as the fundamental, indeed as the essential, in art, they could obviously travel within the realm of form many a road, roads, incidentally, explored and much traveled by older civilizations than ours. Look at the "canons" of early Chinese painting; not "imitation of nature" but "rhythmic vitality" was the first canon. In fact, in the lands of the Sumer and the Akkad in the earliest periods of the Chaldean civilization we could duplicate pretty nearly all the approaches of modern sculpture and prove that mass relationship and simplification are to be found in the second city of Susa, in Telloh (Schirpurla), and in Ur. The modern enthusiasm for simplification hardly has its roots in Mesopotamian archaeology; it was not evoked by stones or bronzes, for these stones existed decades ago, when they either were not noticed or were met with very slight appreciation.[2] It is not in archaeology that we find an explanation for our modern desire for simplification. Rather do we sense it as a reaction of a generation frustrated by the growing complexity of life and yearning for simplicity that is lacking and wanted. What does simplification produce—emphasis and power! What can abstraction produce but an

[1] Clive Bell, *Art* (London, 1932), p. 209.

[2] Take the attitude of Professor Gardner (and he expresses as well as anyone the feeling and appreciation of his generation) toward one of the Mount Ptous Temple Apollos. He discussed it together with the bust of the Acropolis maiden holding a pomegranate, and after dealing with the details in an uncomplimentary fashion he sums up: "The whole impression conveyed is weak and indefinite, as if the sculptor were diffident and tried to gain the effects he wished for with the least play of surface." Gardner, *op. cit.*, p. 121 (ed. 1920). Three decades later J. E. Barton tells us that he met in the Acropolis Museum an enthusiast who could hardly tear himself away from this statue in which he saw the "inherent grandeur of plastic feeling"; and he adds, "Yet this same figure is cited as particularly 'lifeless' in the latest catalogue by a highly endowed Athenian archaeologist, who with all his accuracy and logical equipment seems to take for granted the popular nineteenth-century premise that 'life' in sculpture is a matter of photographic verisimilitude" [in *Greece and Rome*, vol. I, no. 1 (October, 1931), p. 16].

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art severe and impassive, impervious to mercy and untroubled by love? Our new aesthetico-emotional attitude may indeed have been a symptom, an early manifestation of correlated attitudes that were destined to arise in a social order that, unable to cope with the complexity of its own civilization and its own wars, produced our fascism, our dictatorships, and finally the third Reich, with its "coördination" in its phallic nakedness. Here you have simplification—with a vengeance.

The modern movement in art was not produced by this man, or that, not even by its heavy-handed master, Cézanne. It was a collective enterprise of rebelling artists and of a generation ready to welcome a revolt against naturalism. It is interesting that so great and eloquent an admirer of Rodin as Meier-Graefe had to make an admission, astounding and symptomatic for his time, that Rodin's sculpture completely lacks architectonic quality. He writes:

> Yet if we place certain Rodins, the size of which makes them barely conceivable in an interior, in the open air, the tragedy becomes evident. The profundity of their conception, the beauty we divined, the force of expression, to which we were ready to sacrifice all other considerations, do not prevent them from becoming shapeless masses, which call in question the whole edifice of inspiration that surrounded them.[1]

Such a statement involves a changing attitude and a formal approach. As it was in painting so it was in sculpture—the old gave birth to and nurtured the new that began to assert itself in the last decade of the nineteenth century and steadily gained ground in the twentieth century. It is difficult to establish any of the various claims to priority. Some give the credit to Bourdelle and others to Maillol, not that the matter is of any consequence or that the succeeding sculptors were necessarily influenced by either. As a matter of fact, Lucien Schnegg as early as 1894 declared to P. Leroy that he had succeeded in marrying sculpture to architecture and he stated that "*là a été et sera toujours ma grande préoccupation*".[2]

[1] Meier-Graefe, *Modern Art*, vol. II, p. 19.

[2] A. H. Martinie, *La Sculpture* (Paris, 1928), p. 80.

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And Hudnut considers Schnegg as perhaps the first French sculptor to see clearly and work consciously at the modern tendency, influencing his immediate pupils and friends,[1] the most important of whom is probably Despiau. Maillol, independently, later followed the same road and Bourdelle "was the first to give it convincing and aggressive utterance. The Heracles was the great sensation of the Salon."[2] That was in 1908. As a matter of fact their works would not seem to us like radical departures, for they traveled the road from the naturalistic romanticism of Rodin to fourth-century Greece, thence to the fifth century, with growing appreciation of the transitional period and finally of the archaic. Bourdelle's great war monument, the colossal Vierge d'Alsace at Niederbruck, is characterized by Stanley Casson as "a successful blend of early French Gothic with archaic Greek."[3] When naturalism, with or without romantic gestures, was abandoned, a return to the early formal art, whether Romanesque, Byzantine, or Greek archaic, as fount of inspiration was inevitable. The movement ceased to be entirely French. The spiritual peregrinations of our own Paul Manship are aptly summed up by Stanley Casson: "Without a halt even in Paris, he jumped straight from Minnesota to Rome and thence with all possible speed to Greece."[4] And they came forth from every land, driven by forces of which they themselves were but dimly conscious—there came Mestrovic and Rosandic, there came Archipenko and Zedkine and Epstein, there came Eric Gill and Gaudier-Brzeska and a Brancusi and a Modigliani and scores and scores of others—men of distinction, men of conviction, and men of neither. It is easier to say whence they came than whither they were going. For if there were limitations to the possible varieties of naturalism "*servilement fidèle*", there was nothing that could limit or check new doctrines, new concepts, new experimentation in the field of formal art. The pioneers of yesterday were relegated to the "dark ages" by those who went in pursuit of so-called "pure form".

[1] Joseph Hudnut, *Modern Sculpture* (1929), pp. 30-31.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

[3] S. Casson, *Some Modern Sculptors* (1928), p. 39. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

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And yet in spite of the great differentiation in objectives, we believe that modern sculpture could subscribe to a statement of one of its extremists, Gaudier, who said, "Sculptural feeling is the appreciation of masses in relation; sculptural ability is the defining of these masses by planes." [1] The question on which opinion differed was whether "masses" are used for representational purposes or whether the masses are fitted to "pure forms".

Parallel with the penetration of the new attitude into ever-widening circles, went on an ever-deepening appreciation of all ancient stylicized arts of every kind and description. Early art was so much invoked, and indeed became so much in vogue, that the movement could not help but make an impression on archaeology, history of architecture and sculpture, as well as general art history and criticism. So for instance if we turn to so eminent a scholar as Professor Beazley we find an entirely different evaluation of the so-called transitional period. "Transitional", writes Beazley, "implies inferiority to that which goes before or comes after, or to both, and the great works of this period—enough to mention the temple of Zeus at Olympia—are equal to those of any other in quality, originality, and creative force." [2] But it is not only the transitional period that he appreciates; his eyes are certainly not closed to the beauty of archaic sculpture.[3] He has traveled a long way from E. A. Gardner or A. H. Smith, to whom, for instance, the statues of Branchidae were of interest only "because they exhibit the process by which the grotesque coarseness of primitive work tends toward the stiff and formal refinement that marks the later stages of archaic art." [4] But this approach in all its pristine "naturalistic" crudity definitely belongs to the past. Indeed it has come to pass that the naturalistic art of Greece began to be seriously questioned and even considered an architectural incongruity! "The archaic

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

[2] J. D. Beazley, *Greek Sculpture and Painting* (1932), p. 32.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[4] British Museum, *Catalogue of Sculpture* by A. H. Smith (London, 1892), p. 17. *Cf.* also Gardner, *op. cit.* (ed. 1897), p. 107.

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statutes", writes Hudnut, "of the Hellenic Gods were enshrined in an architecture that is a perfect union of mathematical law and lithic structure."[1] To Hudnut, mathematical law, we take it, means something, while to us it means less than nothing. What is important is to record his weighty and nobly expressed view that it is

> inconceivable that realism should have entered to destroy a spiritual harmony so profound as that of the temples of Paestum and Girgenti; and we know from the fragments of statues, that have come down to us, and from the tradition that even Lysippus and Scopas could not utterly destroy, that the archaic gods possessed an architectonic grandeur. They reaffirmed that which the temple teaches us. Perhaps they were the most beautiful things that man has created, being the pure product of a religion that reconciled him to his environment, that achieved a balance between life and spirit.[2]

The new attitude toward art was bound eventually not only to affect but to modify the entire archaeological approach and its schedule of development. We are not aware of its being done and done well in heavy tomes. But the new approach is outlined and well expressed in an article of the distinguished and many-sided English archaeologist, Stanley Casson, who takes issue with Miss Richter's position that the metopes of the Parthenon present the highest level of achievement of the Greek sculptors.[3] He points out that technically many of them are poor and, from the point of view of composition, unworthy of the rest of the building. He rates them, taken as a whole, as inferior in composition and technique to the metopes of the Temple of Zeus at Olympia.[4] But decidedly outweighing this old type of argument is his different vision of the treatment of the entire subject. Without saying so he senses that it is the attitude, the approach, the objective that counts and that it is in these terms (not in terms of incom-

[1] Hudnut, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

[3] Richter, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

[4] Stanley Casson, "A Matter of Emphasis", in *Greece and Rome*, October, 1932, p. 15.

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mensurable comparisons, into which incidentally he himself lapses) that Greek art must be viewed. Or as Casson puts it in his own words, "What is important is to realize that the objective differed from generation to generation, even from decade to decade, in the periods of intensive activity."[1] In other words what he is urging is appreciation of the achievement within the attitude that inspired as well as controlled and limited it. Indeed no more magnificent concept is theoretically conceivable. Unfortunately, we, as well as the Greek sculptors, are framed in our attitudes and controlled as well as limited by our approaches. Aesthetic reactions are emotional reactions; either one feels a certain way or one does not, and there are no universal emotional reactions independent of time and space, and of the attitudes that represent our temporo-spacial setting and constitute our spiritual life. We are therefore somewhat doubtful of the joy that classical Chinese music would have given to a Bach or to a Beethoven, and we can easily imagine what a Cézanne would have had to say about an Alma-Tadema, though it might not be printable. And yet Casson's scheme is the only sensible and tolerant attitude. Within it, however, Casson, in our judgment, is the first to fail. He tells us that "in the Archaic period lies the charm of the exquisite, of the formal, and the imaginative".[2] And one wonders how he will fit into this scheme of appreciation the Hera of Samos or the Apollo of Mount Ptous (Fig. 7) or even the Kouros in the Metropolitan Museum.

However it is a long long way that we have gone from the days of Winckelmann and we see in Casson an eminent professional archaeologist, whose friendly appreciation of the archaic is admitted. But even he, as a matter of fact, is too conservative to reflect the appreciation of the archaic, as it found expression in our own decade. When the Berlin Museum acquired the archaic Standing Maiden (Fig. 8) the statue was hailed by the modern artists as one of the greatest sculptures of all times. Its very purchase for a million gold marks in times of want and misery indicates the new place that

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

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archaic art was beginning to occupy even in circles that were holding the purse strings. Small wonder that, as Barton puts it, panegyrists of latter fifth-century art "are perplexed and irritated by what they sometimes call 'this craze for the archaic' in modern art criticism."[1] An earlier and much more impassive example of archaic art was acquired in 1932 by the Metropolitan Museum (Fig. 9) and the way the new acquisition was greeted by the art editor of the *New York Times* is certainly worth noting. Edwin Alden Jewell describes this statue as majestic, its beauty as divine, and suggests that it may be the greatest work of art that ever crossed the ocean and came from the old world to the new.[2] Indeed it could never have come but to a world of a new aesthetico-emotional orientation, and in this new world the old statue is made to bear witness, to testify and serve as the exponent and the forerunner, of the new attitude, for, as E. A. Jewell says, "When it comes to looking ahead, there are those who discern in archaism the adumbrated image of Picasso."[3]

But that is not the end of it. The revolt against naturalism went much further and with it went an attack on all of Greek art, an attack the savagery of which is amazing. Take for instance the book of Wilenski.[4] The book is interesting in many ways: its style is that of the street corner agitator. Wilenski is a believer and has declared a holy war on the

[1] J. E. Barton, "New Valuations of Greek Art", in *Greece and Rome*, October, 1931, p. 20.

[2] "It represents the full-length standing figure of a slender youth—possibly of the god himself. Measurements are given in the museum bulletin—height, without plinth, six feet four inches, and so following. But the significance of this majestic work is not thus easily tabulated. Here, if ever, one glimpses an inward beauty; a beauty of such radiance as to merit that rarely applicable term, divine. . . . Than this figure, we may suspect, nothing lovelier has journeyed from the Old World into the New. . . . In formalized design, as in plastic content and silhouette, the 'Apollo' is superb. With what economy the problem of simplification is worked out! These lines that negative 'realism' are few, but so tellingly wrought." E. A. Jewell, "Greek Sculpture at the Metropolitan", in *New York Times*, Sunday, October 9, 1932.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] R. H. Wilenski, *The Meaning of Modern Sculpture* (New York, n. d. [1932]).

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world's prejudices and abominations because they interfere with the triumph of his particular faith. In this war his observations on Greek sculpture may sound fantastic, but not any more so than Tacitus' observations on the faith of the early Christians.

Wilenski is the theorist and spokesman of a certain variety of modern sculptors who believe that formal art should be founded on geometric forms—the cylinder, the cube, the sphere—for "the meaning of geometric art is universal and everlasting." [1] Describing a stone head of Modigliani—a modification of a negro mask from the Ivory coast—Wilenski gives us its universal meaning as "a construction of two elliptical forms, two plates, as it were, facing one another with a sheet of cardboard between." [2] Discussing a Chinese Tang sculpture, Wilenski tells us that he is not concerned with the meaning that the sculpture may have had a thousand years ago. "From the modern sculptor's standpoint this Tang statue is essential sculpture in that it has the meaning of a permanent universal form — the egg." [3] The will-o'-the-wisp that Wilenski is pursuing is a concept of universal analogy of form or, as he puts it:

> The modern sculptors have arrived at the concept of the universal analogy of form, the concept of all human, animal, and vegetable forms as different manifestations of common principles of architecture, of which the geometric forms in their infinity of relations are all symbols; and at the concept of the meaning of geometric relation as the symbolisation of this universal analogy of form.[4]

The universal analogy is only tainted with morphological suggestions; it reduces itself to geometric relationships, and as such it is really a very ancient egg.

We know of no book that has dealt adequately with mathematical mysticism from Pythagoras up to the view that even

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 148.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 132.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

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scientists had of mathematical formulae and down to the mental slums of numerology and geometrical aesthetics.[1] In such a book chapters would have to be devoted to artists of very different generations that were in search—not of the philosopher's stone—but of mathematical formulae for true, universally valid and perfect proportions and compositions. What this type of fetichism—whether in art, philosophy, or science—does is to regard the measure of a thing as its meaning or quality. Of course all quantitative relationships can be expressed mathematically; of course all spacial relationships can be expressed geometrically. That is what geometry is for—but it will measure and "express" the Apollo of Belvedere just as much as it will a negro sculpture, Radio City, or a barrel of sugar. There is no more mystery about it than there is about weighing hogs. The "mathematical expression" of the hog—its weight and cost per pound—contains no more aesthetic judgment than the geometric measure of its size. The interesting thing about the mathematico-geometrical fetichism as an attitude is that it is so "archaic". It shows that mental attitudes in our cultural universe are not necessarily always correlated.

A. S. Eddington gives an amusing illustration of a college bursar who pictured all college activities in terms of pounds, shillings and pence, which to him made up what he would call "the commonsense college of everyday experience!"[1] The geometrical relationship of form can express no more of life, art, and the universe than can the bursar's accounts express the meaning of the intellectual activities of a university. The fact, however, remains that some artists have taken refuge in geometrical forms and fantasies and Wilenski's book is written to serve and spread this attitude toward art. The thesis of the book is simple. To make room for the new attitude, the old attitudes that control the appreciation of art must be de-

[1] An extremely interesting commentary on some geometrical theories is to be found in the brilliant article of William Bell Dinsmore, "How the Parthenon Was Planned", published in *Architecture*, June 1923, pp. 177-180, July 1923, pp. 241-244.

[2] A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York, 1929), p. 237.

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stroyed. The world must be freed from its "prejudices", and the source of all evils is our "Greek prejudice". So Wilenski raises his voice:

> I know now that this prejudice, which consists in the notion that the Greeks achieved the final and only possible perfection in sculpture, derives its power from a world-wide organisation vitally concerned with its continuation.
>
> I know now that most books on Greek sculpture and the Greek sculptors are nothing but emotive propaganda, and that we do not recognise this propaganda as propaganda because we have all absorbed it in childhood and youth as part of our ordinary education.[1]
>
> We have all imbibed this propaganda in our childhood; it forms the basis of our general concept of Greek life and civilisation; and to correct it we have to make a definite effort because the propaganda is not only encountered in schoolboy literature but also in standard compilations designed for adult men and women.[2]

These are very interesting statements, for they show an appreciation of the significance and rôle of attitudes, for what he calls "prejudices" are attitudes. He happens to call our education and upbringing "propaganda", for he is against our particular attitudes, which are part and parcel of our Western civilization and which we got from our education. Greece and Greek civilization belong to a bygone past but the Renaissance in its own as well as the popular estimation did but imitate Greece. Hence the "Renaissance prejudice", as Wilenski calls it, is tied up with the "Greek prejudice"—thus the altar may be broken but the fire is still burning.

His economic interpretation of scholarship is very simple. "In the last hundred years, moreover, countless museum officials, university professors, and educational officers in every country of the civilised world have constituted other groups whose actual existence depends in a large measure on maintaining the legend of the final perfection of Greek sculpture."[3] In his missionary zeal to rid the world of its "prejudices" he has to rewrite the history of art, disregarding the

[1] Wilenski, *op. cit.*, p. xviii. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 42. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

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corrupted archaeology. He does so by reciting a string of famous sculptors whose names were esteemed in antiquity, and then briefly informing us that, "no works by these sculptors survive."[1] It is quite true that a question can be raised about the attributions, but not about the existence of the marbles. But to eradicate our Greek "prejudice" Wilenski informs us authoritatively that the works of the masters are no longer in existence. The marbles that do exist are but specimens of Greek masonry.[2]

In the chapter on "The Modern Sculptor's Creed" there are two articles of faith that forbid "essential sculpture" to be based on clay-modeling. It must be a "collaboration between the sculptor and the essential character of the block of resisting substance beneath his hand".[3] In the light of this faith history had to be rewritten. This attitude creates two historical facts.

> Now let us look at two facts. a. The first is that the Greeks in the fifth and fourth centuries produced a number of clay-modellers who acquired wide reputation in their day; Calamis Myron, Pythagoras, Phidias, Polyclitus, Scopas, Praxitiles, and Lysippus are among the names of such sculptors recorded in the writings of the ancients. b. The second fact is that no works by these sculptors survive. All these sculptors modelled for bronze, and a thousand years ago all their bronzes had already been melted down by men who thought the metal more useful to them than these particular statues.[4]

It is beside the point to discuss Wilenski's "facts" or catalogue for his benefit a volume of other facts. Wilenski's book is of interest as clinical material only; it shows in a loud and no doubt exaggerated way how attitudes function in dealing with "facts"; and here we end the history of the unchanging monuments of Greek art![5]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 64.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[5] To be continued.—ED.

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BRITISH ROYAL COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

DURING the Hoover administration the appointment of commissions of inquiry by the executive became so common a practice as to attract the attention of the press and the opposition party. One journalist wrote an article entitled: "Mr. Hoover's Sins of Commissions."[1] Hoover was by no means the first president to use the device of an executive commission to investigate questions of public policy; and the governments of the forty-eight states have used the method as well.[2] The British have used investigating bodies of this sort extensively for more than a hundred years.[3] As one authority put it: "Nearly every important measure of reform has been preceded by an inquiry by a Royal Commission or a Parliamentary committee or a Departmental committee or by independent ministers."[4] The prestige enjoyed by British commissions of inquiry is apparently greater than that enjoyed by corresponding bodies in the United States.

In the first place, commissions of inquiry are part of the British parliamentary system. The Cabinet and the House of Commons have become overloaded with work. Outside investigating bodies made up of experts are needed in order to save parliamentary time. Legislative investigating com-

[1] S. Bent, *Scribner's Magazine*, vol. 90 (July 1931), pp. 9-14.

[2] G. B. Galloway, "Governmental Investigations", *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 8, pp. 251-260; "Interim Committees and Commissions 1929-30", *State Government*, vol. 3 (May 1930), p. 12; and "Interim Committees and Commissions 1931-32", *State Government*, vol. 5 (February 1932), pp. 12-19.

[3] H. Cox, *The Institutions of the English Government* (London, 1863), p. 155, footnote (a) states that royal commissions of inquiry are very ancient and he cites the following statutes authorizing such commissions: 10 Ric. II., A. D. 1386, 6 Hen. IV. c. 3 (A. D. 1404) and 4 Hen. IV. c. 9. W. J. Ashley, *English Economic History* (New York, 1914), vol. 2, p. 283, sets the date at 1517 when Henry VIII appointed a commission to examine into the matter of enclosures and upon the basis of the report took summary action against the landlords. Extensive use of royal commissions began with the Whigs in 1832.

[4] E. Troup, *The Home Office* (London, 1925), p. 38.

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mittees are relatively little used in Great Britain as compared with the United States.[1] There are of course select committees appointed on the motion of either house and joint committees appointed by the two houses combined, but these committees do not carry the main burden of the preparatory work for legislation.

Royal commissions and departmental committees are the chief advisory bodies in the legislative and administrative processes in Great Britain. As far as their methods are concerned it is very hard to distinguish between royal commissions and departmental committees. Legally, the difference is clear. A royal commission of inquiry is a body appointed by the Crown under the sign manual to investigate and report on specific subjects.[2] While the personnel of a royal commission is usually chosen by the minister of the department most concerned, once a royal commission is appointed it is independent of all departments except for the fiscal control exercised by the Treasury. A royal commission remains in existence until its work is finished. On the other hand, a departmental committee is the creation of a particular minister of a particular government, and it may be suspended by the succeeding government. Departmental committees are much more numerous than royal commissions, particularly in recent years.

[1] M. E. Dimock, *Congressional Investigating Committees* (Baltimore, 1929), p. 35.

[2] This is an independent executive power. Parliamentary action is needed only to approve the expenses of royal commissions. Royal commissions are appointed for other purposes than to investigate specific subjects. Some are semi-executive like the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, which was established in 1869 and which has been renewed from time to time. Some are semi-judicial like the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, which was established in 1919 to determine what should be paid to inventors in respect to the use of their inventions during the war. Little has been written on the subject of royal commissions as such. See Departmental Committee on the Procedure of Royal Commissions, *Report*, 1910 (Cmd. 5235); Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Methods of Social Study* (New York, 1932), chap. vii; A. Todd, *Parliamentary Government* (London, 1892), vol. 2, pp. 93-103; J. Toulmin Smith, *Government by Commissions illegal and pernicious: the nature and effect of all commissions of inquiry and other Crown appointed Commissions* (London, 1849); L. Courtney, *The Working Constitution of the United Kingdom* (New York, 1905), chap. xiv.

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During the recent Labour Government only six new royal commissions were appointed but there were more than sixty committees of inquiry not including statutory or standing bodies, subcommittees and departmental committees composed exclusively of officials.[1] While some very important investigating bodies, like the various Committees on Reconstruction,[2] the Balfour Committee on Trade and Industry, the MacMillan Committee on Finance and Industry, and the May Committee on National Expenditure, were departmental committees, usually the most important bodies of inquiry are royal commissions. When a body needs to call important outside witnesses it is given the added prestige of the royal warrant. On the other hand, when it comes to questions of economy, a departmental committee is usually chosen. A royal commission usually works in public and it wishes to attract attention. A departmental committee usually holds private sessions and it is not bound by custom to furnish minutes of evidence. The bargaining between the various branches of the service over questions of economy cannot be conducted in public very well. For bargaining purposes a service might say that it could not be cut, but later on it might make concessions. The public might misunderstand these maneuvers. Like other features of the British constitution, the line between royal commissions and departmental committees is not a sharp one.

Because of their smaller number and fuller proceedings the British royal commissions of inquiry appointed since the war have been chosen as the basis of a first-hand study of British methods in investigation. The chairmen, members and secretaries of these royal commissions and persons who appeared before them were unusually coöperative in furnishing information on such questions as the origin, composition, methods of procedure, and influence of the commissions with which they were concerned.

[1] *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, 1931, vol. 251, Col. 1840 and vol. 260, Col. 1875. The National Government suspended many of these bodies and was not as active in appointing new ones. On June 28, 1933, there were twenty-three commissions and committees of inquiry in existence. *Ibid.*, vol. 279, Col. 1495. Thirteen of these were appointed by the National Government.

[2] The Webbs stated that these committees were the most important of all.

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The symbols of the monarchy are used to increase the prestige of royal commissions. In contrast with a departmental committee, which is set up by a departmental minute, a royal commission is established by a royal warrant signed by the king himself and worded in appropriate language.[1] To quote from a recent warrant:

> GEORGE THE FIFTH, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, to Our Right Trusty and Well-beloved Cousin and Counsellor Arthur Hamilton, Viscount Lee of Fareham, Knight Grand Commander of Our Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath; etc. GREETING! . . . Now know ye that We, reposing great trust and confidence in your knowledge and ability, have authorised and appointed, and do by these Presents authorise and appoint you . . . to be Our Commissioners for the purposes of the said enquiry.
>
> And for the better effecting the purposes of this Our Commission, We do by these Presents give and grant unto you, or any four or more of you, full power to call before you such persons as you shall judge likely to afford you any information upon the subject of this Our Commission; to call for information in writing; and also to call for, have access to and examine all such books, documents, registers and records as may afford you the fullest information on the subject, and to inquire of and concerning the premises by all other lawful ways and means whatsoever. . . .[2]

Royal commissions are important because the men appointed to them take them seriously. The members of a commission, including the chairman, are unpaid[3] and are given only a

[1] It is countersigned by the Secretary of State for Home Affairs. When the report of a commission is finished, the king presents the chairman with a silver inkstand.

[2] *Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure*, 1929, Cmd. 3297, pp. ii-iii.

[3] In the middle of the nineteenth century compensation was allowed on rare occasions for the time and labor of persons whose services involved to a great degree the exercise of professional skill. A. Todd, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 99.

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small allowance for traveling expenses. Service on a commission therefore means a considerable sacrifice of time and energy on the part of the members, as they are usually busy men. The fact that important and influential men can be found to do this work is characteristic of British society. Commissioners are members of the so-called governing class, which regards itself as responsible for the operation of British political institutions. One chairman of a royal commission said that he was amazed at the people who expressed a desire to serve on a particular royal commission. There is undoubtedly a connection between the success of royal commissions and the strength of the aristocratic tradition in Great Britain.

A well-known authority on British parliamentary government has stated that "commissions of inquiry may be properly appointed by the crown, or by the head of any department of state, to examine into a particular grievance, or alleged defect in the administration of a public department, or to collect information on any important public question and advise the crown upon the same."[1] It is taken for granted when a commission is appointed that the government is prepared to give definite instructions to the commissioners. These instructions are called the terms of reference and always appear in the royal warrant. In the period since 1918 some thirty-three royal commissions of inquiry have been appointed. They may be roughly classified by subject as follows:

I. Public Administration
   A. National
      1. Commission on Civil Service
      2. Commission on Income Tax
   B. Local
      1. Commission on Local Government
      2. Commission on Powers and Duties of Police and on Fire Brigades
      3. Commissions on Greater London, London Bridges, and on London Squares

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

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II. Social Services
  A. Commissions on National Health Insurance, Lunacy, and Unemployment Insurance
  B. Commissions on Different Universities

III. Regulation of Public Morals
  A. Commissions on Licensing
  B. Commission on Lotteries

IV. Changes in Private Law
  A. Commission on Land Drainage
  B. Commission on Mining Subsidence

V. Colonial Administration
  A. Five commissions on various phases of Indian government
  B. Commissions on Malta and Newfoundland

VI. Economic Questions
  A. Commissions on Agriculture, Importation of Cattle, and Food Prices
  B. Two commissions on Coal Industry
  C. Commission on Transport

VII. Political Questions—Commission on Honours

In order to illustrate how instructions are given to these commissions the terms of reference of two of them are given below:

ROYAL COMMISSION ON UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

To enquire into the provisions and working of the Unemployment Insurance Scheme, and to make recommendations with regard to:—

(1) its future scope, the provisions which it should contain and the means by which it may be made solvent and self-supporting, and,

(2) the arrangements which should be made outside the scheme for the unemployed who are capable of and available for work.[1]

[1] *Report*, 1932, Cmd. 4185, p. iii.

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ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRANSPORT

> To take into consideration the problems arising out of the growth of road traffic and, with a view to securing the employment of the available means of transport in Great Britain (including transport by sea coastwise and by ferries) to the greatest public advantage, to consider and report what measures, if any, should be adopted for their better regulation and control, and, so far as is desirable in the public interest, to promote their coordinated working and development. . . .[1]

The whole attitude of the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance was fixed at the outset by the terms of reference. It was compelled to confine its attention to provisions of the existing unemployment insurance scheme and it felt that it could not make suggestions regarding fundamental industrial policies.

In a few cases the terms of reference may be so narrow that the commission cannot possibly make a thorough investigation of the subject. When the terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Honours were announced, the press complained that the commission was bound to be ineffective because it was directed merely to look at the future and not to unearth the unpleasant past.[2] If the charges made regarding the sale of honors were not to be investigated, how could the facts of the situation be known? Some journalists urged the commissioners to refuse to serve on a body with such circumscribed functions.

It is next of interest to examine some of the considerations which led to the appointment of these commissions. All can be traced back to public demands that were expressed in a variety of ways. Commissions and committees of inquiry on a given subject are likely to recur at intervals of from twenty to thirty years. When some striking event is played up in the press, the public agitation which follows frequently leads to the appointment of a royal commission. Criticism of the police in the Savidge case led to the appointment of the Commission on Police Powers,[3] public discussion of the book by

[1] *Report*, 1931, Cmd. 3751, p. vii.

[2] *Manchester Guardian*, September 5, 1922.

[3] *Report, loc. cit.*, p. 2.

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Dr. M. Lomax and the so-called Harlett case led to the Commission on Lunacy,[1] the adverse comments on the plan of the London County Council to demolish Waterloo Bridge led to the Commission on Cross River Traffic in London,[2] and the combined press and parliamentary discussion of the "sale of honors" led to the appointment of a commission on that subject.[3] In other cases the public demand is not associated with any particular event but is the result of a prolonged discussion of the subject. Complaints come to the departments concerned, embarrassing questions are asked in Parliament, letters are written to the press, various interested bodies pass resolutions, and gradually the demand for an investigation shapes itself. This was the situation in the case of the commissions on National Health Insurance, Unemployment and Transport. Sometimes, a party leader senses the public demand for an investigation on a given subject and he will make an election promise to appoint a commission. Baldwin promised a commission on food prices in his election address of 1924[4] and both Baldwin and MacDonald promised a commission on licensing during the 1929 election campaign.

The demand for a royal commission sometimes comes from a section or a subordinate unit of the nation. The Commission on the Government of Greater London was established to consider a plan which the London County Council had worked out for the extension of its boundaries and powers. Most royal commissions are supposed to evolve a solution but this one had to consider a solution that was put before it. The Commission on London Squares was appointed because the London County Council felt that a commission would have more influence in obtaining evidence on this delicate subject. The Commission on Local Government was set up because of

[1] Interview.

[2] D. S. MacColl, "Waterloo Bridge", *Nineteenth Century*, vol. III, pp. 623-32.

[3] *Morning Post*, August 28 – September 18, 1922; *House of Lords Debates*, June 22, 1922, Cols. 1126 *et seq.*, June 29, 1922, Cols. 109 *et seq.*, July 17, 1922, Cols. 475 *et seq.*; *House of Commons Debates*, July 17, 1922, Cols. 1745 *et seq.*

[4] *Times* (London), October 13, 1924, p. 7, "The problem of the cost of foodstuffs is one which demands careful investigation by a Royal Commission."

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the controversies between county boroughs and county councils in the West Riding of Yorkshire.[1] The varied problems of colonial administration likewise give rise to the appointment of many royal commissions. Particularly in India, royal commissions enjoy a prestige which makes them a popular form of inquiry. Unrest in India, complaints of the civil servants, questions in Parliament, and the requests of the Viceroy are all factors that may help to crystallize the demand for a royal commission. Other parts of the empire also welcome the appointment of commissions. The suspension of parliamentary government in Malta led to the naming of a commission and the financial straits of Newfoundland resulted in similar action.

Quite a different set of reasons led to the appointment of commissions on the Universities and on National Museums and Galleries. The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge were in financial difficulties immediately following the World War and the condition of the national treasury was such that only the most urgent demands would justify public expenditures. Following the war the national museums were also badly in need of funds. The function of the commissions in these instances was to show the public the necessity of the expenditures to be made.

When a legislative proposal is brought up which involves fundamental changes in the common law, it is usually thought necessary to appoint a royal commission to investigate the entire subject. For instance, the commission on Mining Subsidence was established to "consider the operation of the law relating to the support of the surface of the land, and of buildings or works on or under the surface, by underlying or adjacent minerals; to inquire into the extent and gravity of the damage caused by subsidence owing to the extraction of minerals and the incidence of resulting liability; and to report what steps should be taken, by legislation or otherwise, to remedy, equitably to all persons concerned, any defects or hardships that may be found to arise in existing conditions."[2]

[1] Interview.

[2] *Report*, 1927, Cmd. 2899. Under the English law, land owners have had

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Likewise, the Commission on Land Drainage considered important changes that had been suggested in the law relating to the distribution of the cost of drainage systems.

In times of national crisis the perplexed government frequently turns to the device of a royal commission. Twice in the last fifteen years the coal industry has been the source of national labor troubles and in each case the government appointed a commission. Coal mining has been a much investigated industry in Great Britain, partly because of the powerful trade unions involved and partly because of the dramatic incidents connected with the industry. In the years from 1867 to 1926 no fewer than nine royal commissions, over thirty committees of inquiry and twenty-six Acts of Parliament were concerned exclusively with one aspect or another of the coal mining industry.[1] The Coal Commissions of 1919 and 1925 have been called panic commissions because of the circumstances of their appointment. In each case a strike by the Miners' Federation was threatened at a time when the consequences would be disastrous. In 1919 the miners agreed to accept a commission of inquiry into the questions which they had raised.[2] In 1925 a nine months' subsidy was given to the coal industry in order to allow the Royal Commission time to work out a solution for troublesome problems. It is obvious that these two commissions worked under terrific pressure.

COMPOSITION

Once it has been decided to appoint a commission on a given subject the next question that arises is its composition. A commission may be a small body of supposedly impartial persons, it may be a small body of experts, it may be a large

complete rights. The exploitation of subsoil rights created new problems. After a seam of coal is taken out, the land sinks. This subsidence may injure buildings. It was sometimes difficult to collect damages, as the colliery owners who were legally responsible might have ceased to operate the mine.

[1] Sir Ernest A. Gowers, K.B.E., C.B., "Commissions and Committees and Legislation in the Coal Industry, 1867-1926", *Iron and Coal Trades Review* (December 1927), pp. 112-19.

[2] Sir R. A. S. Redmayne, *British Coal Industry During the War* (Oxford, 1923), p. 218.

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body which is representative of all the main interests concerned. Most of the royal commissions in the last fifteen years have been of the last-mentioned variety. The representative commissions have ranged in size from ten to twenty-three. In one sense, these commissions are more representative than committees of Parliament would be.[1] In addition to nominees of the main political groups found in Parliament these commissions also contain delegates from the important social and economic interests concerned and scholars who have made a reputation in the field. Among the British social scientists who have served on commissions or committees are the Webbs, E. H. Tawney, Sir William Beveridge, Henry Clay, J. M. Keynes, H. J. Laski and T. E. Gregory.

The Commission on Licensing is a good illustration of the representative type of commission. Its twenty-one members included four persons connected with the trade-union movement, three persons associated with temperance societies of one sort or another, three representatives of the liquor trade interests, two prominent business men, two directors of coöperative societies, two social workers, two government experts in licensing administration, a secretary of The Working Men's Club and Institute Union, a woman prominent in local government affairs, and the chairman. On this commission the three main political parties had representatives, there were three women representatives, and the main sections of England and Wales were well represented. In other words such a commission recognizes sex, political, sectional, professional, economic and social groupings.

Not all of the representative commissions were as varied in their personnel as the Licensing Commission. The Commission on Local Government was made up of representatives of types of local authorities, the county councils, the county boroughs, the urban district councils, the rural district councils, with three additional commissioners who were not directly concerned with local government. The 1919 Coal Commission

[1] The Committee on Royal Commissions, *op. cit.*, par. 15, objected to the large representative commissions which were very likely to split into a majority and a minority.

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was nominated by the economic interests directly concerned, the colliery operators and the coal miners. The Commission on Transport was representative of the political parties but not of the economic groups directly concerned, namely, the railways and the road interests.[1] The National Health Insurance Commission did not contain any persons who were directly associated with the scheme. The purpose was to constitute a body of able and impartial persons. While the political parties, economic groups, actuarial experts and other groups were represented on the commission, it contained no representative of an approved society, or of the Ministry of Health, or of the Insurance Committees. On this commission the expert advice was furnished by two members who had been actively connected with the National Health Insurance Department in the past.

On some commissions the expert element clearly predominated. The Webbs have pointed out that the Royal Commission on Sewage Disposal of 1898-1915 was composed almost entirely of experts.[2] In recent years the commission on National Museums and the one on Cross River Traffic in London are good illustrations of this type of commission. The Museums Commission was made up for the most part of trustees of museums and galleries and persons who were interested in the arts. Since the British Museum was under investigation a librarian was also included. There was not a person on the commission who was not familiar with the subject. The London Cross River Traffic Commission had as members a well-known architect, a professor of applied mechanics, a financial magnate who would know about the financing of new bridges, a former member of the London County Council, and a prominent business man who was vitally concerned with the city's transportation system. Each of these men had some technical knowledge to contribute to the discussion of the Thames bridges. Another illustration of the expert commission is to be found in the Commission on Universities, which

[1] Press release of the Commission on its membership.

[2] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *English Local Government—English Poor Law History:* Part II: *The Last Hundred Years* (London, 1929), vol. 2, p. 474.

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contained persons with long years' experience in university administration.

In making up some commissions the departments concerned seek to avoid persons with too intimate knowledge of any one side of the question. As Bacon put it: "In the choice of Committees, for ripening Business, it is better to choose Indifferent persons, than to make an Indifferency by putting in those that are strong on both sides."[1] Experience with the Sankey Coal Commission, a body of the representative type, which produced four separate reports, led the Baldwin Government to seek a different kind of inquiry body to meet the 1925 crisis. The Samuel Coal Commission was a small body of four men, none of whom was connected with the coal industry in any way. Sir Herbert Samuel had been out of the country for three years prior to the crisis of 1925 and his fellow commissioners were all men of recognized independence of thought on the questions under discussion. The Commission on Unemployment Insurance of 1930-1932 was likewise made up of persons who were regarded as impartial on the issues at stake. It included a judge as chairman, a municipal councillor suggested by the Ministry of Health, a social worker suggested by the same ministry, a professor of political economy, the vice chancellor of the University of Liverpool, a man engaged in the insurance business, and a barrister. In a commission of this sort the purpose is to bring together a group of fresh minds on the subject. Many of the members of such a body may be without any prior knowledge of the subject.

There remains the royal commission which is composed entirely of members of Parliament. Todd has pointed out that "as a general rule, members of the government should not be appointed on commissions of inquiry, as it might afterwards become their duty to decide upon some executive action growing out of the same, as a question of state policy upon which a minister of the crown ought not to have previously committed himself to an opinion."[2] There are, however, some excep-

[1] Essay XX, Of Counsel, Edition of 1625.

[2] *Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 97.

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tions. The Commission on Honours was composed of members of Parliament. This was a delicate political subject that the Government of the day could not trust to persons who were not part of the system. The Indian Statutory Commission was also composed wholly of members of Parliament. This meant that there were no Indian members, a fact which led to a partial boycott of the commission in some parts of India. In composition the Indian Statutory Commission was like a joint select committee but it was set up by royal warrant as well as a statute. The aim was to give it all the prestige possible.

The key to the success or relative ineffectiveness of a royal commission is frequently found in the character of the chairman. In the last fifteen years the chairmen have either been judges or men of public affairs. The aim of the Crown is to get a distinguished chairman, a man whose name carries weight with the general public. Some of the critics of present British political institutions have said that the aim is to get a "safe" man as chairman, a man who is not likely to suggest any important changes in the existing order. Be this as it may, there have been some remarkable men who have been willing to make the great sacrifice of their time and energy that a chairmanship of a commission of inquiry involves. The following comments were made by a secretary about the chairman of a certain commission:

> A was the chairman. He is the most extraordinary man that X has met. He is an eminent lawyer. He has the capacity to take a brief and get the questions that point the discussion. This could be expected of a good lawyer but on top of this he has the gift of putting the witness at ease. He could make the witness feel that he was helping the commission. He had an uncanny way of getting at the truth. When witnesses told stories based upon imagination, he would expose the facts.
>
> He is a man of immense industry. He made himself the master of the subject before he started. He looked up the acts, the practice and the tides of opinion. He is an enormously quick worker. He was extraordinarily good in delegating responsibility. He differentiated between a point of principle and a point of detail. Besides he has a charming personality.

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> The commission was harmonious and he diffused an air of sweet reasonableness.[1]

Not all chairmen would fit the above description, but they are generally courteous and they do not use the bullying tactics that are sometimes employed by the chairmen of investigating committees in the United States. The Webbs have complained that some chairmen are not versed in the difficult art of cross-examination.[2] Others have objected to the great number of judges appointed as chairmen on the ground that commissions were primarily policy-determining bodies and a judge by training was not the right person to lead in the formulation of policies. Judges looked upon the proceedings as contentious and they were too likely to accept compromises. Advanced age, dullness, laziness and weakness have also been among the criticisms made against certain chairmen. A chairman, like any other public figure, has to face the burden of responsibility and the glare of publicity. On the whole, a high standard of efficiency and public service has been set by the recent chairmen.

Another important position on every commission, one that receives little publicity and always carries a great burden of work, is that of secretary. As a rule the secretary is a permanent official of the administrative class who is assigned especially to the task by the department concerned and who is relieved of his regular duties during the life of the commission. Usually a principal or an assistant secretary is chosen but sometimes a higher officer may be called upon. Most secretaries are familiar with the subject which is to be investigated but a few have had only their experience in secretarial work to fall back upon in their new tasks. Since the secretary acts as a Sub-Accountant to the Treasury, he is appointed by the department concerned and not by the commission itself. He is not named in the royal warrant because such a procedure would make it more difficult to change secretaries when a shift is thought necessary. If the secretary were named in the

[1] Interview.

[2] *Methods of Social Study*, p. 151.

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royal warrant, his replacement would require the signature of the king. If he is not so named, he can be changed at will by the department concerned. Some chairmen have taken an active part in the selection of the secretary,[1] but this situation is rare.[2] While fourteen different departments furnished secretaries to royal commissions in the past fifteen years, one half of them came from the following departments: Treasury, Ministry of Health and the India Office. The chairmen invariably have high words of praise for the industry, efficiency, helpfulness, courtesy, literary ability and superior intelligence of their particular secretaries. The secretaries are typical of the higher civil servants in Great Britain and they take great pride in their work. They have been accused of bureaucratic tendencies and of bias in favor of the status quo, but no one has questioned their essential rôle in the work of royal commissions as they are now constituted.

METHODS OF WORK

Once the royal warrant has been issued and the secretary has been appointed, the royal commission is in control of its own destiny. As Todd puts it, "Within the limits of their prescribed functions, and subject to the provisions of any act of parliament defining the same, commissions have absolute power of regulating the proceedings of their own tribunal, and of admitting or excluding those persons they please from attendance during their sittings."[3] The preliminary meetings of the commission have many questions to decide regarding the interpretation of the terms of reference, the holding of open

[1] "There is no definite rule at present as to who should appoint the Secretary. Sometimes he has been mentioned by name in the Royal Warrant, sometimes he has not been so named. Sometimes he has been selected by the Chairman; sometimes he has been chosen by the political Head or the Permanent Secretary of the Government Department chiefly concerned in the appointment of the Royal Commission." *Report of the Departmental Committee on the Procedure of Royal Commissions, Parliamentary Papers*, 1910 (Cmd. 5235), vol. LVIII, par. 20.

In the 33 postwar royal commissions of inquiry, no secretary has been named in the royal warrant.

[2] None since 1918.

[3] *Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 100.

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or private meetings, the kind of witnesses to be chosen, and the general mode of procedure to be followed.

Since royal commissions usually wish to attract as much attention to their work as possible, they hold many meetings in public. If the commission is investigating a subject of general interest, the press gives considerable attention to the proceedings. On the other hand, some commissions do all their work in private and others do portions of their work in secret. In sharp contrast to American legislative investigating committees which delve into party campaign finance, the Royal Commission on Honours had no public meetings. The Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder started to hold public meetings during the hearing of the testimony of discharged patients but it changed its procedure after an unfortunate experience.[1]

The common procedure which royal commissions follow in gathering information is the taking of oral evidence. This involves the selection of witnesses, their cross-examination and the analysis of their testimony. Each of these steps deserves separate consideration.

The list of witnesses to be called before the commission is made up by the chairman and the secretary, who are aided in this task by the members of the commission and the officials of the department concerned. The list usually includes the higher permanent officials who are in closest touch with the matter under investigation, the secretaries or other officials of the organized economic groups which are vitally interested, and some university professors who are specialists in the questions at issue. For example, the Royal Commission on Transport heard oral evidence from representatives of the Accident Offices Association, Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen, Association of British Chambers of Commerce, Association of Municipal Corporations, Automobile Association, Board of Trade, Home Office, Ministry of Transport, Chief Constables' Association, Federation of British Industries, Lloyd's Underwriters, National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers, Railway Companies Association,

[1] *Report*, 1926, Cmd. 2737, pp. 5-7.

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National Road Transport Employers' Federation, National Union of Railwaymen, Transport and General Workers' Union, and many other bodies.[1]

Are the right witnesses always called? Are some important types of persons never heard? It is difficult to answer these questions. One of the members of the Commission on Honours made a minority report which stated that the commission failed to get at the real situation because it refused to summon any persons known as "touts", i. e., alleged agents of prominent officials engaged in the sale of honors.[2] This action was deliberate on the part of the Honours Commission and received some unfavorable comments in the press.[3] On the other hand, a commission may unintentionally omit a certain class of evidence. The Commission on National Health Insurance admitted in its report that it received very little evidence from insured persons.[4] The Commission on Food Prices was criticized for not getting more complete information on the subjects under its purview.[5] As in other matters, the unorganized groups are likely to be the least articulate.

In contrast with select committees, royal commissions do not have powers to compel the attendance of witnesses, to give oaths, or to demand the production of documents. Such powers may be expressly conferred upon a commission by law or, in accordance with the Tribunals of Inquiry Act of 1921, by a resolution of Parliament. However, these steps are rarely taken. Of the thirty-three commissions under discussion, two had statutory powers, one came under the terms of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, and the others had no special powers to collect evidence. This lack of compulsory powers has not

[1] *Report*, 1931, Cmd. 3751, pp. 235-40.

[2] *Report*, 1923, Cmd. 1789, p. 13.

[3] *Morning Post*, December 30, 1922; *Manchester Guardian*, December 30, 1922.

[4] *Report*, 1926, Cmd. 2596, p. 3.

[5] The Right Hon. Christopher Addison, "Report of the Royal Commission on Food Prices", *Nineteenth Century*, vol. 98 (July 1925), p. 4, said: "The examination of this table gives us some glimpse of what the Commission might have been able to do if it had the same power for the ascertainment of cost as we had, for example, in the Ministry of Munitions during the war."

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seriously handicapped the work of most of the commissions. In the words of the Report of the Committee on the Procedure of Royal Commissions:

> As a general rule it appears no difficulty was found in obtaining evidence. The exceptions are few in number. In one instance (the Trade Disputes Commission) no trade unionist was willing to give evidence; in another instance certain miners were unwilling to give evidence on the ground that it might injure their fellow workmen or themselves in their relationship with their employers; in another instance a Board of Trade official declined to give evidence on the ground that the subject would come before him officially for opinion; in another instance some suggested witnesses refused to give evidence for publication.[1]

Among the recent bodies of inquiry that had difficulty in getting at all the facts, the so-called MacMillan Committee on Finance and Industry should be mentioned. Some bankers refused to give relevant facts on the ground that publicity would injure their business. As a rule, however, most bodies concerned welcome inquiries and commissions are embarrassed with an overabundance of material. The crucial task is the selection of significant conclusions from a great mass of data, much of it undigested.

The practice is now well established for royal commissions to require witnesses to furnish a written summary in advance of the evidence which they wish to present. This insures a careful presentation of the views of the witness. The written statements (evidence in chief) prepared by the government officials are invariably of high quality. The oral examination proceeds on the basis of the written memorandum with the chairman taking the lead in the questioning. Most chairmen are chosen because of their skill in cross-examination but a few rely upon the secretary to prepare the questions. Any member of the commission may ask questions in his turn. As a rule, no other persons are allowed this privilege.[2] However,

[1] *Op. cit.*, par. 6.

[2] This characteristic of the procedure of royal commissions was very severely criticized by J. Toulmin Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

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a few commissions, like the Samuel Coal Commission and the Indian Statutory Commission, appointed assessors who were permitted to interrogate witnesses. At one stage in its proceedings the Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder gave a witness the right to be represented by counsel. As far as can be ascertained, this was unprecedented and has not been followed by any other commission.

Opinions differ as to the value of the method of oral evidence. The Webbs take an extremely critical view of the method.[1] They state that a majority of the commissioners are not versed in the difficult art of interviewing, that the choice of witnesses leaves much to be desired, that the lack of formality and of compulsory powers leaves a wide range of possibilities of error, and that there is no verification. To illustrate their criticisms the Webbs use a number of commissions appointed in the late nineties. Their charges are not so applicable to recent commissions, particularly the charge that there is "no written statement as to the facts about which witnesses are prepared to be cross-examined."

The method of oral evidence is defended as follows:

> The evidence of the department concerned is an extraordinarily valuable piece of exposition. The ordinary man finds it easier to understand if the report is put before him and the man who made it comes to explain it than if he reads the report by himself. Even for the expert it is good to have the items laid out in the clearest way. There are bits of evidence in the minutes of every commission that are very good. Then there is some that is not very good.
>
> By constant hearing of witnesses, the commissioners get an impression of where the truth lies and they get impressions which they share and in this way they arrive at a unanimous report.[2]

[1] *Methods of Social Study*, pp. 142 *et seq.* On p. 155 they say: "Every statement by every witness, whatever his qualifications, is accepted as of equal value and enshrined in the blue-book, thus gaining a quite fictitious evidential value for future generations of students. To put it shortly, the great mass of oral 'evidence' given before committees of enquiry relates to opinions on general questions, and not to actual occurrences, whilst even the modicum of fact given in evidence is not checked or verified by other enquiries."

[2] Interview.

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In a similar vein is the statement below made by a historian who has also taken an active part in politics:

> The oral evidence performs a real function. Even though the report is not an important document itself, the bringing of witnesses from all parts of the country was educative. The civil servants and the persons called to give evidence were compelled to look at their work from a fresh point of view.[1]

Another method which some commissions use is the questionnaire system. This device was employed by the following commissions: Indian Currency, Indian Statutory, London Squares, Licensing, Land Drainage, Lunacy, Universities, Fire Brigades, and Powers and Duties of the Police. The questionnaire of the Indian Statutory Commission was an invitation to submit memoranda. It was in outline form and covered such main topics as the representative system as applied to British India, the suitability of existing areas for governmental purposes, the local self-governing bodies, centralization, the courts and the growth of education.[2] Its chief purpose was to point the written statements toward the principal problems confronting the commission. Very effective use of the questionnaire method was made by the Royal Commission on London Squares. The object of this commission was to inquire into the conditions on which London squares were held and used and the desirability of their preservation as open spaces. A questionnaire sent to the owners of these squares brought written answers that covered many of the subjects to be investigated. On the other hand, the Commission on Powers and Duties of the Police was less fortunate in its attempts to use this method. The subject was one which did not lend itself to formal methods. Under-cover devices were needed in order to find out the facts regarding "the practice followed in interrogating or taking statements from persons interviewed in the course of the investigation of crime."[3]

[1] Interview.

[2] Indian Statutory Commission, *Extracts from Official Oral Evidence*, vol. 15, pp. 535-36.

[3] Terms of reference, *Report*, 1929, Cmd. 3297, p. ii.

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Every commission invites all persons who are interested to present materials which bear upon the subjects included in the terms of reference. This results in the collection of a number of very valuable documents, unpublished statistical material, and reports on the practices in foreign countries. For instance, the Samuel Coal Commission obtained from collieries some special returns which were not available elsewhere. Regarding this part of the work of commissions, the Webbs said:

> Perhaps the most useful of all services rendered to sociology by these official enquiries is the collection that they usually make, and sometimes publish, of contemporary documents not otherwise accessible to the student. Taken as a whole the massive array of British blue-books stands preeminent as a source of information about contemporary social conditions and contemporary public opinion.[1]

Another method which has been used very successfully by some royal commissions is the employment of special investigators, who may or may not be paid for their services. The work of Mrs. Webb in connection with the Royal Commission on Poor Laws, 1905-1909, involved the hiring of special investigators out of her own funds.[2] The Samuel Coal Commission provided for the inspection of certain mines by members of the staff of Inspectors of Mines. The Commission on Labour in India hired some Indian women to get life histories of migrant workingmen. The chairman claimed that this procedure produced some very revealing documents.[3] The Commission on Unemployment Insurance obtained the voluntary coöperation of several universities in order to follow up some of the cases of persons who were left off the unemployment lists as a result of the emergency legislation. These volunteer social workers were given the names of persons who had been left off the benefit lists within a two weeks' period. The findings of the investigators were analyzed for the commission by an impartial person.

[1] *Methods of Social Study*, p. 156.

[2] *English Local Government — English Poor Law History:* Part II: *The Last Hundred Years*, vol. II, p. 496.

[3] Interview.

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Commissioners report that informal contacts are frequently more valuable than masses of formal data. The commissioners visit outlying cities and get some concrete notion as to how certain laws and practices are operating. For instance, the Commission on Unemployment Insurance in its tours discovered some of the technical difficulties of administering a system that distributed benefits to three million men every week. The practices followed in an ordinary insurance business could not be used by a government official in a small office that was swamped with ten times the amount of work which it was meant to handle. Sometimes, as in the case of the Licensing Commission, the inspection of outlying areas is not done by the whole commission as part of the commission's business but individual members at their own expense may tour the country. The Commission on Transport made a special investigation of stop-lights in the cities where they were first adopted in England. In connection with the investigation of Lunacy and Mental Disorder the commissioners visited a number of institutions.

At some point in the proceedings the commission decides that it has collected enough evidence and it begins the task of drafting a report. Usually the first step is the preparation of a summary of the evidence by the secretary. Some secretaries make daily summaries of the evidence on cards so this stage of their work involves the classifying of the cards and the writing of a connected account. Other secretaries have to go over the many thousands of pages of evidence and pick out the essentials. Sometimes the summary of evidence is published separately, sometimes a brief summary is included in the report and at other times it is merely circulated privately among the members of the commission.

After the summary is prepared there are a series of meetings to discuss the general findings and conclusions of the commission. A rough draft of the report is then prepared by the chairman or the secretary. The draft is always presented in the name of the chairman but in the great bulk of the cases the draft is the work of the secretary. A good secretary will get the sense of the commission and make a preliminary draft

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that is fairly acceptable to the majority. The chairman may call together an inner group to consider the main items in the preliminary draft of the report. Once the rough draft is prepared it is gone over by the entire commission word by word and an opportunity is given to make suggestions or alterations. Regarding the procedure as to drafting the report, the Committee on Royal Commissions said:

> Association with his colleagues during the inquiry will have enabled the Chairman to appreciate the probable points of agreement and the possible points of disagreement. The discussion will show how far unanimity is likely to be ultimately secured. It should be the first care of the Chairman to make apparent the points of agreement, and to endeavor to extend and to multiply them so far as friendly invitations to reconsideration and other legitimate forms of persuasion avail.
>
> If a substantial unanimity on points of principle is indicated, the Chairman should proceed with a draft report on the lines of the agreement arrived at, and the Commission should consider this draft Report paragraph by paragraph and point by point.[1]

It is not always possible to secure a unanimous report. In fact, when the personnel of some commissions is announced it is taken as a foregone conclusion that there will be a minority report. Of the thirty-three commissions under investigation, there were minority reports in the case of seven [2] and reservations in the case of five.[3] The Sankey Coal Commission of 1919 was perhaps the most hopelessly divided of all the post-war commissions. There were four separate final reports and the chairman led one of the minority groups. Some of the minority reports have an undoubted political tinge. When the majority urges economy in such social services as national health insurance or unemployment insurance, the Labour

[1] *Op. cit.*, par. 27.

[2] Unemployment Insurance, Licensing (England and Wales), Food Prices, National Health Insurance, Honours, Government of Greater London, Coal Commission of 1919.

[3] Licensing (Scotland), Transport, Indian Currency and Finance, Fire Brigades, Income Tax.

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Party commissioners present a minority report. When a particular economic interest is affected by the majority report the commissioners who are closest to that interest make a minority report or important reservations. This happened to the Licensing Commission and to the Indian Currency Commission. In general minority reports are drafted by the minority commissioners who have to do without the aid of the secretary. The majority sometimes drafts a reply to the minority report which is printed as a part of the majority report. The Departmental Committee on Royal Commissions was hostile to the idea of minority reports and suggested a method for reducing them to a minimum. It urged that each commissioner should not have the right to present a minority report but that such reports should be based upon a quorum of the commission.[1] This suggestion of the Departmental Committee has not been followed by subsequent commissions and minority reports by single individuals are still found. Minority reports grow out of fundamental differences in outlook and as long as British political institutions remain democratic they are to be expected.

A commission passes out of existence when it submits its final report to His Majesty. Occasionally, a commission makes no final report but it is considered defunct because of the resignation of many commissioners.[2] The fact that commissions are temporary bodies established for particular purposes raises the question of their average duration. The life of a commission may be expressly limited by the royal warrant or by act of Parliament.[3] Usually, however, there is no time limit set for the commission and it lasts until the chairman or a majority decides it has gone on long enough. There has been considerable variation in the duration of the postwar commissions. The shortest-lived was the Commission on Honours, which lasted three months, and the longest was the Commission on Local Government, which was in existence for over six

[1] *Op. cit.*, par. 27.

[2] The Commission on Agriculture, appointed in 1919, made only an Interim Report.

[3] Todd, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 100.

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years. The Honours Commission heard very few witnesses, it printed none of its minutes of evidence and its report was only fifteen pages in length. The Commission on Local Government lasted so long because the breadth of the inquiry was enormous. Its first and longest report was made in a little over two years after it was appointed. It is probable that it would have completed its work shortly after this if political events had not delayed its order of business. The Government's policies were very uncertain and the commission suspended its activities for a time until the Government brought in a Local Government Bill. As a rule, however, the commissioners who are contributing their time freely are not anxious to prolong the work. Fourteen of the postwar commissions finished their tasks in less than a year, seven took between one and two years and nine took between two and three years.

As a part of the final report each secretary is required to give an estimate of the total cost of the commission. The expenses of commissions include the salaries of the commission's staff, charges for postage, telegrams and telephones, commissioners' and witnesses' expense allowances, stenographic services, stationery and printing costs. The commissioners are only entitled to the small allowance of £1 5s. for each night on which they are absent from home. Physicians, surgeons, barristers, civil engineers and architects who appear as witnesses are allowed nearly three times this much, but they are given no fee for their testimony. Laborers who act as witnesses are given the meagre allowance of 7s. 6d. for each night away from home. When a commission is holding many hearings the stenographic and other costs mount considerably. In the words of the Committee on Royal Commissions, "Oral evidence is one of the most expensive methods; it has been known to cost as much as £50 a day for travelling expenses, short-hand writers' attendance, and transcription of notes, printing, etc."[1] The royal commissions since 1918 have ranged in cost from £31 for the Commission on Honours to £146,000 for the Indian Statutory Commission. Three-quarters of the commissions

[1] *Op. cit.*, par. 22.

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cost less than £10,000 and over half of them cost less than £5,000.[1]

The financial affairs of royal commissions are carefully supervised by the Treasury. Royal commissions must present their estimates to the Treasury just as do government departments. The secretary of the commission acts as the Sub-Accountant to the Treasury and is held responsible for seeing that the instructions issued by the Treasury are observed by the commission. If the expenses of a commission appear too high, then there is a conference with the Treasury officials. The only thing that the chairman of a royal commission could do if he felt that his commission was not allowed enough money would be to resign. Actually this has never happened as the Treasury officials and the commissioners have always arrived at some reasonable agreement.

POPULAR RECEPTION OF ROYAL COMMISSIONS

The press reception of the publications of royal commissions shows the importance which the general public attaches to the work of these bodies. Even the popular newspapers do not fail to mention them though they may tend to play up unimportant details. The more serious papers, like the London *Times* and the *Manchester Guardian,* give full accounts of the reports and also add editorial comments. When a commission fails to live up to expectations, it is told so in no uncertain terms by the Conservative, Liberal, Labour and independent newspapers.

Journalists tend to classify royal commissions as business-like or useless, straightforward or evasive, courageous or timid, timely or obnoxious, depending upon the bias of the paper and the character of the report. The worst that can be said about a commission is that it is a whitewashing body, appointed to shelve a given question until public attention is attracted elsewhere, and that its report is destined to go into a pigeonhole.[2]

[1] These figures are based upon the estimates given in the reports, which do not take into account the time spent by government departments in preparing and giving evidence.

[2] W. J. Brown, in commenting upon the Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Service in the *Spectator,* July 25, 1931, p. 107, said: "The modern

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On the other hand, a commission may be praised as diligent, its report lauded as a permanent budget of special information and Parliament urged to take immediate action.

The treatment which royal commissions receive at the hands of the press can best be illustrated by a few examples. The Report of the Royal Commission on Honours was unfavorably received by most of the daily papers. Conservative papers like the *Morning Post* found themselves in harmony with Liberal papers such as the *Manchester Guardian* in condemning the recommendations of this commission as timid, insincere and inconsistent. The *Times* was more charitable and so was the *Liverpool Post*.[1] The Commission on Food Prices also had to face a press which was hostile in the main. However, the *Daily Mail* came to its defense with the comment: "The report issued by the majority of the Royal Commission on Food Prices after a patient and careful inquiry, in most of its recommendations will be approved by all reasonable people."[2] The Report of the Royal Commission on Licensing had a varied reception. The Liberal newspapers were very enthusiastic about the report, the Conservative papers, with the exception of the *Times,* were critical and the popular newspapers twisted some of the details of the report in order to hold them up for ridicule.[3] Typical of the latter was the following reference: "Mr. A. P. Herbert has tellingly illustrated it with some of the more grotesque things in the Report—the remarks about the licensing of billiard tables, for example, and 'drunkenness in trains.'"[4] An examination of the Report shows that

Royal Commission greatly resembles modern democratic politics. In Parliament the forces of action and reaction are so evenly balanced that however great the need of the country for swift and decisive action, nothing particular is done about it. The method of appointing Royal Commissions leads to much the same results. . . . This method is guaranteed to ensure (a) a unanimous Report which recommends nothing in particular; or (b) majority and minority reports which cancel each other out and give the Government the opportunity of saying that, in view of the sharp divergence of view, matters had better be left where they are."

[1] Comments in each of the four papers appeared in issues of December 30, 1922.

[2] May 9, 1925.

[3] Issues of January 8, 1932.

[4] *Week-End Review*, January 16, 1932.

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the recommendations on these subjects were not grotesque but very reasonable.[1] In contrast to this treatment, the three reports of the Royal Commission on Transport were all favorably received by the daily press. When the final report of this commission was issued the *Times* said: "The Commission, appointed less than two and a half years ago, carried through that part of their work so successfully and so much to the general satisfaction of Parliament and the people that the bulk of their conclusions and recommendations, incorporated in the Road Traffic Act of last year, are now part of the law of the land." [2]

EFFECT OF REPORTS OF ROYAL COMMISSIONS

The influence of a royal commission cannot be judged by the comments of the contemporary press. Some of the recommendations of an important commission may not be acted upon for many years. It was twenty years before important legislative action was taken on the monumental report of the Royal Commission on Poor Laws of 1905-1909. Every commission makes a variety of suggestions some of which are much easier to carry out than others. Besides, it is enormously difficult to trace the influence of a given royal commission. The work of the commission is always one of very many factors. There may be previous or subsequent investigating bodies on the same subject. After a report is made, conditions may change so radically as to lessen or increase the importance of the recommendations made. A change in government may determine the fate of the report of a commission. The personality of the minister of the department chiefly concerned may also have something to do with the parliamentary action taken with regard to the report. These and many other factors complicate any attempt to study the effect of royal commissions.

[1] *Report*, 1931, Cmd. 3988, p. 801.

[2] January 9, 1931. The Conference on Rail and Road Transport which followed up the work of the commission was also highly praised in the press. J. E. Allen, in an article entitled "Road and Rail", *Nineteenth Century*, vol. 112, pp. 573-83, said: "The Salter Report, as everyone now calls it, is a masterly document. It gives a review of the position, it analyses the cost incidental to road and rail transport, and it offers precise recommendations based upon scientific calculations."

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The fact that some royal commissions have apparently little effect upon social change is due to a variety of reasons. The recommendations of the commission itself may involve few changes. The Commission on Decimal Coinage made a report in 1918 which opposed changing the existing coinage system on the ground that no alterations could be made without causing great practical inconvenience. The Royal Commission on the Government of Greater London reported unfavorably upon the plan of the London County Council to increase its powers and it failed to suggest any other plan. Commissions that endorse the status quo cannot be expected to have any dynamic influence.

When a commission's recommendations involve a considerable financial outlay, their adoption is likely to be retarded or indefinitely postponed. The recommendation of the Samuel Coal Commission of 1925-1926 that coal-mining royalty rights should be acquired by the government, has not been acted upon, in part because of the fiscal difficulties involved. Similarly the recommendation of the Commission on National Health Insurance as to increased benefits, the proposal of the Commission on Civil Service as to the pension systems, and the plan of the Licensing Commission for the extension of state-owned public houses have not been acted upon because the government pleaded, among other reasons, the lack of funds.

When a commission makes an involved report on a complicated subject like mining subsidence, its report may meet with the opposition of the permanent officials. An interdepartmental committee was appointed to consider the work of the Commission on Mining Subsidence. It was made up of representatives from the following departments: Health, Mines, Scotland and the Lord Chancellor's. The opinion of the committee was that as far as small houses were concerned, the remedy proposed was too complicated and too contentious to be pressed upon Parliament.[1] Official opposition was also manifested toward the Report of the Commission on the Powers and Duties of the Police. While some of the recommendations

[1] Interview.

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were followed,[1] the Home Office officials were in general very lukewarm about the work of the commission.

In the case of many of the postwar commissions it is too soon to make any estimate as to their influence. The fate of the report of the Indian Statutory Commission is bound up with that of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, which is still in session. Parliament has scarcely had time to act on the suggestions of the commissions on Licensing,[2] Unemployment Insurance, and Lotteries.

POSITIVE INFLUENCES

There is no question that over a long period of time royal commissions and other executive bodies of inquiry have had a great influence upon the course of British history. Their work in a given field, such as civil service reform or poor law reform, has been cumulative in effect. Even for such a short period as the last fifteen years unmistakable evidences of their influence are at hand. Administrative orders, local legislation, colonial practices and parliamentary statutes have been added to or changed in order to conform with recommendations of recent commissions and committees.

Administrative orders and regulations are frequently being issued which reflect in one way or another the work of some royal commission. The recommendations of the Royal Commission on Civil Service as to the needed changes in the cost-of-living bonus system were carried out in part by negotiation under the Whitley Council system. When a question was

[1] "Mr. Buchanan asked the Home Office why the House was not informed at the time that the order with regard to the right of question by the police was withdrawn in 1930, since such order was made in view of the report of the committee of inquiry into the Savage [*sic*] case? Sir Herbert Samuel: Before this order was issued, the Home Secretary explained in this House that it was to be provisional only and might be revoked or altered as a result of the report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure, and its revocation on 11th Aug. 1930 followed recommendation XIV at p. 114 of the Commission's report." *House of Commons Debates*, 1931-1932, vol. 262, Col. 536.

[2] A private member's bill was introduced Nov. 25, 1932 (Bill 13, Hotels and Restaurants) to carry out the recommendations of the Commission that the licensing arrangements for hotels and restaurants be made more logical and convenient. The fate of the bill at this writing is unknown.

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raised in the House of Commons about the Report of the Malta Commission, the Colonial Secretary said:

> His Majesty's Government have given very careful consideration to the report of the Malta Royal Commission and subject to the statement I shall make on two matters, have decided to give effect to all the proposals which are set out by the Royal Commission in Chapter XIV of the report under the title "Summary of Suggestions and of Main Recommendations." The Constitution will be restored to the Island in accordance with the commission's main recommendation, and steps will be taken to give effect to the various other proposals in the appropriate way by local Ordinance, by Letters Patent and by a Bill which will be introduced in the Imperial Parliament.[1]

The various commissions which have reported on different phases of Indian administration have usually seen their recommendations acted upon. Thus, in 1924 the Government, in general agreement with the Government of India, accepted the main recommendations of the Commission on Superior Civil Services in India for the improvement of pay and pensions.[2] In 1926 the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India accepted the chief recommendations of the Commission on Indian Currency and Finance regarding the stabilization of the rupee.[3] Two years later a conference of provincial Ministers of Agriculture and agricultural experts opened by the Viceroy accepted the report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India as a basis for rural reconstruction and approved the application of the main recommendations as the circumstances of each province permitted.[4] Similarly important action concerning the freedom of Indian laborers grew out of the work of the Commission on Labour in India.

The recommendations of some commissions are directed primarily to local governing bodies. For example, some of the suggestions of the Commission on Fire Brigades have been carried out by local acts. The London County Council is now taking steps to recondition Waterloo Bridge in accordance with

[1] *House of Commons Debates*, 1931-32, vol. 262, Col. 1089, March 2, 1932.

[2] *Annual Register*, 1924, p. (128).

[3] *Ibid.*, 1926, p. (261).

[4] *Ibid.*, 1928, p. (239).

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the recommendation of the Commission on Cross River Traffic in London. The London County Council has also negotiated several transactions regarding open spaces along the lines put forward by the Commission on London Squares.

Informal action on the part of the Government is all that is necessary to carry out the suggestions of some royal commissions. As a result of the Report of the Royal Commission on Honours the Prime Minister appointed three members of the Privy Council as a committee to consider the recommendations for honors on account of political service and to report to him whether they considered the recommendations suitable.[1] In like fashion, a Food Council was set up by the Prime Minister following the report of the Commission on Food Prices.

Royal commissions are particularly anxious to have the results of their labors embodied in the form of parliamentary legislation. Many commissions have seen this come to pass. However, in a few cases the legislation has not remained on the statute books for long. The Agricultural Act, 1920,[2] which grew out of the Interim Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture, was repealed after it had been in effect for two years. The Government thought that it would cost too much money to keep up the prices guaranteed in the act. While the direct effect of the commission was short-lived, the departmental committees on agricultural marketing which followed it were more fortunate in bringing about permanent results. The Mining Industry Act, 1920, which followed the report of the Sankey Commission, was also mainly temporary in character. It provided for the continuation of government control for a brief period and it imposed a welfare levy for a period of five years. The creation of a Mines Department, subordinate to the Board of Trade, was one of the few lasting parts of the act.[3]

Many commissioners can point to lasting changes made in the law of the land as a result of their efforts. The Royal Commission on Income Tax, which reported in 1920, saw the

[1] *Annual Register*, 1923, p. (10).

[2] 10 and 11 Geo. 5, chap. 76, p. 501.

[3] Gowers, *loc. cit.*, p. 116.

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results of its work incorporated in the 1920 and subsequent budgets. The Royal Commission on Local Government produced three unanimous reports. The Local Government, County Borough and Adjustments Act of 1926 was the result of the first report and the Local Government Act, 1929, was based in part on the other two reports. While the Act of 1929 was being drafted, close coöperation between the Commission and the Ministry of Health was maintained. Two years after the Royal Commission on National Health Insurance reported, the Act of 1928 was passed, which included the vast majority of the recommendations made. In like fashion the Mental Treatment Act, 1930, which was prepared under a Conservative Government and passed under a Labour Government, was the result of the work of the Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder. The act carried out the recommendations of the commission regarding the treatment of certain cases without certification. The Land Drainage Act, 1930, was in the main based upon the report of the Commission on Land Drainage, which reported in 1927. Following the report of the Royal Commission on National Museums a standing commission was appointed which was able to announce in 1933 that many of the needs of the national museums were being taken care of.[1] The first and second reports of the Royal Commission on Transport were acted upon by Parliament before the commission had finished hearing its evidence for the final report.[2] The first report of the Royal Commission of Unemployment Insurance was made in the spring of 1931. It recommended increases in payments and decreases in benefits. Shortly after this the Committee on Public Expenditures reported, recommending more drastic reductions in benefits. These two reports helped in a measure to precipitate the crisis of 1931. The Labour Party was unwilling to accept the recommendations and the National Government came in to meet the situation. The Unemployment Insurance Acts of 1931 and the National Economy Act of 1931 included some of the suggestions made by the commission. These are a few of the

[1] Standing Commission on Museums and Galleries, *First Report*, 1933.

[2] *Report*, 1931, Cmd. 3751, p. 3.

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legislative fruits of recent royal commissions. Over a longer period of time the array would appear much more impressive.

What can Americans learn from the experience of the British with commissions of inquiry? British investigators like the Webbs have stated emphatically that royal commissions are not research bodies but rather agencies for popular government, forums at which people can air their opinions and complaints. On the other hand, the Webbs admit that these bodies produce materials of great value for social studies.

Royal commissions have certain advantages over American governmental and private bodies of inquiry. They have back of them a long and in the main successful history. They enjoy some of the aloofness and prestige which attach to the institution of the monarchy. They can rely upon the efficient services of the secretaries recruited from the higher branches of the civil service. They can look forward to possible cabinet support for their recommendations. In the United States, governmental investigations, whether executive or legislative, tend to be partisan and the rivalry between the executive and legislative branches of the government has defeated many proposals. Fundamental changes would have to be made before we could approximate British methods of public inquiry.

On the other hand, there are certain features of the royal commission which could be copied in this country. The success which royal commissions and departmental committees have achieved as investigating bodies and as formulators of public policies is partly due to the reliance which such bodies put upon the ablest of the public administrators, to the requirement of careful written statements as the basis for testimony, to the willingness of men of affairs to sacrifice time and money to serve as commissioners or witnesses, to the use of experts outside the government departments, to the readiness of conflicting interests to make sacrifices in order to produce workable compromises, and to the reliance placed by the Government and the general public upon an impartial view of the facts.

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REVIEWS

Peacemaking 1919. By HAROLD NICOLSON. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933.—vii, 378 pp. $4.50.

This is a brilliant and an important book, for the writing of which Mr. Nicolson is admirably qualified. He was intimately concerned with the workings of the Peace Conference in a variety of fields, in close touch with the "Olympians" as well as with the minor delegates, acquainted with the grief and toil that attended the settlement of vexatious territorial problems, sensitive to the noise, confusion and color of the Conference and endowed with extraordinary capacity for reproducing its atmosphere. He has the rare quality of intellectual honesty. He refuses to arrange his material either with the purpose of proving a thesis or providing a formula of simplification that might facilitate comprehension of intricate problems but which would not express the facts. Even when he is treating the most contentious topics his tone is consistently and sincerely that of the seeker for truth. He has a gift of sympathy which enables him to express objectively a point of view different from his own.

Mr. Nicolson's book is in two parts, of which the first is a historical survey of the organization, methods and problems of the Peace Conference. He admits the impossibility of writing a connected narrative in terms either of subject or of time sequence. His presentation, roughly chronological but with a wise emphasis upon the topics of especial importance in each period, he calls "a study in fog." He is over-modest, for while he gives the impression of confusion and inconsequence that corresponds with the way things happened, his own narrative is lucid. After a brief consideration of the situation confronting the peacemakers as a result of the pre-armistice agreement, he takes up the conditions that made their task particularly difficult and the initial mistakes which, in the end, vitiated the settlement. His succeeding account of the disorganization that interfered with wise decisions and the quarrels over the secret treaties has all the sense of reality that is forcibly lacking in the Temperley history, and the objectivity which has never been claimed for Mr. Baker's book. This portion of the book concludes with chapters on the compromises and the extent of the "failure" which, in the author's opinion, resulted from them. The latter portion is made up of extracts from

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his 1919 diary. It is evidence of the range of contacts which he had established. Despite his own disclaimer, the diary is a "historical document" of the first importance, for nothing has been published that mirrors so faithfully the intimate life of the Conference.

Mr. Nicolson's catalogue of the inevitable misfortunes and the avoidable mistakes of the Peace Conference is so impressive that the reader will have no difficulty in appreciating countless reasons for the failure of the Conference to bring peace to a war-minded world. The picture he has drawn is so much closer to life than anything before attempted, so much the best reproduction of the peacemaking atmosphere, that it seems ungracious not to accept wholeheartedly the author's explanations and conclusions. His criticism of Wilson is tempered with warm appreciation of the President's idealism; his characterization of all the Americans, even in his disappointment at the ultimate ineffectiveness of the American program, is friendly to a degree. Yet I think that most Americans who were at the Conference will find themselves in disagreement with two of his basic assumptions. Mr. Nicolson assumes, first, that it actually lay in the power of President Wilson to translate his idealistic dream into fact; secondly, that the essential failure of Wilson occurred at Paris rather than after his return to the United States. These two assumptions are important enough to demand analysis.

The President is presented in this book as provided with a unique chance to accomplish a revolution in international organization. Such was certainly the belief of most liberals previous to the Conference. "For the first time in history," Mr. Nicolson writes, "you had a man who possessed, not the desire merely, not the power alone, but the unquestioned opportunity to enforce those ideas upon the whole world." It is the actual existence of this opportunity at the Peace Conference that I should question. For, as the author himself makes plain on a hundred different pages, the difficulties of capitalizing whatever opportunity existed were so great that humanly speaking it was non-existent. "Had President Wilson been a man of exceptional breadth of vision, of superhuman determination, he might have triumphed over all these difficulties. Unfortunately neither the will-power nor the brain power of President Wilson were in any sense superhuman." To demand the superhuman is surely tantamount to admitting a human impossibility.

Wherever Wilson or his colleagues attempted to apply the principles of the Fourteen Points to details of the settlement, they met, in the first place, a determined and often a concerted opposition on

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the part of the Europeans. It is true that European liberals hoped and prayed that the American delegates would remain uncompromising. "We longed for the Americans to call down fire from heaven and to proclaim their principles against any array of detail." But this hope was less articulate in the Paris councils than in this book and it proved of no assistance to the American program in the practical operations of the Peace Conference. What good resulted from the obstinate insistence of the Americans that Hungary retain the Grosse Schütt? They were merely outvoted three to one by British, French and Italians. When Wilson in the Council of Four told the Italians that they must choose between the Treaty of London and Fiume, he received no support from either Clemenceau or Lloyd George, although both secretly sympathized with him. "It was not that he negotiated unskilfully," writes Mr. Nicolson; "it was that he consented to negotiate at all." But whenever Wilson in the Four or an American delegate in a Committee refused to negotiate, they found themselves isolated and confronted with the question: "Who made you a judge over us?"

In all the critical issues Wilson had his choice of accepting a compromise or of going home bag and baggage. If he had gone home in April, the final outcome might have been better, in the sense that Europe would have known a year earlier that America would not coöperate in a permanent world organization. But the effect of American departure would certainly not have been to improve the terms of settlement in a liberal sense. It would have been considered by some liberals as a fine gesture, but it would not have advanced the cause of liberalism in Europe.

More important still is the fact that Europe was not merely unwilling to accept the practical and detailed application of the Fourteen Points, but was actually not in a condition that would permit their application. Whenever the Fourteen Points came to be applied to a specific problem, detailed exigencies of the locality conflicted with idealistic generalities. This the Americans discovered for themselves. In every problem the issue lay not between right and wrong but between right and right. Mr. Nicolson believes that once the Americans had abandoned the unassailable fortress of their own principles for the surrounding "marshes of detail, they were immediately surrounded, outnumbered and disarmed." The criticism, I think, confuses the problem. It was impossible for the Americans to coöperate in framing a settlement without approaching the "marshes of detail." The fate of the American program lay in the application

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of general principles to such details as Klagenfurth, Teschen, Orava, Gmünd. But when they approached details they found that they must abandon their principles, at least in part, because the detailed problem presented a conflict of principle which compelled a compromise. With the advantage of hindsight we can now see where the decisions of the Conference might have been improved. But even with that advantage he is a bold historical lecturer who can show his class a single problem of importance to which in the existing circumstances, Wilsonian principles could have been applied without serious modification. Wilson's discovery of this fact for himself and his vain attempt to square his principles with the exigencies of the situation doubtless accounts, in part at least, for his ultimate breakdown. Not merely the French, British and Italian interpretations of the European situation, but the very facts of that situation, prevented any real opportunity for the integral application of Wilsonian principles to the whole range of problems.

Even more important than the unavoidable compromises written into the treaties, with all their vicious results, is the fact that the treaties were never carried into effect as planned. They were based upon the assumption that the coöperation of the United States would be permanent. The defection of America intensified their faults and removed a vital moderating influence that might have altered the whole spirit of postwar Europe. Mr. Nicolson is not concerned with what happened after Wilson left the Peace Conference for America; but in estimating the extent of what he calls Wilson's failure it is important to remind overselves that the failure at Paris was only a partial failure. The President could not apply his principles integrally but he did secure a settlement which, including the League of Nations, was better from the American point of view than that which the Allies would have dictated if they had been left to themselves. Wilson's real failure came after he reached home. Here, moreover, he had a real opportunity.

The United States in 1919 was ready to enter the League. In March of that year, as Mr. Nicolson points out, thirty-four state legislatures and thirty-three governors had endorsed the League. It was certain that Republican senators would insist upon amendments or reservations, but even Senator Lodge did not expect to defeat ratification. Many League supporters felt that there might be some value in such reservations which would enable the Republicans to claim the League as their own child, begotten by Theodore Roosevelt, nurtured by Taft and Hughes, set in the path of righteousness by

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Lodge. If, as a good many expected, a Republican administration were elected in 1920, it was important that the party should have fully adopted the League. Lord Grey was sent to tell Wilson that, from the European point of view, it was preferable that the President accept the Lodge reservations rather than run the risk of a refusal of ratification by the Senate. The two-thirds majority for ratification of the treaty with the Lodge reservations was certain. But this opportunity was not taken by Wilson and all his efforts at Paris were thereby nullified. Physically helpless, isolated and bereft of advice, living in the unreal world of the sick-room, he issued orders to the loyal Democratic senators to vote against ratification if the Lodge reservations were retained. Even so, ratification failed by only seven votes of the necessary two-thirds. If Wilson had permitted events to take their course or if the Democratic senators had disobeyed him, opposition to the Treaty would have been confined to the handful of Die-Hards. America would have entered the League.

American membership in the League and coöperation in the application of the treaties would not in itself have created an ideal settlement out of the Versailles treaty. But it is likely that the most vicious effects of the treaty would thereby have been avoided. Mr. Nicolson stresses the disastrous consequences of American withdrawal. What he does not make entirely plain and what he, like many others, perhaps does not understand in its full significance, is that while Wilson's program was compromised at Paris, it was at Washington and through his unwillingness to compromise with the Senate that the deathblow was dealt.

CHARLES SEYMOUR

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Financial Democracy. By MARGARET MILLER and DOUGLAS CAMPBELL. London, The Hogarth Press, 1933.—132 pp. 4s. 6d.

In a short but readable book, the analyst of early Russian economics and the analyst of British railroads join to attack the problem of democracy in the control of industrial corporations. Since the authors are frankly essayists, they have attempted only a small amount of statistical analysis, and have dealt with general considerations.

The history of the problem in England runs roughly parallel to that in the United States. The original theory of companies in England, as of corporations in the United States, was that they were

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to be run on a democratic principle—each shareholder to have a vote; Herbert Spencer, in 1854, however, pointed out that the result in England had been that the shareholders fell under the control of "some one member of superior cunning, will, or wealth, to whom the majority become so subordinate that the decision on every question depends on the course he takes"; and Boards of Directors tend to become closed bodies. Even in England, it is pointed out, shareholders' control is extremely difficult; the cost of attempting to exercise it is enormous; the position of the individual shareholder attacking his management is apt to be misunderstood; and the residual control—undermining the confidence of investors in the corporate system—is apt to stop the flow of funds at the time when they are needed most. In England, as in America, associations of shareholders for direct action have not achieved permanent significance, with the result that "the legal assumptions with regard to the position of shareholders find no reflection in the realities of business life" (p. 49), which, of course, is equally true in the United States.

There is a review of the results of the British system of having an elected auditor (or accountant) as a control mechanism. Here, *mirabile dictu,* the authors compare the British system with the American to the detriment of the former, since British companies commonly issue annual statements, whereas on the New York Stock Exchange only twenty-five per cent of the listed companies confine themselves to annual statements. As a quantitative analysis this may be all very well; but no one who has studied the intricacies of American accounting will agree that the American shareholder is better informed than the English. Further, the authors probably overlook the fact that the auditor, who is elected by the shareholders in England, is chosen by the "control" quite as much as are the company officers, save in time of great dispute, and the real safeguard lies in the quality and mentality of the auditor.

The courts as a means of protection are glanced at, and, rightly, eliminated; the qualifications of directors are attacked, on the ground that business does not attract the best brains in England, that directors commonly attain their position in the late forties, and that the average age is 63. With a naïve trust in American efficiency, the authors deplore the fact that in England the best brains do not go into business, but go into the Civil Service; whereas on our side of the Atlantic we are praying for a reversal of the trend which leads the best brains into the service of private industry, leaving the Civil Service to take what is left.

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There is a final discussion of pluralism (the holding of many directorates by individuals) and a brief conclusion.

The book is illuminating and informative; but of course it leaves out the great drama. One would hardly guess, even from as penetrating an essay as that of the authors, that the concentration of corporate control, as finance definitely discards (perhaps by necessity) the methods of a democracy, is reaching a point which is slowly engulfing government itself. Yet the evidence is not far to find. There are five great industrial nations in the world: Italy, Germany, France, England and the United States. Of these, two, Italy and Germany, have found that the intricacies of industrial financing have so wound themselves into the economic and political fabric as to make parliamentary democracy almost untenable; and both Italy and Germany are frankly adopting the idea of the "corporate state", respectively fathered by Messrs. Mussolini and Hitler, in which the corporation, instead of being regarded as private, is frankly absorbed into the state machinery, working a real revolution in government technique. In France, a somewhat similar process is proceeding, without benefit of headlines, as France takes over, in the form of state monopolies, first its airways, now its shipping lines, and is proposing to do the same with its railroads, leaving the underlying problems of its steel, coal and heavy machine industries for future reference. Yet France is the country in which there is least pressure.

This leaves England and the United States isolated in an attempt to live with industrial corporations whose size, whose concentration of control, and whose effect on the economic life, have become of first importance. It may be that Great Britain, with a strong tradition of public service in private as well as in public matters, may dodge the question by solving it—that is, by calling into business (as it has in banking) a group of men who consider that their business is really a part of the public service of the state. In America we seem to be making very little progress along that line; the rising tide of demand for control through N. R. A. measures, through Securities Acts, perhaps also through federal incorporation laws, and through the entry of the United States government into the investment banking business, is the beginning of an interpenetration of the government into business. In America, of course, the democratic ideal is the last stronghold of financial imperialism; *laissez faire* is the embattled principle of the group who have not the slightest idea of allowing anyone to be let alone, except themselves.

A. A. Berle, Jr.

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Interregional and International Trade. By BERTIL OHLIN. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1933.—xvii, 617 pp. $5.00.

Professor Ohlin presents here a volume which students of international trade have been eagerly awaiting for a number of years; word that it was impending had far preceded its actual appearance. Professor Ohlin has already advanced a number of the ideas on specific questions which it contains, in journals and in an earlier book in Swedish, but this is his first large-scale work in English.

The book is in part a modification and extension of the classical English doctrines on international trade, in part a criticism thereof, and in part an attempt to break quite new ground. In his treatment of the broader theoretical problems, as distinct from those of mechanisms of adjustment and the like, Professor Ohlin starts from two main bases. One is the use of that tool, now coming so widely into favor, which is provided by analysis of a system of mutually interdependent prices. Following in general the model of Professor Cassel in his conception of this tool, he applies it not merely to a single market, but also to interregional trade within a country, and then to international trade. The description of international trade itself which results is necessarily quite different from that given by the classical writers. "Real" costs disappear, and are replaced by the money costs of commodities and of the factors of production; and there is no room left for any special law of comparative costs. In addition, the fundamental classical distinction between domestic and international trade, which a series of recent writers have assailed with increasing vigor, is here well-nigh obliterated so far as matters of underlying principle are concerned, and is replaced by the distinction between "regions", whether in the same or in different countries.

The second base for the general theoretical argument is given by extended analyses of the part played by the factors of production, their distribution and their prices. Broadly stated, and with due allowance for demand elements, Professor Ohlin's contention is that the nature and availability of the factors of production determine the localization of the various industries; and that differences in the nature and availability of the factors, by inducing differences in the types of commodity produced, stimulate interregional and international trade, and thus also stimulate further specialization. In essence, this is the classical principle of the division of labor put in refined dress. There is little here to disagree with, unless it be

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the apparent tacit assumption that techniques of production with respect to given commodities are substantially the same in different regions and countries at a given time; taking account of the wide differences often found in actuality, and attempting to explain them, would materially complicate the propositions on localization. The localization theory itself is then combined with the conclusions reached by analysis of a mutually interdependent system of prices, with several markets available as outlets for the factors of production; allowance is made for costs of transportation, tariffs and the like; and a rounded picture of international trade is thus obtained.

The presentation of the ideas just sketched occupies the larger part of the volume. Their development is accompanied by extended descriptive material, and is interspersed with many shrewd observations and inferences. The theoretical foundations of the work are good, the special stress on factors of production, localization and the like is important and even novel, and the whole point of view is one which should command general support. Yet at the end of these sections one is left, I think, with a somewhat empty feeling, and is uncertain of the extent to which they fundamentally advance our understanding of the character and effects of international trade. I found myself in agreement with the bulk of Professor Ohlin's criticisms of classical theory, but not sure that a satisfactory system had been put in its place, and regretful that he had not tried to dig deeper with his excellent tools. The equations given in an Appendix, for example, do not seem really to carry matters much farther; and the deliberate omission of nearly all allowance for business-cycle phenomena, and for monopoly and quasi-monopoly situations, at times makes the argument rather unrealistic. Professor Ohlin has *stated* the major problems involved in international trade theory, and has often stated them brilliantly, but I am not clear that he has *solved* them—though I should myself hesitate to try to define the character of an adequate "solution" here!

In the later chapters of the book, Professor Ohlin examines the problem of the maintenance of equilibrium in the balance of international payments. Here he advances views with which English and American students already have some familiarity. Rejecting the dominant rôle assigned by classical theory to international gold movements, he places his chief initial emphasis on changes in the size of international short balances. The argument, in brief (see p. 389), runs from an adverse international payment situation to short balances and the exchange rates; thence to tight money markets and credit

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contraction; and thence to substantially the results postulated by the classical analysis. The difficulty in this argument, as I see it, lies in the proposition that an adverse payment situation will *necessarily* induce credit contraction. If the excess imports are financed at home, but if exports decline as imports rise, so that the total burden of financing on the domestic money market is unchanged, why should tightness be induced in the money market? The point is developed in an article of mine in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* for 1928, which Professor Ohlin apparently missed. Somewhat later (chap. xix), he explores another line of approach, and on the analogy of domestic capital movements, explains the adjustments following international capital movements in terms of the effects of increased and decreased "buying power" in the borrowing and lending countries. This again, however, seems to me incomplete. Borrowing abroad will increase, *ceteris paribus,* the volume of media of exchange in the borrowing country, but why should there be any shrinkage in the lending country? What the lending country loses (barring gold, usually negligible here) is *titles to the ownership* of bank deposits, not the deposits themselves. The puzzling problem of the mechanics of international adjustment is still, I think, not entirely solved.

Despite these criticisms, however,—and a short review almost always seems unduly critical, because the points of agreement are likely to interest the reviewer less than the points of disagreement—I believe that Professor Ohlin has made a signal contribution to the theory of international trade, and one which will interest every student of economic problems. He has opened up many fields of ideas and points of view which are comparatively or wholly new to English and American students; he has amassed a great deal of suggestive illustrative material; and, finally, he has presented what he has to stay in a simple, effective style that cannot but attract the serious reader, whether in academic or in business life.

JAMES W. ANGELL

European Diplomatic History 1871–1932. By RAYMOND JAMES SONTAG. New York and London, The Century Co., 1933. —xi, 425 pp. $3.50.

In spite of the fact that the World War is history of only yesterday a tremendous amount of material concerning its origin has been written. Data made accessible through the opening of government archives has attracted many scholars with the result that a deluge

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of monographs and books has appeared. Even specialists in the field have found it difficult to acquaint themselves with all the published material, while the undergraduate and the general reader have found it next to impossible. Dr. Sontag, in his book of slightly more than four hundred pages, has gone a long way toward the solution of this problem. He has sifted hundreds of sources and has produced a comprehensible work covering the involved period from the Franco-Prussian war to the present time.

There are three rather distinct periods covered by this work: prewar diplomacy, the diplomacy of the war and the peace congress, and finally the postwar diplomacy. The author devotes twice as many pages to the first period as to the remaining two and gives the last two equal space. Some will question the emphasis given to the second part as compared with the last but that is largely a matter of opinion.

Dr. Sontag has chosen as an approach to the subject to describe the personalities rather than to discuss the economic and social factors involved. Skilfully he has shown how the obsessions of men in power directed policies of governments and destinies of people. Bismarck, Salisbury, Disraeli, Sazonov, Isvolski, Aehrenthal, Lloyd George, Grey, Briand, Clemenceau, Poincaré, Tirpitz, Bülow, Bethmann-Hollweg and Wilson live again in the reader's imagination. The author has succeeded in giving unusually clear pictures of his characters in a very few words. Note his description of Sir Edward Grey (p. 131):

> The lot of the British Foreign Secretary, pulled now this way and now that by conflicting currents of opinion, was not a happy one. In the Foreign Office, and in dispatches from ambassadors abroad, Sir Edward Grey was plied with arguments justifying belief in the German menace. In the cabinet meetings, most of his colleagues favored a naval truce with Germany, and insisted that Grey preserve British freedom of action unimpaired. Grey himself wished above all else to preserve international peace. He wished to deal honestly and straightforwardly with all nations. He was determined to give Germany "no excuse for saying that she is being cold-shouldered, isolated, or squeezed." He knew the English people wanted no binding commitments with other powers, and he felt he must carry out the popular wish.

A great deal of history is written in these few lines. In reality the book is hardly a narrative of what happened but an interpretation of what leaders desired and the technique which they used in attempt-

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ing to achieve it. Consequently the reader desiring an encyclopedia of facts will be disappointed with this book but he will find a penetrating generalization.

The author is at his best in chapter iv, "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente". One of the most complicated and disputed periods in European diplomatic history is very successfully treated in this chapter. There are enough details to clarify the developments without confusing the reader. An extract from the concluding paragraph illustrates the point (p. 149).

> There were trouble-makers in every country: Russians who plotted dangerously in the Balkans; Austrians who preached war against Serbia; Pan-Germans intoxicated with dreams of conquest; Frenchmen who hoped to use Morocco as a means of stirring the embers of *revanche*; Englishmen who would block German expansion completely, who would sink the German fleet without warning. Every country had its firebrands. If they controlled one government, they could embroil all Europe. If any state felt confident of victory, would it not be tempted to heed aggressive counselors? The times were too dangerous for new and untried experiments. Force and the balance of power were dangerous for peace, but they were the best Europe knew.

The last two chapters fall short of the standard set in the first part of the book. The story becomes more confused. Chapter viii, "The Hegemony of France", in which the diplomatic history of Europe, including America, is traced from 1919 to 1925, is disappointing. I doubt very much if the average reader emerges from this chapter with a very clear understanding of the period. In spite of the fact that the author aims at interpretation rather than enumeration of facts the reviewer feels the lack of emphasis placed on such outstanding developments as the Little Entente, Russian foreign policy, Franco-Italian rivalry and the Polish Corridor detracts from the value of the book. The same can be said concerning the final chapter, "Conclusions". At least there is an unfortunate choice of chapter headings for these last two chapters.

However, taken as a whole this is an excellent book and is a worthy addition to the "Century Historical Series". Dr. Sontag has a splendid style. It is a relief to read a book in which unnecessary words are minimized. The reader will feel that every page is really needed to complete the story rather than merely to increase the size of the book. One of the greatest virtues of this work is the impartiality which is needed so much in the treatment of this subject. There is a convenient annotated bibliography, a good index and five

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excellent maps. Typographical errors are scarce; the reviewer noted only a few. "Inimical" (p. 288) and "Britain" (p. 280) are misspelled and the author probably intended to use "noted" instead of "voted" (p. 298).

JAMES EDGAR SWAIN

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Methods of Statistical Analysis in the Social Sciences. By GEORGE R. DAVIES and WALTER F. CROWDER. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1933.—xi, 355 pp. $3.25.

The authors, in the preface and a very brief introductory chapter, set forth the scope and objectives of their work on statistical analysis. Attention is concentrated "upon laboratory methods and the logic underlying them". Abundant exercises are given at the end of chapters for practice in applying the methods discussed. The entire subject of gathering and presenting data is covered in about twenty pages (chapter ii), including the discussion of sources, sampling, tabulation, types of distributions and graphic methods. Specialized methods in graphic presentation are left to be adapted to the particular research "by reference to the excellent manuals on charting now available". The authors hold the view that the technique of gathering data "can be learned only by practice in a given applied field", and that "the research student . . . must discover for himself in his chosen field of research just what use he can make of his tools".

The exposition is restricted, for the most part, to standard methods useful in economics and sociology — averages (chapter iii), dispersion (iv), index numbers (v), trends (vi), cyclical and seasonal movements (vii), correlations (viii), probability (ix). The usual treatment is expanded to include more recently developed methods and to suggest ways of adapting these techniques to specific problems.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of this text is the division of each chapter into two parts, the first describing the more elementary and essential statistical methods, the second presenting the more complex or specialized techniques. This plan facilitates the use of the text for a short elementary course, and will be found convenient for teachers and students, even though they may not agree with the exact division of topics. For example, in the first part of the chapter on dispersion (iv) the usual measures are de-

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scribed and the techniques of their computation are illustrated; then, under the heading of "supplementary methods", the authors discuss techniques for refining the approximate values already presented, by the use of corrections, as Sheppard's well known correction. Likewise, the methods of partial and multiple correlation are presented in the second part of chapter viii, as supplementary techniques.

In their preface the authors say that, "as far as possible, all methods have been reduced to formulas so that they may be handled by the worker who has but a minimum of mathematical knowledge". In the reviewer's opinion, this book invites dependence of the worker, to an unusual degree, upon mere techniques, which is contrary to the declared purpose of the work—"concentration upon the methods and logic of statistical analysis". This approach tends to substitute formulas for rational processes.

The criticism offered above is supported by the fact that answers to the exercises are published at the end of each chapter with the exercises themselves. The reviewer would hold that this should not be done even if the book were designed for the use of graduate students only. It is a great convenience to have the answers printed separately for the use of teachers and others. The student, however, should first check his work in every way possible, and he will not do it with the correct result before him. His attention tends to become concentrated upon the technique and the result of a computation by formula, whereas his attention should be centered upon the consistency of the result and its significance for his problem.

Having restricted the scope of their work, which they have a perfect right to do, so as to exclude a full discussion of many related topics, why do the authors suggest no references for outside reading? In chapter ii obviously such topics as sources, collection, tabulation and graphic methods have been passed over deliberately with the briefest possible treatment. If this work were intended only as a manual of techniques, this omission of additional readings would be defensible.

The reviewer ventures to point out the inadequacy of the treatment on the side of the logic of the procedures. For example, the assumptions underlying averaging (chapter iii) are vaguely formulated, if at all. It is stated (p. 34) and illustrated that several kinds of average are in use, but why? When should one be used and when another? What are the cautions necessary in their use? What are the special characteristics of the arithmetic and geometric averages which give them preference under specific conditions? The text

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is devoted almost entirely to explaining how the measures are computed, but the student is left in doubt about the logical justification of averaging at all. This weakness follows naturally from an inadequate treatment of distributions in chapter ii, as an introduction to averages. The chapter on dispersion (iv) illustrates the same defects. Why are measures of dispersion required in describing a frequency distribution? How does the concept of homogeneity relate to the number of cases required in a sample? Why does one compute a coefficient of variability? The authors do say (pp. 77-78) that "the first combination of measures (A M and σ) is best adapted to complete and regular data, particularly where further calculations of a complex nature are to be undertaken". But, if true, why is this so? Why leave the student to follow formulas blindly?

Conceding the right of the authors to restrict and to define their objectives according to any plan which is consistent and clear, what may be said of the content of chapter ii? It is asserted (p. 6) that the theory of sampling is not of primary importance in an introductory course. Perhaps they refer to the theory presented in the last chapter of the book (ix). A section is devoted to the distinction between primary and secondary data. It is implied that a census report is a secondary source. What, then, is a primary source? It is clear that the technical directions for drawing up tabular forms and for making tabulations may be omitted from a text on statistical methods (p. 8), but how do the authors avoid a discussion of different types of series, derived from different ways of classifying the data? What is the distinction between qualitative and quantitative series; a frequency distribution and a time series; a continuous and a discrete series? Are not methods of analysis adapted to the particular types of statistical series?

Since the frequency distribution is probably the most important type of series from the standpoint of fundamental statistical methods, it certainly deserves more adequate and clearer presentation than it receives in this chapter. The kinds of frequency curves, symmetrical and skewed, are important as affecting the choice of a measure of central tendency. They indicate the pattern of concentration to be measured. The authors describe a skewed frequency distribution as a "logarithmic frequency distribution" (p. 17). This description is likely to confuse the student, because it introduces the idea of a ratio scale without having described the two kinds of scales, as to their essential characteristics. It seems to the reviewer that in this chapter (ii) the obvious course in discussing frequency distributions

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would have been to prepare the student for the presentation of averages (iii) and dispersion (iv). If this was intended the results are disappointing.

The most important criticism of the order of treatment in this book is the postponement of the entire discussion of sampling, errors and tests of reliability to the last chapter.

ROBERT E. CHADDOCK

The United States in World Affairs: 1932. By WALTER LIPPMANN with the assistance of the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. New York and London, Harper & Brothers, 1933.—xvi, 355 pp. $3.00.

This is the second of a series of annual volumes on the United States and world affairs under the auspices of the Council of Foreign Relations. The first volume dealt with 1931, and appeared last year. In the publication of the present volume, Mr. Lippmann had the assistance of William O. Scroggs and Charles Merz. The principal topics of the volume are war debts and the economic depression, rising tariffs, the abandonment of the Young Plan and the liquidation of reparations, the limitation of armaments, disturbances in Latin America, and the aggression of Japan in Shanghai and Manchuria.

The conduct of our foreign policy during 1932 was not encouraging. Perhaps it is too much to expect a really great national program in our international relations during an election year, the more so since it was also marked by the greatest economic depression of our history. Continuity of policy and tenacity of purpose were too difficult for an administration, harassed by a distressing loss of contact with Congress, and the discouragements of its own defeat. Further, as the authors point out, both "the outgoing and the incoming Administrations were equally powerless to make decisions" during the interregnum from November to March. In the face of the domestic crisis and the temper of Congress a waiting policy was inevitable, and any further development of the policies initiated in 1931 became impossible.

Nevertheless, Hoover's much heralded moratorium proposal, buttressed by previous pledges of support by leading senators and representatives, augured well. Its defeat by the delays and qualifications imposed by Paris were a bitter disappointment to him. The incident is just another proof of the comparative ease with which the delicate balance in the adjustment of foreign relations can be

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upset. Perhaps in the course of years, after the American thinking public has become imbued with Mr. Lippmann's insight into national and international matters, the mobilization of public opinion behind a constructive program in our foreign relations will be possible.

In the meantime, the existence of so admirable a yearly survey of the United States in world affairs is of real significance. The author's exceptional qualifications for the task are evident throughout. Events and affairs are fitted logically into their setting, there is an excellent feeling for perspective and balance unusual in a work devoted to conditions so close at hand. Added to this should be noted Mr. Lippmann's strong sense for realities based on direct contacts with men and events and on well established habits of reflection and scientific thinking. The impression of dependability is further strengthened by appendices of pertinent statistics, tables and texts of important documents supplied by the research division of the Council.

The temptation to speculate must have been strong, and the reviewer congratulates the author and his collaborators on the objectivity of the treatment. In connection with war debts and the postponement of payments, considerable attention is paid to the economic deterioration during the negotiations, to the inflation of commodity prices, weakness in the security markets, decline in new financing, increase in unemployment, wage reductions and shrinkage of profits. The effort of debtor nations to balance their international payments by exchange control, moratoria and import quotas, licenses and surtaxes makes an excellent foil to our own maintenance of an export surplus by lending abroad. In the discussion of the rising tariff walls, the authors rather overlook the effect in Europe of the extravagant suggestions and opinions expressed during the congressional debates on the Smoot-Hawley tariff. The European press and public opinion took them seriously, and since they were often much more drastic than the actual provisions of the final act, they served to arouse the spirit of chauvinism still further. The student also looks in vain for indications of the influence of big business behind the trade policies of the respective governments, and for an adequate recognition of the significance of the British departure from the gold standard to Anglo-American trade relations. After all, the depreciated pound furnished a fairly good springboard to British trade interests in surmounting our tariff wall. The criticism in certain influential quarters of the Stimson Doctrine in the Far East is touched upon very lightly, while war debts and reparations are approached from a distinctly revisionist point of view. The chapter

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on disarmament is excellent but like one or two others affords further evidence that the unsettled problems in our foreign relations of 1932 —and they comprise virtually everything—were all left as a heritage to the new administration.

The style is clear and lucid. The narrative moves swiftly forward, and at times, as in the case of the account of the paralysis which crept upon our economic life with such ominous results, is even dramatic. Journalistic in the best sense of the word—that is, timely and readable—it is an indispensable volume for editors and students alike. There is a good index, chronological table of events, and a selected list of books which carries forward Professor Langer's excellent bibliography recently published by the Council.

WILLIAM E. LINGELBACH
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Modern Industrial Organization: An Economic Interpretation. By HERBERT VON BECKERATH. Translated by ROBINSON NEWCOMB and FRANZISKA KREBS. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933.—xiii, 385 pp. $4.00.

Professor von Beckerath in this volume discusses and interprets "the constitution, the motive powers and the prospects of modern industrialism on the basis of an international survey."

The analysis centers around the "enterprise" as the primary unit of industrial organization, the productive system as a whole being described in terms of the forces playing upon the enterprise, viz., the technical conditions of production (including the qualities of the human elements) the form and functioning of the markets for raw materials, labor, capital and finished goods, the technique of sales promotion, the "irrational personal element" in industry (particularly the influence of national tradition upon the attitudes of enterprisers), devices for eliminating conflicts between plant and market requirements (cartels and combines) and the policy of the state. The "enterprise" is defined by reference to "the homogeneity of interest in profits within the . . . capital complex" and "the uniform management of each business". It is questionable, therefore, whether the surrender to a cartel of such vital functions as the determination of price and output policy justifies the classification of the cartel member as a separate enterprise. The possibility of conflict within the corporation between the interests of the entrepreneur (active manager) and the capitalists (who provide the

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capital and are entitled to the profits) also undermines the validity of the definition of the enterprise by reference to a homogeneous interest in profits.

Professor von Beckerath's altogether admirable boldness in endeavoring to cover so wide a field and arrive at broad generalizations necessarily exposes him to criticism of both his broader and his more specific interpretations. His penetrating evaluation of the present capitalistic system of production stimulates both thought and criticism. He denies that industry has, by its own initiative, already abandoned private competitive capitalism, holding that the economic destiny of the greater number of private industrial enterprises is still decided by price and quality competition and that the lowest cost manufacturers in the long run still control the market: cartels can do little more than prevent prices from falling below the competitive level because they are restrained by potential competition and the tendency for returns upon capital to be leveled. Professor von Beckerath's argument that high prices promote capital investment and, in consequence, reductions in price, overlooks the possibility that where cartels control prices increased investment may be followed by profit but not price reductions, the presence of unused plant deterring potential competitors; profits may also be diminished by expenditure upon sales promotion rather than price reduction. There are many references to the competitive mechanism of automatic adjustment but also many admissions that there are important spheres of industry in which "the economic laws of supply and demand and the survival of the fittest no longer operate", that control is so concentrated as to render industrial fields subject to the decisions of one or a few individuals, and that the large size of firms diminishes the adaptability of the system to changing conditions. The conclusion that industry is still mainly competitive rests, therefore (as it must) upon an arbitrary definition of the extent to which the system may depart in its operation from the ideal adjustments of competition and yet continue to qualify as "mainly competitive".

The author also holds that the competitive system is unlikely to give place to a socialistic one by gradual evolution because workers lack the collectivist mentality necessary for socialism and because of the superiority of private over government enterprise, the former being claimed to be the only system capable of maintaining the living standards of closely populated industrial countries. Private industry has, however, serious weaknesses. It distorts demand without regard to physical and cultural requirements and requires of

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workers a type of work contrary not only to their ideals but often to their physical well-being, thereby consuming "the moral heritage upholding industrialism" and endangering both capitalism and civilization. To meet this danger it is necessary to develop a cultural system that will resist the tyranny of producers over consumers, and a political system that will, by calling for active participation by workers and eliminating class lines, force workers to realize the ultimate limitations upon the material well-being of both nations and individuals and abandon their "Utopian ideas". The state must, however, control the utilization of natural resources, the operation of public utilities, determine the proper distribution of rights within the enterprise, "prevent business leaders . . . from socially significant errors in management" and secure harmony between their policies and the national economic structure. But intervention must be inspired by the spirit and intentions of the capitalist system. Whether such a system should be called one of private competitive capitalism appears to the reviewer to be largely a matter of words. Above all, government policy must permit the accumulation of capital at a rate that will secure a permanently profitable production able to compete in the world market. Throughout the work the necessity for accumulation and the importance of international trade (on cultural as well as material grounds) are exaggerated. It is, moreover, a serious shortcoming in a comparative study of industrial organization, and especially one which includes such sweeping conclusions concerning the future of industry, emphatically denying even the possibility of efficient government operation and advocating a classless society, that the organization of production in Russia should be rejected in a few parenthetical remarks.

Among the generalizations of a minor sort there are many that are open to question, e. g., the attribution of the rise of American industry after the war to improvements in the organization of the credit mechanism, the statements that shares are usually not fully paid in England and that convertible bonds and preferred stock are issued mainly during temporary slumps on the stock market. The picture of the American entrepreneur as treating his personnel "from the vice president down to the workmen as collaborators" and adjusting work to "the psychical and physical nature of man" is hardly of general validity. The argument that American experience between 1922 and 1929 has shown the present impossibility of stabilizing business and the condemnation of expenditure by the state on public works lacks adequate support. The statement that the participation

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of banks in the direction of German industry has facilitated a "rational adaptation to the business cycle" is also unsupported by quoted evidence, with which, indeed, the book is in general inadequately equipped.

Although criticism can be directed to many parts of the book, the breadth of its philosophical approach and the keenness of its analysis compel appreciation: its translation should stimulate a broader approach to trust and corporation problems. Doubtless the translators and the author share the responsibility for such terms as "emotional demand", "empirical industries", "polygraphic workshops", "electrotechnics", "capital intensive plants" and the "American purchasing power of labor theory".

ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A History of the Economic Institutions of Modern Europe: An Introduction to "Der moderne Kapitalismus" of Werner Sombart. By FREDERICK L. NUSSBAUM. New York, F. S. Crofts & Co., 1933.—xvi, 448 pp. $4.50.

This introduction to Sombart's great work is the most extensive and most faithful summary of *Der moderne Kapitalismus* that has appeared in any language. Sombart has exerted a notable influence upon other writers ever since the publication of his first edition resulted in an extensive revision of Hobson's *Evolution of Modern Capitalism*, but these influences have usually been modified in various ways so that Sombart's interpretation of economic history has not been fully available to readers except in the original, which is too extensive to encourage any but the most determined students. This painstaking and accurate version of Sombart's work is thus a significant addition to the literature of economic history, most especially to English readers.

To condense six large volumes containing 3100 pages into a single volume addressed to beginners in economic history is a substantial achievement. Much detail must be suppressed and compression of statement is essential throughout the exposition. This difficult task has been carried out with real success. The massing of the material is well conceived and Sombart's thought is rendered with genuine felicity of expression. The idealistic aspects of his doctrines are explicitly stated, but compression in the exposition will create difficulties for a reader unfamiliar with such concepts. The average

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reader will require a more extended treatment of these points; a want adequately supplied by the excellent essays of Doctor Parsons,[1] which unfortunately are not included in the references for reading that follow the chapters. The passages on the influence of the American gold and silver are more moderate in tone than the passages in the original, so that there is no confusion between money and capital. There are references to new literature at many points, but for the most part the text follows the original very closely. The primary contributions of Sombart are so clearly brought out that the work should exert a considerable and desirable influence upon the teaching of economic history in the United States.

Instruction in our colleges is still dominated by what may be called the "revolutionary" school. This group of writers concentrates attention upon the so-called "Industrial Revolution" in England to such a degree that the history of the sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries is thrown out of perspective, and institutional development in continental Europe is subordinated to the development in England. Incidentally the rise of economic liberalism tends to distract attention from the essentially constructive rôle of the state in the development of the institutional framework of economic and social life. Sombart's interpretation of the rise of capitalism gives us an extensive revision of these narrow views, and Professor Nussbaum's version will make this view accessible to new groups of readers. It is to be hoped that this new text will lead to some revision of our courses.

It must be confessed, however, that this socialistic interpretation of economic history has certain weaknesses of its own. It is therefore important for us to realize that the revision of our economic history cannot wisely be limited to the substitution of the doctrines of Sombart for the concepts of Toynbee, Mantoux and Mrs. Knowles. Although Sombart attempts a comprehensive sketch of the development of economic institutions since Charlemagne, the problems of the middle ages are not effectively treated, and the exclusion of antiquity from the supposedly independent culture of Europe since the migrations is peculiarly unsatisfactory. Furthermore, though we hear much about institutions in Sombart, the quantitative and geographic phenomena of economic development are largely ignored. This is perhaps a natural outcome of the tendency of all the Socialists to treat institutions as an end in themselves, but it is possible to

[1] Parsons, T., "Capitalism in Recent German Literature," *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 36, pp. 641-661; vol. 37, pp. 31-51.

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contend that institutions are really means to social ends. Such a view would give greater importance to the quantitative problems of the growth and distribution of population and to the related problems of adaptation to the geographic environment. Because these problems are becoming increasingly important to us, the reviewer finds it difficult to share all the enthusiasms of Professor Nussbaum for Sombart's interpretation, despite the undoubted significance of the positive contribution.

Although the broader elements of a concept of social evolution have been present in economic literature since Comte, no fully satisfactory analysis of these problems has yet appeared. Considerable progress has been made in special treatises and monographs, but much still remains to be done. It is to be hoped that admiration for the accomplishment of Sombart will not stand in the way of further advance in the study of economic history.

ABBOTT PAYSON USHER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The White Armies of Russia. By GEORGE STEWART. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1933.—xiii, 469 pp. $4.00.

Perspective is already focusing some aspects of the Russian Revolution; the historical approach is replacing the partisan. Of this, Stewart's book is excellent evidence. With commendable detachment and moderation the author has produced a clear and objective presentation of what, not so long ago, was clouded with obscurity and usually discussed with the most extreme and acrimonious bias. The title, though accurately descriptive, may convey the notion that this "chronicle of counter-revolution and allied intervention" is sympathetic or propagandist for the cause of traditional Russia. This is not so; no partiality or intimation of propaganda for any side in the Russian conflict is apparent.

This is a straightforward, fairly detailed narrative, interpreted with judgment and balance. Beginning with Kornilov's effort to establish a dictatorship in 1917, the account follows the rise of the "Volunteer Armies", the Denikin campaigns, the north Russian efforts, the Czechoslovak "anabasis", Kolchak's Siberian adventure, Yudenitch's offensive from the Baltic states, Wrangel's final struggle, the relations of Japan with the Far Eastern Republic, and ends with brief statements of the fortunes of some of the émigrés. It is grim reading. Among all the periods of human suffering and agonized

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conflict, none is more harrowing, more intense, or on a vaster scale; in import, certainly, none is more significant. Distracted as the world outside of Russia has been with its own war settlements, ignorant, prejudiced, and often fearful, there has been comparatively little knowledge or understanding of the process of events in which the anti-Bolshevik forces were finally defeated and foreign intervention repelled.

Stewart's book gives us a sober and competent synthesis of all the efforts at counter-revolution and Allied intervention. It is based upon evidence, both written and oral, representing all shades of opinion from Russian and non-Russian sources. The exceedingly complex conditions of parties among the anti-Bolshevik forces and the varied interests of British, French and Japanese policies together with the frequently clashing aims of Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, the Baltic and Caucasus regions are fairly stated and intelligibly related. Particularly well done is the Siberian scene from 1918 through 1922, wherein were involved so many factions and ambitions. Even Japanese policy, tortuous, ruthless and besmirched with support of such monsters as Kalmykov and Semenov, is coolly and judicially explained. Effective, also, is the exposition of the intricate circumstances of the Ukrainian separatist movement with its party welter and civil wars, with its cross-currents of German and Polish invasion and their relation to the general course of the World War and its aftermath.

Little of the traditional, heroic glamor surrounds the White armies; no glory of Thermopylae gilds their laurels. Theirs was a lost cause in a far more tragic sense than that of Spartan or Cavalier, of Bourbon or Confederate. With a personnel which was by no means always convincing, the White forces were unstable and fluctuating; they comprised diverse elements, political, social and geographical, with former imperial soldiers and officers, Cossacks, deserters and numerous types of adventurers; they were a heterogeneous assemblage, most difficult to organize and control. In statesmanship and military qualities their leadership was often deplorably weak. Too often without unity of purpose, fighting for what was either an ill-defined or outworn creed, their position became increasingly anomalous and desperate. Yet in their forlorn circumstances, painfully dependent upon the vacillations of *real-politik* as manipulated by Russia's former allies, and in their sufferings and losses, the courage and endurance of some of them are to be compared not unfavorably with the record of Stuart or Bourbon

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émigrés. There is little likelihood of a "restoration" for these latest exiles.

The book is well illustrated, and an admirable effort has been made to supply an adequate complement of maps; the maps are not always clear, however, nor are they always most suitably placed with reference to the text. A considerable bibliography is appended, to which might also be added Masaryk's *Making of a State* and Lockhart's *British Agent*.

LAURENCE B. PACKARD

AMHERST COLLEGE

The Metropolitan Community. By R. D. MCKENZIE. New York and London, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933. — xi, 352 pp. $3.50.

Like the other monographs prepared under the auspices of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, this volume is restricted to the analysis of objective data. It attempts to show in a verifiable way some of the basic changes that have taken place in American cities since the advent of motor transportation. It is organized into five parts, the first three dealing with the rise of the metropolitan community as a population aggregate and an economic entity, the last two treating of certain aspects of change within the metropolitan community and with some of the problems arising therefrom. Eight of the twenty-three chapters have been written by experts in special fields; the rest was written by Professor McKenzie who has also edited the volume. On the whole, it is an excellent statistical study, and Professor McKenzie, who is one of the foremost students of urban sociology in the country, is to be congratulated.

Population, as his analysis shows, is not merely moving into urban centers; it is concentrating more and more in larger urban aggregations.

> Fully one-half of the people of this country now live within 50 miles of a city of 100,000 or more, and over 80 per cent reside within an hour's motor journey of a city of 25,000 or more. Growth has been much more rapid in the territory adjoining the larger cities than in the nation as a whole or even within the large cities themselves. . . . This grouping of population around the larger cities of the country and the reaching out of such communities over larger territories are the outstanding phases of the recent "drift to the cities" (p. 311).

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Commercial functions show the same tendency toward higher concentration. The settlement structure of the United States is tending to be regional rather than sectional; that is, the interdependent economic region has replaced the self-sufficient geographic section as the territorial unit of American settlement; and the different regions are tending to become more nearly uniform in economic and cultural characteristics.

The metropolitan region is primarily a functional entity. "Geographically it extends as far as the city exerts a dominant influence. It is essentially an expanded pattern of local communal life based upon motor transportation" (p. 70). But the problem of devising a system of objective criteria, on the basis of function, that will define the geographical scope of the metropolitan aggregate and at the same time be of sufficient uniformity for census purposes is still unsolved. The Bureau of the Census, in outlining metropolitan areas, uses the factor of density of population.

The population patterning within the metropolitan community is of social and political significance. The suburban or "out-going" movement of the city's population has been selective in character, the more efficient elements of the population gravitating in higher ratios than the weaker economic groups to the margins of the city. Not only the economic status of the population but also the wholesomeness of the urban environment and social stability tend to increase with distance from the center of commercial activity. The composition of the population by age, sex, race and nativity differs in the suburban territory from what it is in the central city. Institutional development has followed closely the patterning of population, by confining location largely to the center and rim of the city.

> The centrifugal movement of population, accompanied by the concentration of business and other nonresidential utilities in and around the area of original settlement, has the effect of gradually depopulating the city that does not extend its political boundaries. In fact, the faster a city grows as a center of business and commerce, the more likely it is to decline in residential population unless it incorporates territory in keeping with the outward movement of its population (p. 191).

But American cities are not annexing territory in keeping with the expansion of their population.

Unlike the political city, the physical city has expanded in response to new conditions of transportation and population distribution. The entire metropolitan complex is rapidly acquiring a common physical base in the form of streets, sewers, water mains,

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light, power and transportation and communication facilities, though these are frequently not integrated in a regional plan. In general, however, the metropolitan region has attained a high degree of physical, economic and social unity. The political structure, however, has lagged behind. The area is split into dozens or even hundreds of independent governments without means of common action. Metropolitan New York, for example, covers parts of three states, all or part of nineteen counties, and almost 300 cities, villages and other minor units. This failure of the political structure of the metropolitan community to become adjusted to the physical and social structure of the area constitutes one of the major problems in local government at the present time. It is probably the greatest handicap to the efficient functioning of the metropolitan region, for nearly every one of the new problems of great cities comes home sooner or later to the governmental agencies. Regional planning on a scale commensurate with actual needs is thwarted by this political situation.

The most obvious method of meeting a metropolitan problem affecting several units of government, as Professor Thomas H. Reed, who prepared chapter xxii, points out, is the establishment of a special or *ad hoc* district for the purpose of dealing with that problem; e. g., a water district, a sanitary district, a park or recreational district. We are becoming increasingly familiar with this device, which is relatively easy to secure because the creation of a special district does not disrupt any existing unit or displace any political power or influence. But this method does not solve the metropolitan problem as a whole; it may serve only to complicate the governmental situation. On the assumption that the problem of political integration will not be met through the expansion of political boundaries, since annexation has habitually lagged behind the spread of population, Professor Reed suggests two alternatives. (1) The performance directly by the state of functions that concern local units; for example, highway construction and maintenance. Such a tendency toward state centralization, however, will doubtless stop far short of a complete solution of the metropolitan problem. (2) The creation of units of metropolitan scope possessing sufficient powers to deal with those matters which affect the metropolis as a whole but leaving other matters to be dealt with either by the existing units or by new units to be created for the purpose. So far no project for the creation of this type of metropolitan government has been put into practice in the United States, but examples may be

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found in the Administrative County of London and the City of Greater Berlin. A more radical procedure would be for the state to take the initiative and abolish all local political units and substitute a unified metropolitan government.

MAURICE R. DAVIE

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The People's Party in Texas: A Study in Third Party Politics. By ROSCOE C. MARTIN. Austin, The University of Texas Press, 1933.—280 pp.

Studies of this character are often valuable as developing significant local variations upon a familiar general theme. If Professor Martin's painstaking researches have unearthed little of consequence to supplement Professor John D. Hicks's standard account of *The Populist Revolt*, the fault is apparently less with him than with Texas. The state made its distinctive contribution to the organization of discontent among the Southern farmers, but that was in the earlier days of the Farmers' Alliance, with its successive enthusiasm and disillusionment over the Democratic Governor Hogg, "a man who spoke the language all might understand, who removed his coat when he made a public address and threw his suspenders off from his shoulders, letting them dangle about his knees, who drank out of the water pitcher provided for him 'like a horse'", and who campaigned on a platform favoring the abolition of the national banking system and the free and unlimited coinage of silver; and over C. W. Macune and his "sub-treasury" plan for inflation and agricultural credits. It was the union of Alliance men and liberal "Jeffersonian" Democrats committed to the sub-treasury and disappointed with Hogg that gave body to Populism in Texas, and it was the schism over the sub-treasury that demoralized and, for all practical purposes, destroyed the Alliance throughout the South. Hogg and Macune are dynamic figures, not to be neglected in any history of radicalism. Unhappily for the reader's interest, they are in process of exit from the scene as Professor Martin's account begins.

Thereafter the history of Texas is a minor current in the stream of Southern Populism. The disillusionment with the "regular" leaders and the disposition to break with the dominant party in order to force attention to the crying needs of the small farmer were auguries of perennial bitterness and defeat. Loyalty to the Democratic party was, of course, the cardinal article in the Southern

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political creed after reconstruction. An organization of poverty-stricken marginal farmers, as the Populists essentially were (Professor Martin's maps and charts by counties clearly establish this for Texas), was bound to lose all caste by a defection which could be represented as a betrayal of "white domination". Tillman in South Carolina appreciated this and succeeded in capturing the Democratic party from within. In North Carolina and Georgia, Leonidas L. Polk and Tom Watson, through exceptional qualities of leadership, were able for a while to make headway with a separate organization. Even for them defeat was inevitable. The exigencies of political campaigning impelled the Populists to fuse with the Republicans and to make overtures to the negroes. The Democrats, with a wink to consistency, proselyted the negroes more effectively, kept an accusing finger pointed at Populist "treason" and, when necessary, employed the election machinery to count out their enemies at the polls.

Heterodoxy in a conservative society, poverty and inexperience go far to explain the miscarriage of Southern Populism. In Texas, outstanding leaders failed to appear, and stirring orators were no substitute. There was a vigorous organization at the top, with an apparatus of conventions and lectures and an active, if impecunious, press. Populist clubs flourished and camp meetings catered to the physical and intellectual appetite. But there was no adequate staff of local workers to get out the vote. The Populists won successes in poor white counties and even exerted sufficient pressure on the state legislature to secure action on some of the minor measures they sponsored, but the bills were poorly drawn and failed in practice. Populist officials elected in the counties labored under constant charges of inefficiency or worse. The Democrats were indefatigable in obstruction and misrepresentation. When the Bryan fiasco wrecked the Populist party nationally and disagreements among its leaders on the question of fusion with the Republicans demoralized it locally, the Democratic state organizations killed no fatted calf for returning prodigals.

"The heart of the agricultural section remained the bulwark of the Democratic party in its contests with Populism." This, Professor Martin's book shows, was even more true of Texas than of other parts of the South.

CLIFTON R. HALL

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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BOOK NOTES

A View of Europe, 1932: An Interpretative Essay on Some Workings of Economic Nationalism, by Paul van Zeeland (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933; vi, 135 pp. $1.75) and *Economic Conditions in Foreign Countries 1932-1933,* issued by the National Industrial Conference Board (New York, National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1933; x, 62 pp. $2.00) may well be reviewed together. They are both clinical records of the progress of the disease of economic nationalism that is undermining the foundations of the Western social and political system. To those whose eyes are not yet blinded by the new ballyhoo of "national planning" they should bring additional warning. Van Zeeland speaks from a background of varied experience as director of the National Bank of Belgium, deputy director of the Bank for International Settlements, and frequently as a delegate at the international economic conferences of recent years. The volume is a simple recital of his present view of the international economic situation. It gives a detailed sketch of the present measures of economic nationalism, including tariffs, exchange restrictions, clearing agreements and moratoria, and reviews the various remedial efforts along international lines. Thus far the author covers a familiar story although he does it well and from a fresh angle of observation. The second part of the volume, which deals with the problem of autarchy and planned economy, is more original. "Planned economy"—or, as the author says in literal translation of the more correct French term, "directed" economy—is one of those slogans that excite "either spontaneous enthusiasm or downright opposition." For some these words "conjure up some sort of a paradise where, by a miracle of knowledge and authority, there would only be, to quote Baudelaire, '*ordre et beauté.*'" When thought turns to implementation of the new objectives, the realm of sentiment is soon pierced and familiar outlines of tariffs, subsidies, cartels, compulsion, bureaucracy, vested interests and so forth make their disillusioning appearance. Van Zeeland spends little time on the "ideal" but he has written a vigorous, realistic account of the extensive European experience in this field. Mr. Vaso Trivanovitch's monograph for the National Industrial Conference Board supple-

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ments the Baltimore lectures in a remarkable fashion. He gives a careful statistical survey of the monetary situation and the gold movements of recent years, followed by a critical appreciation of the recent proposals of the Gold Delegation and other groups of experts. The detailed pictures of the situation in debtor and creditor countries, with chief emphasis on their international accounts, are remarkably concise. The author has succeeded in presenting a significant selection of relevant material in a brief and interesting fashion. Is it ungracious to remark that the price charged by the National Industrial Conference Board seems excessive for a publication of barely sixty pages?—HARRY D. GIDEONSE, University of Chicago.

To his long experience as the Paris correspondent of the London *Times* is doubtless due the air of actuality that distinguishes Mr. W. L. Middleton's brief survey of French politics, *The French Political System* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1933; 296 pp. $3.00). Present-day practice rather than historical origins, theory or even what appears in France's "least written of written constitutions" is his chief concern. The result is often illuminating. How the complexities of parties and elections produce a result that is in substantial accord with public opinion, the connection between national and local politics, the function of non-partisan leaders in the chamber, are here explained. More familiar themes, such as the geographic division of political opinion, the parliamentary and party systems, the social and church questions, the *école unique* and its political significance, the position of the president, are adequately presented with a wealth of illustrations that only an observer of the author's experience could give. Neither from the Right nor from the Left does he anticipate a serious danger to the republic. Of the intelligence and independence of the electorate he has a high opinion, but he believes that a stricter discipline within existing parties is not only desirable but possible. The political influence of newspapers is minimized, rather than exaggerated, in a chapter devoted to the press; the provincial newspapers however are ignored. Least satisfactory is his discussion of foreign policy, for he fails to associate it with domestic politics. The book leaves with one the impression of a keen political intelligence. It should be especially useful for the general reader.—E. MALCOLM CARROLL, Duke University.

Among the "Recent Social Trends Monographs" published by the President's Research Committee on Social Trends is that of Malcolm M. Willey and Stuart A. Rice, *Communication Agencies and Social Life* (New York and London, McGraw-Hill Book Com-

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pany, 1933; xv, 229 pp. $2.50), a summary of which appeared earlier as a chapter in the committee report entitled *Recent Social Trends in the United States.* The book is divided into three main parts, the first of which, "The Transportation Agencies and Their Utilization", includes chapters on railroads, electric railroads, the motor vehicle, highways, highway utilization, touring and travel, waterborne passenger traffic and air transportation. Part II deals with "Agencies of Point to Point Communication" and includes chapters on the postal service, the telegraph, cable and wireless services, and the telephone. Part III, "Agencies of Mass Impression", covers the newspaper and periodical, the motion picture and radio broadcasting. A final division of one chapter attempts to integrate the whole. Such a wide range of subjects in a book of this size necessitates a relatively brief discussion of each. The brevity is in part attained by viewing the whole problem primarily in the present; only enough of the past is given to grasp existing conditions, and predictions as to the future are carefully avoided. Despite the brevity of the discussion, few aspects of the subject of any importance are omitted. Not only is the study amazingly compact, but it is characterized by extraordinary objectivity and freedom from bias, a quality which is not always easy to achieve in handling such subjects as the moving picture and radio. Primarily the volume is a series of statistical studies upon which the authors base conclusions and suggest interpretations, and it is essentially a well-organized collection of facts on existing conditions of communication. Like other aspects of modern life, methods of communication are undergoing rapid change, and the picture five years from now may be quite different. For the present Willey and Rice have provided as closely knit and as accurate a statement of ascertainable facts as one is likely to obtain. —H. U. FAULKNER, Smith College.

The largest part of Professor J. Laurence Laughlin's latest book, *The Federal Reserve Act: Its Origin and Problems* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1933; xii, 400 pp. $3.50) is chiefly autobiographical in character. Professor Laughlin was one of the outstanding leaders in that movement for the reform of our monetary and banking system, and for popular education in the complex questions involved, which culminated in the drafting and passage of the Federal Reserve Act. He here gives his own account of the protracted political and personal struggles involved. In the process, he clarifies a number of matters which have given rise to controversy; and he presents material, especially in connection with the major rôle

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of the National Citizens' League, which other historians have not treated adequately. These chapters should obviously be read in conjunction with the account of the same events given in the recent two-volume work of the late Paul M. Warburg. The latter part of the book contains a discussion of the period since 1929. Professor Laughlin here first stresses the weaknesses and dangers which have resulted from the injection of so much politics into Federal Reserve operation and control, and then considers the various remedies for depression which have recently been proposed. Basing his argument on his own familiar monetary doctrines, he rejects currency management, government bond issues and the like, and concludes that the cure can be found only in the abatement of speculation and the restoration of well-adjusted production.—JAMES W. ANGELL.

In his volume on *Australia in the World Depression* (London, P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1933; xi, 219 pp. 10s. 6d.), E. Ronald Walker offers the reader a clear, concise and orderly exposition in which the international and national factors contributing to the depression are analyzed. Factual material relating to both Australia and the rest of the world is drawn from numerous sources and in some instances worked up independently; furthermore, the theoretical implications are ably discussed. On the other hand, the literature both secondary and documentary has not been thoroughly explored. Of numerous interesting conclusions drawn the following deserve mention: Unemployment is to be associated more with the lack of stability of manufacturing industries than with the payment of uneconomic wages. A policy of protection by making more difficult the encouragement of imports when exports are abnormally high, is held responsible for excessive monetary expansion; for inflation is therefore carried further than otherwise would have been necessary in order to use up the large balances in London resulting from the large volume of exports. Australian banks, instead of allowing the foreign exchanges to depreciate when capital imports have been reduced or when other unfavorable factors have affected the international accounts adversely, have been inclined to keep exchanges rather stable and to correct the situation by rationing exchange and credit. The result has been that exports have not been encouraged by a depreciation of the exchanges and the adjustments have been made almost wholly through curtailment of imports. Within a period of but a few years the national income per capita has fallen roughly 20 per cent; but Mr. Walker hastens to add that the unsatisfactory conditions are especially felt in the capital goods in-

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dustries and therefore the consumption standards have probably not been affected to the extent indicated by production figures. A relatively early decline in consumption goods industries is explained along Viennese lines as the aftermath of excessive expansion in the investment goods industries. Australia was confronted with depression long before most other countries and therefore the policies adopted, the discussions held and the remedies suggested are all of particular interest here; and many of the controversies being aired in the United States today are reminiscent of similar issues already fought in Australia. Particularly stimulating and helpful is Mr. Walker's discussion of wage policy. Rejecting the purchasing power theory, the arbitration courts of the Commonwealth recently ordered a reduction in real wages of 10 per cent. Mr. Walker, however, is rather sympathetic with the purchasing power theory according to which a reduction of wages would not materially reduce unemployment because wage cuts are accompanied by curtailed demand for products. He is, however, careful to point out that it all depends on the behavior of the entrepreneur; his reason for being sympathetic with the unorthodox position is that employers may well not give the consumer the benefit of the reduction of costs, that entrepreneurs, not so well informed of demand conditions as in normal times, may not increase production so long as marginal prime costs are being met, and, finally, that any transfers from labor to capital may mean a reduction of spending for the time being. Although limitations of space make impossible detailed criticisms of this excellent book, I cannot refrain from suggesting that a policy of cutting costs, just because interest costs are included, is not for that reason and to that extent, an inflationary program. To all who are interested in the solution of the economic problems of today the reviewer recommends this substantial volume without any hesitation.—S. E. HARRIS, Harvard University.

The fifth and sixth volumes of Judge John Bassett Moore's great compilation, *International Adjudications* (Modern Series. Volumes V and VI; published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by the Oxford University Press, New York, 1933; xv, 502; xxv, 418 pp. $2.50 each), maintain the same high water mark of scholarly care as exists in the four earlier volumes which have been reviewed in the QUARTERLY (vol. XLVII, p. 118, March 1932; vol. XLVIII, p. 140, March 1933). If one wishes an example of the utmost thoroughness and care in checking documentary sources, one cannot do better than to examine the first twenty-five pages of the

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fifth volume. The subjects covered in Volume V are the Spanish Spoliation claims (1795) and the French Indemnities under the treaties of 1803 and 1831. They thus round out the fourth volume which covered the arbitration under Article 7 of the Jay Treaty of 1794. The two volumes, in describing the settlements of claims arising out of breaches of the law of neutrality and belligerent rights at sea, furnish ample demonstration of the importance and vitality of that body of law. The account of the Spanish Spoliations is based on much new documentary evidence secured by the most painstaking efforts of Judge Moore, which was not available when he published his *Digest* in 1898. Nevertheless, the full documentary records of the commission seem to be irretrievably lost. The claims against Spain were based largely on the mistreatment of officers and crews of American vessels taken as prize and on damages to vessels and cargoes due to delays and improper conduct on the part of Spanish officials. The awards (which are printed in full) were made in set form without detailed discussion of legal principles involved. The second and third parts of the volume together contain a full account of our troubled relations with France from the Treaty of 1778 to the conclusion of the Treaty of 1831. These sections will be of particular interest to the historian and to the international lawyer. The reviewer knows of no better place to which one may turn for an ample and accurate account of the French violations of American neutral rights at sea and, through the notorious acts of Citizen Genêt, in our ports and waters. In the settlement of the claims under the treaty of 1831 in particular there is much valuable precedent for the study of international law. The notes of Mr. Kane, one of the American commissioners, are reprinted in full and contain a full discussion of facts and law. Judge Moore explains that while the plan of the entire work is chronological the time sequence has been disregarded in this instance to bring these related subjects together. The decision is a happy one. Volume VI reports the "Arbitration of the Title to Islands in Passamaquoddy Bay and the Bay of Fundy" by the Mixed Commission under Article IV of the Treaty between Great Britain and the United States of December 24, 1814. Judge Moore points out that this was in reality an arbitration, although the Commission was composed of only two persons, one from each country, since the parties bound themselves in case of a deadlock to refer the matter for final decision to some friendly sovereign. The dispute here involved was in many respects closely related to that settled by the St. Croix River Arbitration which is covered by the first two

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volumes of this series. It appears that Mr. Barclay, the British commissioner, was somewhat shrewder than the American commissioner, Mr. Holmes, and the honors of the argument seem to belong to the British agent, Mr. Chipman, rather than to the American agent, Mr. Austin. The award assigned Moore, Dudley and Frederick Islands to the United States and all the other islands in dispute, including Grand Menan, to Great Britain. Mr. Holmes finally agreed to this award only after Mr. Barclay conceded that the Eastern Passage from Passamaquoddy Bay into the Bay of Fundy was common to both nations. Mr. Barclay was influenced by the conviction that if the case were referred to a friendly sovereign for decision these islands would probably be awarded to the United States in accordance with the unratified conventions of 1803 and 1807. He explained to Lord Castlereagh that the arbitrator might also award Grand Menan to the United States and that from a naval and military point of view this island was more important to Great Britain than all the other islands together. The arguments on both sides were necessarily mainly historical and factual although Mr. Austin introduced some rather tenuous legal propositions regarding sovereignty over adjacent islands.—PHILIP C. JESSUP.

Propaganda is where you find it, and Professor Frederick E. Lumley, author of *The Propaganda Menace* (New York, The Appleton-Century Company, 1933; viii, 454 pp. $3.00), finds it everywhere. He considers all propaganda, moreover, to be a menace, for he defines the term in such a way as to exclude all except bad propaganda: "Propaganda is promotion which is veiled in one way or another as to (1) its origin or sources, (2) the interests involved, (3) the methods employed, (4) the content spread, and (5) the results accruing to the victims—any one, any two, any three, any four, or all five." Many writers would consider this definition too narrow; Bernays, who is quoted by the author, has said that propaganda is what you don't like of the other fellow's publicity. After arriving at his definition, the author examines propaganda in history by "random test borings"; that is, by the use of selected examples, he shows that there has been propaganda since the dawn of history. His examples show that there has been propaganda, but no attempt is made to discover to what extent the course of history has been influenced by it. The chief methods employed by propagandists he finds to be suppression, distortion and fabrication of facts or information, and the diversion of attention from what the propagandist wants to conceal. Any given medium of propaganda—the news-

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papers, the cinema or the platform, for example—may be used for one or all of these methods. Separate chapters are devoted to propaganda in industry, politics, war, patriotism, race questions, education and religion. These classifications, obviously, are not mutually exclusive; war propaganda, for instance, depends upon the propaganda carried on in churches and schools. It may be said, in general, that these chapters are largely based upon secondary material, most of which is familiar to students of public opinion. The author says, indeed, that he has picked out of the stream of publicity the flotsam and jetsam which is propaganda. Most of the material makes interesting reading, and the author's treatment is lively and vigorous, but the sampling method does not lead us very far toward an understanding of the extent to which our institutions are permeated with propaganda. The method of using selected instances is like picking a rotten apple from a box; we may suspect, as a result, that they are all rotten, but we do not know. How much of education is propaganda? To what extent are industries engaged in political propaganda? Such questions are hard to answer, but such studies as B. L. Pierce's *Public Opinion and the Teaching of History in the United States* and H. L. Childs' *Labor and Capital in National Politics* are useful attempts to give answers as definite as it is possible to make them. This book, nevertheless, should be useful to students, especially to those entering for the first time upon the study of public opinion and propaganda. There is a considerable bibliography appended, but there are some important omissions, such as Silas Bent's *Ballyhoo* (1927), H. L. Childs' *Labor and Capital in National Politics* (1930), Ernest Gruening's *The Public Pays: A Study of Power Propaganda* (1931) and Peter Odegard's *Pressure Politics* (1928). In addition, W. B. Graves' *Readings in Public Opinion* contains considerable material on propaganda, even in the narrow sense, and it might well have been included.—DAYTON D. MCKEAN, Princeton University.

Dr. Paul Guggenheim, professor of international law at the Graduate School of International Studies, situated at the seat of the League of Nations, is the author of a recent monograph on *Der Völkerbund: Systematische Darstellung seiner Gestaltung in der politischen und rechtlichen Wirklichkeit* (Leipzig and Berlin, B. G. Teubner, 1932; viii, 281 pp. Rm. 7.40). His narrative, for it is a narrative more than an analysis, is singularly precise throughout, within the bounds of the schematic arrangement. Over a third of the volume describes the origin, members, duties and organs of the

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League, emphasizing somewhat points on which Germany has been sensitive. The four following chapters deal with the war problem in several aspects. One on the avoidance and prevention of war examines the significance of Articles 11-18 and 20 of the Covenant, while one on the evolution of justice takes for its subject the existing network of pacific settlement treaties, the Pact of Paris and codification of international law. The security problem is discussed in connection with Articles 10 and 16, while disarmament is linked with "treaty revision." Three more chapters are devoted to international coöperation, the mandates and the liquidation of the war, including such questions as Eupen-Malmédy, the Saar, Danzig, Memel and the minorities. The national interests of Germany are thus given systematic prominence. In spite of this concentration on the national concerns of the writer's audience, the book is an exposition of the League of Nations. The supposed political factors are brought to the fore, the legal scarcely discussed. The League is seen as an intergovernmental collective organ providing new methods for effective collaboration, and it should be a world clearing house. The periodicity of meetings has imparted to "political state business a rational, systematic content, and the plane on which the powers meet remotely resembles the struggle to attain justice in the trial room." The quicker the political leaders quit trying to utilize this forum for their own purposes, the sooner sincere effort can be made to realize the spiritual objectives of the Covenant. Dr. Guggenheim's preoccupation with political attitudes seems to be symptomatic of the introspective position which Germans take respecting international matters. His pages are in manner entirely objective, but the choice of facts leaves the reader with the impression that the problems of the League of Nations are those which particularly interest Germany and that its record is to be judged by the extent to which those interests are satisfied.—DENYS P. MYERS, World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass.

At the same time that war between civilized nations was deemed inconceivable, the legal security of foreign investments was deemed impregnable. The authors of *No More War on Foreign Investments: A Kellogg Pact for Private Property* (Philadelphia, Dorrance & Co., 1933; 86 pp. 75 cents), by F. W. Bitter and A. Zelle, with an introduction by Chester W. Cuthell, accept uncritically the view that there was before the World War a settled rule of international law against the seizure by the territorial sovereign of enemy private property within his jurisdiction. This view is held by many of the most respectable authorities, but the contrary view, held by Hall and others

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equally respectable, would seem to have been better adjusted to the realities of a war engaging the passions and resources of the belligerents to the utmost extent. The authors recognize that, whatever may have been the applicable rule of international law before the war, there can be no assurance of the inviolability of private enemy property in future wars unless new international agreements are concluded on the subject. They propose, but do not formulate, a multilateral treaty, a Kellogg Pact, as they phrase it, for private property. Such a treaty, they urge, should be (1) unequivocal in its terms; (2) of unquestionable obligation for a considerable number of states, especially the Anglo-Saxon states; (3) enforceable by recourse to an international tribunal; and (4) endowed with moral force by the prior or simultaneous provision of additional compensation by the Allies for the German victims of the seizure of private property during the World War. For the future they believe that the liquidation and confiscation of private enemy property should be absolutely prohibited, and they are inclined to believe that the sequestration of such property should be likewise barred. Their appeal, though well written and on the whole persuasive, can hardly be considered a profound or significant contribution to the literature of the important subject which they treat.—EDGAR TURLINGTON, Washington, D. C.

The field of textbooks on American labor problems is enriched in a gratifying way by the publication of *Labor Problems in American Industry* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1933; xviii, 959 pp. $3.50) by Carroll R. Daugherty. In point of comprehensiveness in its coverage of the field, in its use of up-to-date sources and in its liberal point of view, this volume sets a distinct high water mark for volumes on this subject. If there is any serious omission, it is of a concluding chapter which might well be more philosophical in character. The reader seeks in vain for the author's ideas as to the larger implications of labor problems in the progress of American life and for some hints as to the probable trends suggested by the present situation. He shows, however, a remarkably inclusive and discriminating knowledge which results in a synthesis of exceptional value.—ORDWAY TEAD, New York City.

Because of certain similarities of approach to the problem of wealth production and distribution, the brief day of fame of the Technocrats in the United States during 1931-1932 stimulated the demand for Professor Frederick Soddy's *Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt,* which had originally been published in 1926. Encouraged by this great interest of the American people, Professor Soddy

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brought out a second edition "containing new material and a special foreword to the American nation" (2d ed., New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1933; 320 pp. $2.50). This, too, must have gone very well, for, toward the end of the year Professor Soddy prepared a smaller and generally more compact little volume with the much more popular title of *Money versus Man* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1933; viii, 121 pp. $1.25), in which, however, he covers substantially the same ground as before. The first edition of the earlier work was reviewed in this journal by Professor James W. Angell (vol. XLVII, pp. 621-624). While in the new edition Professor Soddy makes somewhat clearer the distinction between his own position and that of the Technocrats, on the one hand, and the Douglas "Social Credit" advocates, on the other, he stands valiantly by his guns and he appears to be emotionally more strongly fortified than ever. He is, it will be recalled, acidulously critical of modern banking, berating the bankers for lending, and for charging interest for, that which is not theirs. He would restrict the lending by banks to actual cash entrusted to them and would make the issue of money exclusively a governmental responsibility, with the money supply being increased, or decreased, in response to changes in an official index number. The immediate objective would be a stable price level, but Professor Soddy believes that so much beyond that would be attained that, at long last, the distressing paradox of poverty and plenty would be resolved. As already indicated the newer, smaller book expounds essentially the same doctrines although the attempt is made to set up additional defensive bulwarks against practical criticisms. Unfortunately, however, the narrow and inaccurate conceptions of value (hence, also, of wealth) and of the real economic function of banking, for which earlier reviewers criticized Professor Soddy, and which greatly weaken the force of his practical proposals, remain, in both volumes, unchanged.—E. E. AGGER, Rutgers University.

The Purchase of the Danish West Indies, by Professor Charles Callan Tansill (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932; 548 pp. $3.50), is the first and last word on the American acquisition of the Virgin Islands. Such an exhaustive account may be deemed unnecessary by some. But the Islands enjoyed a political importance wholly out of proportion to their material significance. For their strategic position they were long coveted by the Navy Department, while American statesmen were ever vigilant lest a major power, particularly Germany, might secure them. Not often have such terri-

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torial pygmies commanded so much space in the State Department archives. The book is full of interest. It is divided into eight chapters. The first two cover Seward's unhappy 1867 treaty of purchase. The following chapter analyzes fears of American secretaries of state regarding German aggression in the western hemisphere. The next three narrate colorful events surrounding Hay's 1902 treaty. Chapter 7 is entitled "Germany and the Danish West Indies". The final chapter relates to Lansing's 1916 treaty by which the Islands passed under American control. Dr. Tansill has combed the correspondence in the State Department. He has collected hithereto unavailable material from the foreign offices of Denmark, Germany and England. He has supplemented this by a search through the papers of Sumner, Olney, Roosevelt, Henry White, Lansing and others. He has even secured access to confidential letters of Lester H. Woolsey, assistant solicitor under Secretary Lansing. Press dispatches are likewise used, with careful discrimination. Out of this imposing array of primary material interesting and valuable conclusions were bound to emerge. We learn that Seward's Caribbean policy was essentially defensive; the 1867 treaty was defeated largely due to overshadowing domestic problems of Reconstruction; fears of German political aggrandizement in America were mostly groundless; rejection of the 1902 treaty was not due to German intrigue in Copenhagen; Lansing delivered a virtual ultimatum to Denmark to sell the Islands to the United States, under threat of seizure. By liberal use of material from the Berlin Foreign Office, the author unmasks German political aggression in the Caribbean for the bogey that it was. Thus White, Hay and Cabot Lodge are revealed as rank alarmists. Despite the sprightly style, a minor fault has crept in. This is the excessive use of lengthy quotations, many of which might have been shortened without impairing the force of the arguments and the interest of the narrative. Those on pages 117-119, 128-130, 402-404, 481-483 are examples. For the benefit of the less academic reader, extracts from Hansen's *Les Coulisses de la diplomatie* might have been translated. These criticisms, however, should not obscure the general excellence of the volume. It is interesting that the high-handed action of the State Department at no time finds in Dr. Tansill a hostile critic. The study is a distinct contribution to diplomatic history and is indispensable to an understanding of American policy in the Caribbean. The reviewer, long interested in this field, has found no misstatements of fact or overemphasis.—REINHARD H. LUTHIN, New York City.

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All over the world the subject of money has been in the forefront of discussion ever since the World War. And perhaps in no country have the emotions aroused over the subject been more violent than in France. With the franc almost destroyed by the ravages of war-inflation, with the desperate effort under Poincaré to restore some semblance of a stable standard, and with the subsequent assaults on the French position following the collapse of the pound sterling in 1931, it is no wonder that the nerves of the French are, with respect to monetary matters, literally "on edge." This is clearly reflected in the volume *Les Doctrines monétaires à l'épreuve des faits* (Paris, Félix Alcan, 1932; x, 232 pp. 12 francs), which comprises a series of lectures by French savants before alumni and students of *L'École Libre des Sciences Politiques*. The lecturers were MM. Herbette, Pommery, Lebée and Rueff. Discussion of the lectures was carried on in turn by MM. Piétri, Allix, Celier and Flandin—all familiar names to students of money and finance. The subjects dealt with were: the silver question, banks of issue, the gold exchange standard, and experience under the gold standard. The summary nature of the discussions precludes the possibility here of considering them in detail, but it may be said that the common objective seemed to be to convince the audience of the virtue of the automatic, monometallic gold-standard, and of the snares and delusions imbedded in the nostrums advocated by the silver men, by the alleged experts making up the Geneva Conference, and by others. The lecturers took many an ironic fling at the Anglo-Saxon suggestions which so singularly tended to redound to the interest of London and of New York, and at the demand for the reform of the gold standard by those countries which had been unable to maintain it. In the last lecture M. Rueff directed some telling barbs against the whole idea of a planned economy. In short, the volume under review affords some lively, entertaining, but, also, some stimulating and challenging, reading.—E. E. AGGER, Rutgers University.

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